China in Africa: A Close Friend or a Neo Colonialist?

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Ethiopia, Nigeria, Angola and Kenya between 4^th and 11^th May 2014. It was Li’s first visit to Africa, and coincides with the 50th anniversary of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s first visit to Africa in 1964. Li’s visit has been considered as another milestone in China-Africa relations. If Zhou Enlai advocated ‘eight principles for Chinese assistance to foreign countries and five principles for China’s ties with Africa’ back then, Li proposed ‘461 China-Africa Cooperation Framework’ during his speech at the Chinese built swanky African Union (AU) headquarters in Addis Ababa. The digit 4 in the framework stands for adherence to the principles of equal treatment, solidarity and mutual trust, tolerance and development, innovation and cooperation; digit 6 stands for cooperation in the fields of industry, finance, poverty reduction, environmental protection, cultural exchanges, and peace and security; and the digit 1 for perfecting Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that was started in the year 2000. So far five such forums have been held alternatively in China and Africa.  

China is nurturing its relationship with Africa from a futuristic perspective. It is evident from Premier Li’s speech when he underlined that Africa ‘plays an important role in safeguarding world peace and stability’ , ‘is an important force in the democratization of international relations’ , is an important pole of the world politics’ and more importantly ‘Africa is world's fastest growing economic region’ and ‘a new pole of global economic growth.’ Therefore, we see China-Africa relationship changing from a mere political and economic significance towards a deeper comprehensive strategic partnership aimed at future. A resource rich Africa is already having 210 billion dollar trade with China which the Chinese premier said would be doubled by the year 2020. China has heavily invested in Africa’s energy resources, infrastructure development, telecommunications and mining sectors. From the AU headquarters Li also announced that China will build a high-speed rail development center in Africa. During his visit to four African nations China concluded over 60 agreements worth billions of dollars. 

‘Rail-Road Diplomacy’

During his first leg of visit in Ethiopia, Li signed 16 deals including loans and cooperation agreements for the construction of roads and industrial zones. China’s direct foreign investment in Ethiopia last year reached $720 million and investment from Chinese enterprises recently is reported by a Chinese television channel have exceeded $ 1 billion. China is engaged in the development of basic infrastructure that includes building of roads, railways, water and power supply systems, telecommunication etc. projects. Chinese Premier also inaugurated 84.7 kilometer long expressway built by 5000 Chinese workers, the fist in Ethiopia connecting Addis Ababa to the city of Adama in Oromia region. 57% of the project funding came from the EXIM Bank of China as loans. China is also building a light railway project in Addis Ababa, the first in Ethiopia; Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE are building high-speed 4G broadband in the capital city and 3G services throughout Ethiopia. 

During his second leg in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy (510 billion GDP) that in recent times is in news for the abduction of 200 schoolgirls by Nigerian armed group Boko Haram, Li continued the ‘Rail-Road diplomacy.’ China Civil Engineering Group, a subsidiary of China Railway Construction announced that it has signed with Nigeria a railway project worth $ 13.122 billion.  Nigeria has emerged China’s third largest trading partner in Africa with a bilateral trade of $30.65 billion. Nigeria is also China's largest engineering contracting market in Africa; these are in the fields of agriculture, energy, infrastructure, communications, textile, construction materials, and mining industries. China's direct investment in Nigeria reached US$1.79 billion by the end of 2013. In recent years, more than 40 Chinese enterprises have invested $800 million in above mentioned sectors. Early this year, Nigeria approved a $10 billion Chinese investment in oil exploration in the Bida Basin. Chinese and Nigerian enterprises have also teamed up in operating satellite networks with digital television signals covering 84% of the country now. It was revealed by the Chinese commerce minister, Gao Hucheng during the sidelines of Li’s visit that Chinese enterprises have repaired a cumulative length of 4,500 km of railway in Nigeria since 1995, and are currently building modern railways and metropolitan light rails in Nigeria. Chinese telecom companies are helping Nigerian telecommunication operators in a big way and have managed to have mobile phone subscription rate of 91% in 2013, which was less than 1% a decade earlier.  During Li’s visit, bilateral air services agreement was also signed. Li had said in his AU address that the ‘Chinese government proposes to establish joint venture airlines between Chinese companies and Africa and providing civilian aircrafts to develop the regional aviation industry.’ It is interesting to note that Nigeria is the first African country to include Chinese currency, RMB into its foreign exchange reserves. The Chinese premier also attended the 2014 World Economic Forum on Africa in Abuja. 

