Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) stalemate with China: What history says about the Western Sector?

These are excerpts from my book India and China 1904-2004: A century of Peace and Conflict (2005 Manak Delhi)

Kashmir was the creation of Gulab Singh, a feudatory of Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Gulab Singh conquered Kashmir for Sikhs in 1819-20. For his achievements in Kashmir, the Sikhs made him ruler of the Jammu State.  Gulab Singh deserted his Sikh masters in favour of the British during the First Anglo-Sikh War (1846). The British in turn accepted him the ruler of erstwhile Sikh possessions. Since 1846, Kashmir had its allegiance to the British.

During 1860s Muslims revolted against the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan (present Xinjiang that borders Kashmir, hereafter Xinjiang). By 1867 Yakub Beg brought most of Xinjiang under his control. The British and the Russians hurriedly recognised his rule and concluded treaties with him.  Taking this opportunity, Ranbir Singh, the ruler of Kashmir established a garrison at Shahidulla, north of Sugat Pass in Kunlun mountain range; however, the garrison had to be withdrawn to the south of Karakoram when in 1866 Yakub Beg unified eastern Xinjiang by capturing Khotan. Yakub Beg was finally defeated by the Chinese expeditionary forces in 1876 and Eastern Turkistan converted into a province for the first time in 1881.

In 1885, the British sensing the Russian advances sent Colonel Lockhart to Hunza[1], a tributary state of China on a reconnaissance mission. In 1888 Algernon Durand was sent to Hunza and reported the Russian presence there. Since then the British started to strengthen its northern frontiers, British Political Agency in Gilgit was reopened in 1889. The British though wanted to take up the issue of Aksai Chin with the Chinese but stalled it due to Russian threats.  In 1899 considering the importance of Hunza due to Russian threats, the British were willing to cede Aksai Chin and Qara Qash basin to the Chinese in exchange of Chinese recognition of Hunza and made an offer to the Chinese in March 1899 (Officials Report 1961: 63). The Chinese did not even bother to reply to the British. Most likely this was due to the domestic intrigues as a couple of months back Ci Xi, the Dowager who literally ruled China from 1861-1908, had staged a coup by putting the emperor under house arrest and had ordered the execution of reformers who had advocated constitutional monarchy and other institutional reforms for China. Secondly, there was no effective Chinese control over this vassal due to the latter’s tiny stature and remoteness from Beijing.

Ladakh

Ladakh on its part was an independent state at first but became a part of the Tibetan empire during the 9^th century. The Chinese considered it their territory during the Yuan dynasty (Lu 1996: 67).  As for India, it became the part of Mughal Empire (1526-1857) in 1664. Between 1681 and 1683 a mixed force of Mongols and Tibetans invaded Ladakh, and by the treaty of 1684 it entered into a tributary relationship with Tibet (Fisher 1961: 39-40). The Chinese however, are reluctant to recognise the existence of this treaty (Officials Report 1961: CR-12-14), they considered Lapchak missions sent by Ladakh to Dalai Lama, as tributary missions and hence Ladakh’s allegiance to China. India denied the political significance of these missions as Tibet was also sending Chaba missions to Ladakh (Officials Report 1961: 59). After the Manchus drove out the Dzungar Mongols[2] out of Tibet during 1718-20 campaigns, Ladakh forged relations with Tibet based on the threats from the Dzungar Mongols of Xinjiang and Muslims of Kashmir.

In 1834, after having taken Kashmir, Gulab Singh dispatched Zorawar Singh with 4,000 troops to conquer Ladakh. Ladakhi king Tshe-pal Nam-gyal did not offer much resistance and concluded a peace treaty. The king promised to pay an indemnity of 50,000 rupees and an annual tribute of 20,000 rupees (Fisher 1961: 47). Between 1841 and 1842, the period when Manchus were fighting first Opium War with the British (1840-1842) Gulab Singh sent Zorawar Singh to conquer western Tibet. They quickly captured Tashigong, Rudok and Taklakot in western Tibet. However, in the winter of 1841 the Tibetan ambushed Dogra forces and killed Zorawar Singh. With the death of Zorawar Singh died the dream of Gulab Singh to expand into Tibet.

THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 1846-1847

 Many British officials travelled through Ladakh-Tibet border during the 19^th century. The travelogues of these travellers have been cited by the Indian officials while contesting their claims in western sector of Sino-Indian border. Indian officials have cited the travels of Desideri, a Jesuit who travelled from Leh to Lhasa in 1715-16. According to him, Tashigong on the Tibetan side was the frontier town between Ladakh and Tibet. Fraser’s 1820 travelogue is also cited whereby he confirms the Ladakh frontier at Demchok and Tibetan at Tashigong (Officials Report 1961: 42-43). Lamb (1964: 62) however, argues that Fraser never visited Demchok; his narratives are based on the information of one Puttee Ram, a native of Bashahar state on the Sutlej. Moorcroft’s travels that have been cited by Lamb (1964: 61-62), however, trace Demchok in Tibet and locates Ladakh-Tibet border between Chushul and place called Punjoor, which Lamb identifies with Spangur. Lamb’s citation of Moorcroft’s assertion is rebuffed by Rao (1968: 25) by arguing that information provided by Moorcroft is of little value for the Ladakh-Tibet border as the farthest point reached by him was Chushul valley. 

