Excerpts from my book India and China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict (Manak 2005, Delhi)
The Western Sector forms
the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir State of India and Xinjiang and Tibet
Autonomous Regions of China. The entire boundary in Western Sector according to
India stretches over 1,770 kilometres. It starts from the tri-junction of the
boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan and runs eastward through the Kilik
Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchnai Pass, Parpik Pass and the Khunjerab Pass. From
Khunjerab Pass the boundary lies along a spur down to the north-western bend of
the Shaksgam or Muztagh river, which it crosses at that point and ascends the
crest line of the Aghil mountains. It then runs along the crest of the Aghil
watershed through the Aghil Pass, the Marpo Pass and then to the Karakoram
Pass.
From the Karakoram Pass, the boundary lies along the watershed between
the Shyok and the Yarkand, and runs through the Qara Tagh Pass to cross the
eastern bend of the Qara Qash river and to ascend the main Kun Lun mountains.
Thereafter the boundary runs along the main crest of the Kun Lun Mountains and
then descends in a southwesterly direction down to Lanak Pass. South of the
Lanak Pass, the boundary passes through the Kone Pass and Kepsang Pass, which
lie along the watershed between the Chang Chenmo and Chumesang in India and the
streams flowing into the Dyap Tso in Tibet. Thereafter, the boundary runs along
the southern bank of the Chumesang and the eastern bank of the Chang-lung
Lungpa, skirts the western extremity of the eastern half of the Pangong Lake
and follows the northern and eastern watershed of the Indus River through Chang
Pass upto the Jara Pass. A little south
of Jara Pass it turns south-westward, crosses the Indus about five miles
southeast of Demchok, and following the watershed between the Hanle river and
the tributaries of the Sutlej river, it passes through the Charding Pass, the
Imis Pass and the Kyungzing Pass. Thereafter it turns westward and crosses the
Pare river about five miles south of Chumar to reach Gya Peak (Officials
Report 1961: 1-2).
According to the Chinese, the Western Sector is divided into two
portions, with Kongka Pass as the dividing point. The portion north of Kongka
Pass is the boundary between Xinjiang and Ladakh, and the portion south of it
is that between Tibet and Ladakh. The portion between Xinjiang and Ladakh runs
along the Karakoram Mountain Range, following broadly the watershed between
Tarim and Indus river systems. From Karakoram Pass the boundary runs eastward
along the mountain ridge to a point east of 78 degrees East Longitude, turns
south-eastward along the high ridge of the Karakoram Mountains on the east bank
of the Shyok river and northern bank of the Kugrang Tsangpo river down to
Kongka Pass. The portion between Tibet and Ladakh runs along the ridge, passing
through the Ane Pass, cuts across the western half of Pangong Tso, skirts the
western side of the Spanggur Tso upto Mount Sajum, crosses the Shangatsangpu
(Indus) river at 33 degree North Latitude, runs along the watershed east of the
Keyul Lungpa river and south of the Hanle river upto Mount Shinowu and then
runs westward to reach the tri-junction of China’s Ari District [in Tibet] and
India’s Punjab [Himachal] and Ladakh.
Due to diverging approaches to boundary in this sector, somewhat 24,000
square kilometres of territory is claimed by both India and China (Lamb 1964:
7). According to Lamb it is hard to give precise figures for the area because
the extent of Chinese claims seems to increase slightly from time to time. The
Chinese (Zhao 2000: 141) however points to 33,500 square kilometres as disputed
territory. The first issue of discord is
the Aksai Chin, situated in northwest of Kashmir, and the second being the
Ladakh-Tibet boundary from Chang Chenmo valley to the region of Spiti where
Himachal Pradesh has a common border with Tibet. According to Zhao (2000: 141),
Aksai Chin has a total area of 27,200 square Kilometres and has historically been
under the jurisdiction of Khotan region of Xinjiang. According to her, Claude
MacDonald, the British Minister at Beijing proposed border negotiations with
the Chinese government. The British proposal included the entire Aksai Chin in
British India; the Chinese government however ignored the British proposal.
Following this the British marked this proposed line as “not defined” on their
maps, as a result some 33,300 square kilometres of Chinese territory was shown
in the Indian maps.[1]
Wang (1998: 158) on the other hand asserts that in “recent hundred or two
hundred years the Chinese maps are consistent as regards the boundary alignment
in this sector,” and has “all along exercised jurisdiction” in accordance with
the boundary marked on the Chinese maps, which according to him runs through
Karakoram Mountain Pass and enter south along the Karakoram watershed upto
Kongka Pass, from Kongka Pass it runs southward and reaches near Pare river. On
the contrary, the maps published by Britain and India in recent one hundred
year are “full of confusion and contradiction” in Wang’s view. Wang may be
right when he argues that the Chinese maps were consistent, however, to assert
that the Chinese maps showed the right alignment of western sector is
misleading, for Chinese maps made it clear that Xinjiang was never conceived as
extending south of the Kun Lun range and that Ladakh never was a part of China
(Eekelen 1964: 150). Citing Chinese maps Rao (1968: 32-33) argues that works
like Xiyu Tuzhi (Geographical works of Western Region [Xinjiang]) of
1762 and Xinjiang Zhilue (Xinjiang Annals) of 1821 compiled during the
reign of Qianlong and Daoguang shows specifically that Nanshan [southern
mountains] or Kunlun Mountains formed the southern boundary of Xinjiang all
along the Chinese history. Had it been the case as argued by Wang, why did not
China produced a single “consistent map” during the meetings of the Chinese and
Indian officials in 1960 in support of their alignment? Moreover, the Chinese
version of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question published by the Foreign
Language Press also does not produce a single Chinese map in the support of
their case; on the contrary the Chinese have heavily relied on the maps
published by the British India and the government of India for their
territorial claims. Not only this, even the official Chinese maps of 1893, 1917
and 1919 showed the boundary exactly as depicted in official Indian maps of
today (Prasad 1992: 2). Like the Chinese Neville Maxwell has all along formed
his argument on the British and Indian maps while turning a blind eye to the
Chinese map alignments in his account of the 1962 war.
[1] Zhao’s has wrongly interpreted MacDonald’s proposals to the Chinese
government; in fact the proposals would have divided Aksai Chin between India
and China. For various boundary alignments during British India in western
sector, see section 2.2 of Chapter I.
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