Angola that fought a civil war for 27 years and returned to normalcy only in 2002 was the third stopover of Li’s African safari. If the western countries shunned Angola's post-war reconstruction, China stepped in and bagged projects in infrastructure, including highways, railways, power plants and harbors. Angola has become China largest oil exporter in Africa and second largest trade partner with a trade volume of $36 billion in 2013. In the same year, China's accumulative investment in Angola had exceeded $8 billion. It is also in Angola that western countries have accused China of ‘neo colonialism’. China seems to have developed its strategy of soft credit lines worth $14.5 billion and execution of projects through Chinese companies and manpower for these credits here only. contracts were guaranteed by oil repayments. The China International Fund (CIF), a private company based in Hong Kong, has been awarded projects such as the construction of 215,500 low income houses, which western press has reported as ‘ghost towns’, an industrial park in Luanda, an international airport, 2,680 kilometers of national railway tracks, and 1,500 kilometers of road network connecting various provinces. It has been reported by the Angolan government that 258,000 Chinese national work in Angola, one-fourth of the total Chinese in Africa.

The last leg of Li’s visit was Kenya, a country riddled by terror attacks. Comparing above mentioned countries China’s trade with Kenya is insignificant at $ 3.27 billion in 2013, of which a whopping $3.22 billion accounted for Chinese export to Kenya, and Chinese imports from Kenya only accounting for $50 million.  China primarily exported electronics, textiles, garments, and high-tech products. It imported tea, coffee, nuts and other agricultural products from Kenya. The infrastructure development projects included standard gauge railway linking the port of Mombasa to the border town of Malaba. Amongst 17 agreements signed with Kenya Li also signed an agreement that extends the Mombasa line to the Burundian capital Bujumbura, passing though Uganda and Rwanda. It is expected that Li's visit would increase China's role in Kenya's socio-economic development, and open a new chapter for closer relations.

‘Neo Colonialist’?

China’s push into Africa, at times clubbed with other Asian countries such as India and Japan, has been compared to West's imperial move in the 18th and 19th centuries by the western critics. Billionaire financier George Soros has pronounced these countries as ‘Africa's new colonialists’ who he said were ‘exploiting the world's poorest continent in the same way as its old European masters.’ It is reported that more than a million Chinese have settled in Africa in a span of ten years. Chinese are believed to be capturing every employment opportunity varying from non-skilled to skilled jobs, not to talk about higher positions in projects. New China towns are coming up all over the continent, be it Dar es Salaam, Luanda, Nairobi or any other city in Africa. China is also been accused of plundering local mineral wealth, forests, oil and gas, as almost 30% of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa is in mining sector. In China Returns to Africa, a collection of essays published by Columbia University Press, the editors Chris Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira have noted that ‘the overarching driver has been the Chinese government’s strategic pursuit of resources and attempts to ensure raw material supplies for growing energy needs within China.’ Others like Andrew Malone wrote in an article in 2008 that ‘Beijing has launched its so-called 'One China In Africa' policy because of crippling pressure on its own natural resources in a country where the population has almost trebled from 500 million to 1.3 billion in 50 years.’ 

The flooding of Chinese people in Africa has created visible tensions in the continent resulting in riots in Zambia, Angola and Congo and kidnappings and killings in other countries. Owing to cultural and language barriers, and also that of tight project deadlines, the Chinese do not use African labor wherever possible. Even if they are employed, the wages are not the same as their Chinese counterparts. It has been reported that oil workers at two China-invested projects in Chad and Niger went on strike in March in protest against unequal pay.

Notwithstanding above criticism emanating primarily from the west, the local governments in Africa and China see the relationship and Chinese investment as a ‘win-win’ partnership. Contrary to International Monetary Fund’s and World Bank’s stringent debt financing to these countries, China’s credit lines have been likened by most African countries.  Besides, China is also engaged in humanitarian projects in Africa. During the 5^th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao listed 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centers for such projects across Africa. Thousands of unutilized hectares of land has been leased to Chinese companies by many African countries for developing agriculture in various African countries, which obviously has been termed as ‘land grab’ by many western countries.