After taking Kashmir and Ladakh under its wings, and to ascertain the ancient boundaries between Ladakh and Tibet, Lord Hardinge appointed a boundary commission in 1846. Hardinge addressed a letter to Chinese authorities and requested John Davis, the British Governor of Hong Kong, to approach the Chinese Governor General Ke Ying for the joint demarcation of the Ladakh-Tibet border (Lamb 1964: 65; Officials Report 1961: 43; Wang 1998: 40). The British constituted a border commission in 1846 and deputed Alexander Cunningham and Vanas Agnew as its members. The Chinese reply of January 1847 stated (Lamb 1966: 65; Officials Report 1961: 43) that the borders of these territories have been “sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will be best to adhere to this arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them.” The British deputies left for frontiers and waited for the Chinese but the latter never showed up. Later in 1848 Ke Ying informed Davis that an imperial decree entrusted the Chinese Amban at Lhasa with the management of the affairs but the decree did not reach Lhasa in time (Rao 1968: 27). Nevertheless, Cunningham and his team determined the border alignment of Ladakh and Spiti, which was reinforced by the 1847 boundary commission consisting of Cunningham, Strachey and Thomson. According to the Chinese (Wang 1998: 40), the British unilaterally drew a line from the northern fringes of Pangong Lake to the Spiti River; it showed the Kurnak Fort, a fort inside Tibet on the line. According to Wang, “the line drawn by the 1846-47 British Boundary Commission was never ratified by the Qing dynasty and naturally is also an ineffective and illegal line.” But it is also true that the Qing government never repudiated this alignment and Wang does not cite any evidence in support of his argument.

The main hurdle for the Qing authorities appears to be domestic trouble that must have taken precedence over the frontier question. It could also be argued as Wang (1998:40) has posited, “The Chinese never wanted to negotiate a border settlement from a weak point.” They had already ceded Hong Kong to the British in the Treaty of Tianjin in the wake of First Opium War. Soon after came the world’s bloodiest civil war in the form of Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) that almost toppled the Qing dynasty. Other domestic rebellions such as the Nian (1851-1868), the Moslem rebellions in Yunnan (1855-1873) and Xinjiang (1862-1878) were China’s immediate concern.

THE JOHNSON BOUNDARY

 In 1862, the British Indian Government deputed Johnson to do a geographical survey of the region between Pangong Lake and Kun Lun Mountain range in Ladakh district. Johnson, assisted by Godwin Austin carried a survey from Leh to the Chinese frontier. Though not entitled to cross the Indian frontiers, he went to up to Khotan in Xinjiang at the request of Khotanese King Haji Habibulla Khan. Lamb (1964: 83) posits that the Khan appears to have taken interest in Aksai Chin and to explore possibilities of a more easterly route, for his Kingdom was threatened by the ruler of Kashgaria, Yakub Beg. Therefore he had constructed stone shelters (langars) in Aksai Chin; one on Karakash is called Haji Langar after his name. This does not mean that Aksai Chin formed the part of his territory. Aksai Chin as a matter of fact was no man’s land; Haji’s stone shelters were insignificant in face of Ranbir Singh’s fortification at Shahidulla. As a result of his survey, Johnson included Aksai Chin and Changchenmo inside the territory of Kashmir. Since then Johnson’s boundary had been treated as the boundary of Kashmir in Indian political maps. Indian government’s claim to boundary alignment in western sector follows Johnson’s alignment.

Lamb (1964: 84) ridicules Johnson as a political surveyor and feels that he had lent cartographical support to Kashmir’s forward claims.[3]  Lambs remarks have found an echo in recent Chinese works (Wang 1998: 41). They have cited Johnson’s survey as “adventure travel, which stealthily drew Aksai Chin, Chang Chenmo and large tracts of territory north of Karakoram inside the British Kashmir.” Rao (1968: 37) has chided Lamb by citing an abstract from the official report of Survey of India for 1865 that recommended Johnson’s work in following terms:

“Mr. Johnson’s explorations this season completed a most valuable and important work. Throughout the expedition to Khotan and the adjacent countries, he displayed great energy and perseverance to accomplish what he did; and every credit is due to him for being the first to give any account of these previously unknown regions.”