In a Joint Interview to African Press on 1 May 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reiterated ‘China will never pursue a colonialist path like some countries did, or allow colonialism, which belongs to the past, to reappear in Africa.’ Quoting Confucius he said ‘Do not do to others what you do not want others do to you.’ The so-called ‘China's neo-colonialism in Africa’ is a false accusation inconsistent with Chinese tradition and culture, and does not reflect the reality of friendly, equal-footed and mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa. He said, ‘China and African countries are tested brothers and partners committed to common development. In the cooperation with Africa, China has always upheld the principles of equality, mutual benefit, real results, efficiency, sincerity and credibility and never attached any political strings to its assistance to Africa. This has been China's decades-long practice without any deviation. China-Africa cooperation has contributed to Africa's development with a keen focus on social development and people's wellbeing. The aim is to improve Africa's investment environment and its people's lives. Numerous infrastructure projects built with Chinese assistance, including schools, hospitals, stadiums and urban water and power supply systems, have improved the living and working conditions of African people. To lessen Africa's burden, China had altogether canceled RMB20 billion worth of debts owed by African countries by the end of 2013.’ He revealed that in 2013, China-Africa trade reached US$210 billion, 2,000 times that of 1960. China has been Africa's biggest trading partner for five years running. More than 2,500 Chinese companies are operating in Africa, creating over 100,000 jobs for the local communities. In 2013 over 1.4 million Chinese visited Africa generating huge amount of exchange revenue for Africa.

An IMF report has also indicated that China-Africa cooperation has contributed to more than 20% of Africa's development. Therefore the ‘China factor’ is quite evident in Africa’s development. It appears that China is determined to establish itself as a sole player in Africa’s development, especially when most of the western countries have eschewed investing in the poor continent. China, however need to be cautious as the continent is impregnated with civil strife, terrorism and underdevelopment; the scars of colonial suppression are too deep to be healed too soon; any repeat of that path may jeopardize the grand Chinese strategy in Africa that for the present seems to go so well for China as is demonstrated by Premier Li Keqiang’s visit. It certainly is not a low priority area for China as believed by many western critics, the figures in terms of trade and investment may tell a different story but that may not be the same in the times to come!   

印度学者：融入“孟中印缅经济走廊”印度开放还不够

Excerpts from My interview with Zhongxin She of Yunnan on 28 March 2014

中新社新德里3月28日电　(记者　保旭)“相比较中国当前对外开放的力度，印度在沿边开放上力度还不够。”长期研究中国问题的尼赫鲁大学教授狄伯杰28日在印度新德里接受中新社记者采访时如是说。

随着中国对外开放步伐加快，尤其是对南亚地区的开放不断扩大，中国和印度这两个发展中国家的合作越来越受到关注。作为中国向南亚开放前沿的云南省，近年来在推动中印合作中取得许多实质性进展。日前，云南省分别派出高级政府代表团及商务团前往印度交流。

狄伯杰曾在中国留学，是印度最为权威的中国问题专家之一。他告诉记者，中国和印度同为人口大国，也同样是发展中国家，未来将成为全球经济发展的新轴心，因此双方及周边多边合作尤为重要。

狄伯杰称，“在这方面，中国迈出了很大一步，举办中国—南亚商品博览会、K2K经济合作论坛、打造云南作为向南亚开放前沿，特别是中国中央政府提出打造‘孟中印缅经济走廊’，可以看出中国对外开放、寻求海外合作的强烈愿望。”

狄伯杰坦言，虽然大多数印度人希望积极融入“孟中印缅”经济走廊，但由于宏观政策上的不理想，印度对外开放力度还不够。

“这个概念并不新”，狄伯杰说，古代中国的南方丝绸之路就在这个区域形成了一个良好的经济圈，但随着历史的演变逐渐衰落。目前，全球经济重心正向这个区域转移，中国改革开放不断深入，印度、缅甸、孟加拉国也正加快合作步伐，这一个概念的提出又有了新的发展空间。

这四个国家相连，不仅有着经贸往来的悠久历史，也有互补性发展的现状，特别是中印两国的合作更具优势，狄伯杰十分看好孟中印缅的经济合作，“印度在制药、IT产业上有优势，而中国在基础建设、电力、资金上也具很大优势，双方的发展互补性非常强。”

狄伯杰还透露，即将进行的印度大选也可能为印度是否加快融入“孟中印缅”给出答案。另外，印度学者对政府的建言越来越受到重视，而绝大部分学者对印度扩大延边开放，积极融入“孟中印缅”经济走廊持支持的态度。

狄伯杰也相信，随着印度沿边开放力度加大，这个经济圈的建设将会有实质性进展，也将会进一步促进这个区域社会、经济、文化的共同发展。

Does India Have a Dream?

As far as the leadership of a country is concerned, it is vital to have a vision for the future; a vision that holds a very high moral ground and inspires every citizen to participate in the cause of nation building. Both India and China had held that high moral ground during the days of ‘civilization states’ in ancient times, but the same got shattered with the eastward advance of the western imperialism when both were reduced to the status of  colonial and semi-colonial societies, and inflicted on them irreparable damages and injuries through wars of aggression. In the course of struggle to freedom, the national leaders in both the countries right from Sun Yat-sen to Xi Jinping, and from Mahatma Gandhi to Manmohan Singh have been aspiring to rejuvenate respective countries with their versions of dreams. As Xi Jinping’s China Dream narrative gains currency in China and beyond, other emerging economies including India have been trying to construct their own narrative of Indian  dream. So much so during his China visit in October last year when Indian Prime Minister Mr. Singh met the Chinese President Xi Jinping, he told President Xi that the Chinese dream was closely linked with the Indian dream and they fit in with each other. China’s ambassador to India ambassador. Wei Wei resonated similar feeling while writing about Chinese dream in Indian media. Does India really have a dream?

Even if the discourse and narrative of Indian dream has not resonated the same pitch as the Chinese dream has recently, however, the Indian dream comes alive if we glance through pre and post independence history of India. In 1947, as the nation of 400 million people awaited its emergence from the clutches of colonial servitude, everyone cutting across the class, caste and religion aspired for freedom and a hopeful tomorrow. Many of India’s national leaders amidst the freedom struggle foresaw a future for India: an India that would epitomize freedom, peace, prosperity and development. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of Indian nation, and a crusader of non-violence, dreamt of an India ‘free and strong so that she may offer herself a willing and pure sacrifice for the betterment of the world. India’s freedom must revolutionize the world’s outlook upon peace and war.’ This he wrote in Young India in 1925, a weekly magazine published by him. More of Gandhi’s writings and his vision of India were published in a book entitled ‘India of My Dreams’ on 15^th August 1947, the day India attained independence.  Obviously, Gandhi did not wish India to be militarily but spiritually strong as he said, ‘India is less in need of steel weapons, it has fought with divine weapons, it can still do so. Other nations have been votaries of brute force. The terrible war going on in Europe furnishes a forcible illustration of the truth. India can win all by soul force. History supplies numerous instances to prove that brute force is as nothing before soul force.’  A few year later in 1931 he wrote about a classless, untouchability free India, in which everyone have an effective voice, an India in which all communities shall live in perfect harmony, an India where women will enjoy the same rights as men.’ He aspired for India’s rise but emphatically said that ‘I do not want India to rise on the ruin of other nations.’

Jawaharlal Nehru, who became the first Prime Minister of Independent India, reciprocated Gandhi’s views on poverty and inequality. In his ‘India’s tryst with destiny’ speech on 15^th August 1947, he said ‘the service of India means the service of the millions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.’ Reminding people of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru said that the ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been to wipe every tear from every eye….And so we have to labor and to work, and work hard, to give reality to our dreams. Those dreams are for India, but they are also for the world, for all the nations and peoples are too closely knit together today....’

In the same vein other Indian leaders such as Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi wished to make India self reliant and poverty free. The ‘president of the people’ and ‘missile man of India’, A P J Abdul Kalam wrote a book entitled India:2020 and vociferously advocated  an action plan to develop India into a strong nation by the year 2020. He perceived India as a knowledge superpower and developed nation, and a future superpower.  In the run up for 2014 parliamentary elections the leaders of various political parties have been talking on the same lines, albeit the under different circumstances.

The main premise behind such a dream has been that India has been a civilizational state with a brilliant past notwithstanding the foreign aggression right from Alexander to the British. India has a strong foundation built with traditions and culture, science and technology.  India’s contribution to the world civilization in the fields of mathematics by discovering zero, its system of ‘Ayurveda’ (Indian medicine), Yoga, Dhyana, international universities like Nalanda that were founded hundreds of years before any university in the western world, great strides in astronomy, philosophy, literature, music and dance are often cited as the examples of its past glory. It is perhaps the supremacy of ancient India that made Mahatma Gandhi to declare that India can ‘win all by soul force’ rather than the brute force. Secondly, in terms of human resources India is strategically poised to reap the demographic dividend. According to 2011 Census, India’s working age population (15-64 years) is now 63.4% of the total.  India’s labor force is expected to be around 526 million in 2011 and 653 million in 2031. According to the Indian Labor Report, 300 million youth would enter the labor force by 2025, and 25% of the world's workers in the next three years would be Indians. If harnessed reasonably it is believed that Indian economy will grow at a faster rate. Thirdly, India holds a great economic promise, for its market is huge with a huge middle class. Some of the sectors that are worth trillions of dollars are information technology, infrastructure, telecom, retail, and health care. Investment and turnaround of these sectors could catapult India to third largest economy in a short span of time.  Fourthly, it is believed that India has soft power in abundance.  Fifthly, India is committed to democratic institutions, robust financial institutions and the rule of law. Finally, with strides in space research and missile technology, its military capabilities are on the rise. However, there are also various constraints that may jeopardize the Indian dream. 