Rao (1968: 34) also argues that the Indian claim has got nothing to with the Kashmiri claim of Shahidulla. However, it is interesting to note that the Government of Kashmir continued to lay their claim to Shahidulla area and even sought permission from the British to reoccupy it during 1890s but neither the British nor the Chinese showed any interest in this area. To this effect the Indian government during their border talks provided various proofs showing that Chinese did not consider Shahidulla area under their jurisdiction until 1890 (Officials Report 1961: 155). The Chinese cites setting up of a boundary mark in Karakoram Mountain Pass in 1892 as their claim of the border in this area. They could establish a boundary mark was a result of the British inducement, as the British wanted China to occupy the area from Shahidulla to Karakoram pass in order to check the Russian advance and thus create a buffer in between. The British specially sent Younghusband to Yarkand and Kashgar for this purpose in September 1890. Rao (1968:35, emphasis added) quotes from a letter dated 19 October 1890 from the Resident in Kashmir to Foreign Department that said:

“His Excellency (the Viceroy of India) had been led to believe that the Chinese considered their frontier extending only as far as the Kilian Pass, and that the intervening country was unoccupied by any power, or, in other words, was a tract of “no man’s land.” This being an unsatisfactory state of affairs, and one that would afford opportunities for lawless proceedings on the part of the Kanjuits, His Excellency was contemplating extending the Indian frontier to the Kilian Pass, and annex all the country situated between it and the watershed. He had since however, learned that the Chinese were undertaking the protection of the trade route, and if he found this to be really the case, he would be unwilling to extend the frontier beyond the Karakoram Range.”

The Chinese sources acknowledge this “support” for exercising their sovereignty in Pamirs. It is recorded (The Institute of Modern History 1980: 330-31) that in 1891, the British Foreign Office secretly called on the Qing government and handed in a few maps. They proposed to demarcate the China-Afghan border and expressed their desire to confirm Chinese claims in Pamirs. “Younghusband also advocated that in order to check the southern advance of this Russian “glacier” the British government must do its utmost to help the Chinese in securing Pamirs.”  It was after this encouragement to the Chinese that they started showing interest and erected a boundary pillar at the Karakoram pass. The Chinese action was protested against by the Government of Kashmir but the British Indian government due to its strategic requirements vis-à-vis Russians pacified the Kashmir Government and accepted the Chinese action.

JOHN ARDAGH BOUNDARY  

Though the Chinese had erected their boundary pillar at Karakoram pass, by 1893 the sombre reality of a few Sino-Russian clashes that forced the Chinese to abandon Somatosh and other places in the vicinity drove home the British policy makers that China had failed to offer a strategic buffer. This doubt was further confirmed by Chinese defeat in the hands of Japanese during 1894-95 Korean War. Meanwhile, the 1895 Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Commission while securing the Afghan border for British, however, had left the northern Kashmir bordering Xinjiang wide open for Russian threats.

John Ardagh, the Director of British Military Intelligence in 1896, proposed that full use should be made of the northern territorial claims of the Mir of Hunza and the Maharaja of Kashmir. The alignment suggested by Ardagh ran along the Kunlun range, crossed Yarkand River and met at Mushtagh Mountains. In other words, the alignment suggested by Ardagh was roughly similar to Johnson boundary of 1865. 

THE MACARTNEY-MACDONALD LINE 

George Macartney, the British representative in Kashgar when approached by the British Indian Government about his views about border alignment, proposed after consulting the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang that Aksai Chin be divided between British and the Chinese. North of Lokzhung range – the Aksai Chin watershed be controlled by the Chinese and south of Lokzhung range – the Lingzitang plateau be controlled by the British. In March 1899, the British formulated new proposals and were conveyed by Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Beijing, to the Chinese government. The proposals relinquished Hunza’s claim except excluded territories north of the Mushtagh range in turn for what Rao (1968: 53) calls ‘her [China’s] shadowy claim to suzerainty over the state of Kanjut’. Hunza’s claim in Tagdumbash and Raskam were also abandoned and the Macartney alignment of Aksai Chin was accepted.

The Chinese did not reply to these proposals, however, Macartney was told by the Taotai[4] of Kashgar that he had reported in favour of its acceptance (Rao 1968: 58). However, the British changed their mind in following years. McMahon, now Foreign Secretary, proposed upholding the claims of Hunza and subsequently the alignment proposed by Ardagh was accepted. Wang (1998: 44) asserts that the British adhered to the Macartney MacDonald alignment before 1911. According to him, though the British had included Aksai Chin in Chinese territory, they insisted on its inclusion in Tibet rather than Xinjiang. His logic is that in accordance with 1907 Convention, Russia and Britain had committed not to enter Tibet, and therefore if Aksai Chin were included in Tibet Russia would not be able to enter in this area. Wang concludes that the Macartney-MacDonald boundary alignment was the only official alignment that Qing government received from the British; nevertheless, since China never replied to this arrangement officially, the boundary from Bhutan to Nepal awaited demarcation.

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[1] Hunza was a princely state ruled by the Mirs, and had tributary relations with China since 1761. The state was also known as Kanjut. The state bordered Gilgit Agency to the south, China, to the north and Afghanistan to the northwest. 

[2] The Dzungars were a confederation of several Oirat tribes that emerged in the early 17th century, the confederation rose to power in what became known as Dzungaria between the Altai Mountains and the Ili river valley in Xinjiang. Dzungar in Mongolian means left hand; it formed the left wing of the Mongol army.

[3] In 1865 Kashmir government had claimed Aksai Chin as a part of Kashmir

[4] Taot’ai:  the superintendent of a circuit. The name was changed to Xingzhengzhang (head of the executive administration) during the Republic of China.