Notwithstanding these promising positives of an Indian dream, yet there are various inherent constraints that may jeopardize the dream of India becoming a prosperous and developed society. First and foremost, unlike India’s ‘missile man’ president Kalam who had envisioned India as a developed nation by 2020, there is a lack of strategic culture or thinking in India. Many in India  agree with George Tanham’s thinking that ‘India is an extraordinarily complex and diverse society, and Indian elites show little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about national strategy’ albeit India’s top diplomat Shiv Shankar Menon may not agree with such a narrative. Disagreement apart, it is true that various policies between different government departments are often incoherent and the vision very narrow and short.  The sheer absence of a strategic culture and incoherency has undermined India’s civilian and military effectiveness in various ways. The costs in terms of procurement from abroad as well as equipment developed indigenously have increased many folds. For example, the cost of developing Arjun, a main battle tank in India has exceeded the original cost by 20 times, and the procurement of Gorchakov, the aircraft career exceeded by three times of the original cost; same is applicable to various infrastructural projects going on the country.

As far as demographic dividend is concerned, it would be determined by the universality of education amongst the young people. The overall quality of secondary and higher education in India is well below global standards. The kind of capacities that are required for such a ‘dividend’ are missing; for example the much talked Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) produces a tiny number of graduates and many of them finds their ways to the US and other developed countries upon graduation. China has offered special facilities and packages to attract such oversee Chinese experts and many have found their ways to Chinese universities and research institutes. Other infrastructural problems in educational sector that has cropped up as a result of inadequate spending and poor planning will stifle the chances of any ‘dividend’ we are looking at.

Thirdly, the highly stratified society in terms of religion, languages, caste and class is taking a heavy toll of the overall development in the country. Rather than devising strategies to do away with some of these social ills, the government has been unfolding populist policies in terms of freebies and reservation to certain sections of the society that has bred exclusion and ineffectiveness in various domains.  The leadership, especially in an era of coalition politics in India has little time for long-term goals of national development; the government is busy appeasing the coalition partners, and saving the collapse at any cost that has bred serious corruption on the on hand and political instability on the other.  The ‘license raj’ coupled by unfavorable investment climate has given rise to economic uncertainty, and the once bright prospects of a vibrant economic development seems gloomy. This is discernible from the second term of the UPA government when government was riddled by various scams such as ‘commonwealth Games scam’, ‘Adarsh Housing Society scam’, 2G Spectrum scam’, Coal   Block Distribution Scam’ etc. to name a few.

 

However, irrespective of structural weaknesses, widespread corruption, poor leadership, extreme social divisions, religious extremism and internal security threats, the Indian dream that was aspired by the Indian leadership pre and post independent India has the potential   to be realized, provided certain concerns are addressed. First, continue to achieve the faster economic growth rate, so that the momentum of the rise could be sustained and necessary capital created for allaying various developmental challenges.  Secondly, India need to diversify its access to international energy sources which is extremely important for avoiding domestic socio-political troubles. As it has been seen, arresting inflation has got precedence over various other issues of economic and strategic concerns as the price rise has brought down many governments in India. This would also be crucial for the political stability.  Thirdly, the Indian leadership need to think in long-term planning, I cannot find any parallel to China’s long term developmental vision right from ‘self-strengthening Movement’ of the 1860s  (33 years long) to the ‘three step strategy’ of the late 1980s (67 year long plan) in India. Fourthly, spend more on education and health if India wants to reap ‘demographic dividend.’ Fifthly, India need to expand the depth and breadth of its domestic defense industry, for great-defense capabilities are not built and sustained on foreign procurements. It needs to throw open its defense sector for private investment and foreign collaboration. DRDO may have some feathers in its cap but better could be done. Sixthly, it must create a peaceful neighborhood and avoid confrontation. The best bet would ‘soft balancing’ between various players including the US in the region. Finally, I strongly believe that Indian dream complements the Chinese dream. As India has huge development potentials in the areas of infrastructure and industrialization and lack capital, China could play a positive role in developing capacities in these areas with the experience of its own development and its 3.82 trillion dollar foreign exchange reserves. China is encouraging its companies to invest in India; it is for India to create a favorable investment climate to these companies rather than looking at these with suspicion. Joint initiatives such as  BCIM and Chinese proposals to revive northern and southern silk routes are extremely positive steps that will not only uplift people’s lives but will build bridges between the nations also, therefore, India must contribute positively to these initiatives.

Henderson Brooks Report on 1962 War: ‘Secrecy’ an Ostrich Act

There is nothing new about the Henderson Brooks- P S Bhagat Report, the only fact that is established by Neville Maxwell by uploading it on his website is that he indeed possessed a copy as was widely believed, for he has vastly quoted from the Report in his book India’s China War published eight years after the 1962 blunder. The Chinese government is also believed to own a copy as is clear from the books written in Chinese on 1962. Therefore, to keep the Report a ‘top secret’ as is the case with other archival documents pertaining to British India and Tibet is indeed an ostrich act.  Declassifying the Report will demonstrate the willingness of the government to learn from our past mistakes, that it is ready to overhaul country’s defence strategies and preparedness as well as incoherent policy decisions between various ministries and departments.  Therefore, the government must declassify it in supreme national interest.

Maxwell has held the prematurely conceived ‘forward policy’ of India as a culprit for the war, where as he has maintained a silence on the changing border lines in the Western Sector, especially the 1960 claim line by China. He had no answer for the same when he visited my department in late 80s. Therefore, in order to understand the matrix of ‘forward policy’ it is imperative to understand the overall border situation prevalent at that point in time.  The situation on the borders had deteriorated drastically in the wake of Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 and had culminated in the Konka and Longju bloody incidents on Western and Eastern Sectors. The Tibetan revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 added fuel to the fire. The opportunity of reaching out a settlement when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India in 1960 was lost as India was not willing to negotiate the undemarcated and undefined border.

In the face of such a hostile coexistence, China built up its defenses and enhanced communication links in the border areas. Apart from building Aksai Chin Road, Shi (1992: 163) tells us that “By May 1960 a road connecting western Tibet with the Indian border was completed. A network of roads connecting Lhasa to Thagla Ridge was also completed and huge quantities of military supplies found their way to the border.” In the Western Sector, beside Aksai Chin Highway, Lanak La was connected to Kongka by roads. After the failure of official level talks, the Chinese opened new posts at Nyagzu and Dambuguru. In 1961 these posts were connected to Khurnak Fort and Kongka La by constructing a road. Another road connected Rudok with Spanggur was also completed. The Chinese also started construction work on three new roads in Ladakh. One from Samzungling along the Galwan river; another from Khurnak Fort to the vicinity of the Sirijap; and the third from Spanggur to Shinzang along the southern bank of Spanggur lake (Manekar 1968: 38, 41).  Nyagzu and Dambuguru were converted into military bases in 1961.

By mid 1960, China established three regimental headquarters, one at Qizil Jilga, another near Lanak La and a third at Rudok. According to Mullik (1971: 313), the then Director of Indian Intelligence, by October 1961 China had established 61 new posts – seven in Ladakh, fourteen opposite the Central Sector, twelve facing Sikkim in the Chumbi Valley, three opposite Bhutan and twenty-five across NEFA border. According to Mullik, seven new roads constructed in the Indian territory were close to the Central Sector border and eight to the border in the Eastern Sector. China was seriously preparing for war; on the other hand India was clueless as regards how to calibrate  its border policy, the response came in the form of ill fated ‘forward policy’.

In order to counter the Chinese incursions, India according to Prasad (1992: 65, emphasis added) prepared an appreciation of the threat posed by the Chinese in September 1959. It deduced that with present state of development it is unlikely that the Chinese can launch a major incursion on any part of the country or create a situation where there is a likelihood of major operations taking place. However, it was also stated that “the intentions of [the Chinese] coming over Himalayas onto our side is apparent.” Based on the assessment of the Chinese strength across the border, the appreciation recommended positioning of troops in various sectors to counter the Chinese threat. The recommendations could not be implemented immediately due to logistic problems; moreover, the Indian leadership also shared the view that China would not resort to a large-scale aggression. It was after the Kongka Pass incident that the Eastern Sector was put under army command and construction of roads given high priority from early 1960 with the establishment of General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF).

The so-called ‘forward policy’ was crystallised in a high level meeting under Prime Minister Nehru on 2 November 1961. The meeting was attended by Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, Foreign Secretary, M. J Desai, Chief of the Army Staff, General P. N. Thapar, Lt. General Kaul, Director Intelligence Bureau, B. N. Mullik, Brigadier Palit and other officials. The government directive  (Maxwell 1970: 221-22; Mullik 1971: 314 emphasis added) that was issued after this meeting envisaged:

a)      So far as Ladakh is concerned, we are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the international border.

b)      As regards UP [Uttar Pradesh, now Uttranchal in Middle Sector] and other northern areas. We should as far as practicable, go forward and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier. Where there are any gaps, they must be covered either by patrolling or by posts.

c)      In view of the numerous operational and administrative difficulties, efforts should be made to position major concentration of forces along our borders in places conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they should be maintained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.  

It could be gleaned from this government directive that in wake of the Chinese advances it was construed that the ‘forward policy’ would prevent the Chinese to occupy more ‘Indian territories.’ This in other words implied that India would violate the status quo on boundary and move into the area it considered belonged to India. However, the notion was formulated on the ill-conceived apprehensions that China would not retaliate. Moreover, most of the forward posts were dependent on air dropped supplies due to poor communication and logistic problems. As recorded by Prasad at al. (1992: 69), the troops were dispersed into small, isolated posts each barely 10-20 [men] strong. The posts acted as “flag posts” merely to show physical presence of the Indian troops. Not getting involved with the Chinese was also ill conceived notion, for according to China’s interpretations of international border India had occupied vast areas of ‘Chinese territory’ and was determined to eject India from these areas as was witnessed in Longju and Kongka Pass incidents.   Prasad (1992: 70-71) quoting official records notes that by the end of September 1962, 36 Indian posts [43 according to China as on 20 October, Shi 1992:155; Yang 1992: 308] were established in Ladakh as against 47 set up by the Chinese in the area. In the Eastern Sector, 34 new posts were established by 20 July 1962. In this process some of the posts established by India actually crossed the McMahon Line; India ignored the line on the ground and followed the watershed principle. According to Chinese interpretation (Yang 1992: 306), India establishing check posts in between already established Chinese posts and sending forward patrols was aimed to cut the supply routes of the Chinese posts and force them to withdraw in a “Napoleonic victory style.”

China reacted sharply to the Indian forward policy, especially in the Western Sector. In a note of 30 November 1961 (White Paper VI: 3-4, 15), China protested Indian attempts “to realise its territorial claims unilaterally and by force” and threatened that if India did not stop its moves in Western Sector, China would be forced to cross the so called “McMahon Line.” In another note on 1 March 1962, China accused India of refusing to hold the negotiations and “continuing its illegal occupation of the so-called McMahon Line in the Eastern Sector,” while demanding that China withdraw from its own territory in the Western Sector. India refuted Chinese charges in a note on 13 March 1962 and expressed that it was not averse to negotiations provided China vacate the Indian territory it occupied since 1957 (White Paper VI: 18). India argued that the status quo of 1957 would be an essential step for the creation of a favourable climate for any negotiations on border by India and China. In another note of 14 May 1962, India urged China “to give serious consideration to the offer made in the Indian Prime Minister’s letter dated 16 November 1959 to Premier Chou [Zhou] Enlai, which inter alia proposed as an interim measure that, in the Ladakh region, the Government of India should withdraw their personnel to the west of the line shown in the 1956 Chinese map, and the Government of China should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary shown in the Indian official maps (White Paper VI: 43).” India also stated that the adoption of this suggestion would lead to the relaxation of tension in this border region and creates the necessary atmosphere for the settlement of the boundary problem by negotiations and discussions. China spurned the Indian proposal and reiterated its earlier position that for China it would mean to evacuate some 33,000 square kilometres of its own territory, while India would have withdrawn from only a few points occupied by it more recently (White Paper VI: 57). China also stated that it was willing to consider the Indian proposal provided India withdraws from Eastern Sector to the south of the line shown in the Chinese maps.

The stream of notes continued between India and China but both parties were reluctant to compromise on their stated positions. On ground, the Chinese increased their troop deployment in all the sectors. By the beginning of September 1962, China had deployed 6 battalions along the northern frontier; in Eastern Sector some 19 battalions were deployed. Six battalions were deployed in Ladakh facing the Middle Sector, besides many battalions were kept ready as reserves (Prasad 1992: 74-75). From July onward, China started directly intimidating Indian posts by surrounding them and opening fire at them. Starting from 10 July 1962, the Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post in Galwan and cut the supply route of this post for several days. This incident was followed by Chinese firing at many other posts including Daulat Beg Oldi camp on 21 July and 4 August 1962. On 8 September 1962 the Chinese troops surrounded Dhola [Chedong] and attempted to blow it up with grenades on 20 September. On 9^th September India 1962 in a high level meeting in the Ministry of Defence presided by Defence Minister, Krishna Menon and attended by Chief of the Army Staff, General P. N. Thapar, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Eastern Command, Lt. General L. P. Sen, Cabinet Secretary S. S. Khera, B. N. Mullik and a few others, it was decided that the Chinese must be evicted from south of the Thag La Ridge immediately and by force if necessary (Prasad 1992: 94-95). The operation was code named “Leghorn.” Orders to this effect were immediately flashed to GOC XXXIII Corps, Lt. General Umrao Singh, Divisional Commander, Major General Niranjan Prasad and others to put the operation in effect. This would mean that the Indian forces in Eastern Sector would go on offensive and India should be prepared for a bigger conflict with China.

According to Lt General B. M Kaul (Kaul 1967: 356), a relative of Nehru who has also been indicted by Henderson writes that when order reached the concerned officers they expressed their inability to carry out the order in face of comparatively adverse build up, limited reinforcement ability in view of the lack of troops and roads, shortage of ration, winter clothes, ammunition, and inadequacy of fire support. The officers squarely put it forth that “the task of clearing the Chinese south of Thag La Ridge was beyond the capability of our troops.” However, irrespective of outmoded equipments, logistic and communication problems, and sheer numerical superiority of the Chinese forces, the Indian government pushed Indian forces to a vulnerable position and announced publicly on 18 September that the Army had been instructed to drive the Chinese out of the Dho La [Chedong according to China] in Thag La area. Going by the Simla Convention map, Dho La stood north of the McMahon Line. The army also discussed this issue in a meeting held at Tezpur, Assam on 13 September 1962. It was raised that the available maps with the Army showed McMahon Line running south of the Thagla Ridge. On 3 October 1962, Lt.General Kaul, who had no combat experience, was made Commander of the IV Corps, a newly raised Corps. The responsibility of evicting the Chinese was transferred to this Corps from the XXXIII Corps and General Umrao Singh was divested of the responsibility for Eastern Sector. With Lt. General Kaul’s adventurism, Indian forces, clad in cotton uniforms in biting cold and frost in the Himalayas with pouch ammunition set off to “evict” the Chinese in the Eastern Sector which had remained generally calm except a few incidents near the McMahon Line.

It could be gleaned from these facts that the collision course was set in a self-destructive move. It was foolish to think that the Chinese would not launch a massive strike in the territory they considered belonged to them.  According to a Chinese account (Shi 1992: 210-11) India shot dead two Chinese soldiers on 20 September 1962 in picket south of the Bridge II on Namka Chu river [called Kejilang river by the Chinese]. This according to China was the first incident of firing by Indian troops in the Eastern Sector, which broke the dead silence of the Namka Chu area.  In another meeting in September Mao, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi deliberated on “Operation Leghorn” and reported a possible date of Indian action as 10 October 1962. Mao was furious and spoke emphatically, ‘we have fought with Chiang [Kai-shek], the Japanese and the American, and have never been cowed down, rather we have defeated them all. If the Indian people want to fight us, of course we are not afraid. We will not compromise; compromise would mean the occupation of an area equal to Fujian province [of China].” Zhou added, “We do not want to fight a war with India, we had all along endeavoured and hoped that we would solve our boundary issue with India in a friendly manner as we have done with Nepal, Burma and Mongolia etc. countries. But Nehru has shut all the doors for such a resolution; the only option left out by him is the war. I think to fight a bit has also its advantages, it could prove an eye opener to some people.” 

In a broadcast to the nation on 22 October, Nehru called on the people to face united “the greatest menace that has come to us since we became independent.” The Chinese assault, said the Prime Minister “…brought us, made us realise, that we were getting out of touch with realities in the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it...” 50 years down the line, it appears that India is still out of touch with the realities in the era of information age; we are still living in the artificial atmosphere of ‘secrecy’ hope it does not take us another blunder to be shocked out of it!

References:

Kaul, B M (1967) The Untold Story, Allied Publishers, Bombay

Manekar, D. R (1968). The Guilty Men of 1962. Tulsishah Enterprises, Bombay

Maxwell, Neville (1970). India’s China War. Jonathan Cape Limited, London.

Mullik, B. N (1971). My Years with Nehru, the Chinese Betrayal. Allied Publishers, New Delhi.

Prasad, S. N ed. (1992). History of the Conflict with China, 1962, (unpublished report). History Division. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi.

Shi, Bo 师博 (1993). 1962：中印大战纪实1962: zhongyin dazhan jishi (1962: Records of Sino-Indian War). Chinese Earth (Zhongguo Dadi) Publishers, Beijing.

White Papers [Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged and agreement signed between the Governments of India and China], White Paper No. II, September-November 1959; No. III, November 1959-March 1960; No. IV, March-November 1960; No. V, November 1960-November 1961; No. VI, November 1961-July 1962; No. VII, July-October 1962; No. VIII, October 1962-January 1963; No. IX, January-July 1963. Government of India Press, New Delhi.

Yang, Gongsu 杨公素(1992). 中国反对外国侵略干涉西藏地方斗争史  zhongguo fandui waiguo qinlue ganshe xizang difang douzhengshi ( History of China’s Struggle and Resistance to the Foreign Invasion and interference in Tibet). China’s Tibetology Publications, Beijing.