Professor B. R. Deepak (狄伯杰) was trained in Chinese history and India-China relations at the Peking University and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and University of Edinburgh, UK. He has been the Nehru and Asia Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. Dr. Deepak's latest publications include India and China: Foreign Policy Approaches and Responses (2016) and Confucius Sukti Sangrah (The Analects of Confucius).
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
China’s Rural Land Grabs: Endangering Social Stability
On Wen Jiabao’s Government Work Report 2011
Jasmine Revolution and Social Stability in China
On China's White Paper on National Defense 2010
Dalai Lama’s retirement and Tibet issue
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
China in Nepal: India and China need to work closely on the issues of security
Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary of India during her Nepal visit between January 18 and 20 accessed the halted peace process and discussed bilateral and other issues of common concern with the caretaker Nepalese Prime Minister and other senior government officials including the leader of opposition Maoist Party, Prachanda. She also attempted to pull out the jittery relations from the quagmire, which nose dived in October 2010 in the aftermath of Unified Maoists' Party cadres hurling shoes at the Indian ambassador to Nepal. China is considered as the main weight behind the Maoists, and has been increasing its footprints in Nepal with a feverish pace that has made India increasingly apprehensive of its moves.
Historically, Tibet factor has determined the direction of Nepal-China relationship. Nepal’s expansion in Tibet in 1788 resulted in the 1791-92 war with China, by virtue of which Nepal was reduced to a vassal of China. The 1854-56 war with Tibet resulted in Tibet being forced to pay tribute to Nepal; Nepal also acquired extraterritorial and trading rights in Lhasa. However, Nepal’s southern expansion and subsequent Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816 reduced Nepal into a British protectorate. During the mid 19th century, after capturing power, the Ranas forged good ties with the British, and in the early 20th Century, in recognition of the contribution of Nepal during the World War I, the “Treaty of perpetual peace and friendship,’ was signed in December, 1923 between the two. The treaty was replaced with the ‘India and Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship’ on July 31, 1950. Even though the treaty allows the free movement of people and goods between India and Nepal, it continued to interlock Nepalese economic and security interests with those of India owing to the China factor.
India-Nepal relations throughout the monarchy, except Tribhuvan’s time, have been full of discord and distrust. After Tribhuvan’s death in 1955, the relations further deteriorated and China seized the opportunity to develop ‘special relations’ with Nepal. China accused India of ‘expansionism’ and ‘hegemonism’ and signed peace and friendship treaty with Nepal in 1960, also concluded the border agreement, and commenced the construction of Kathmandu-Tibet highway a year later. China’s another interest in Nepal during this time was to flush out the Tibetan guerrillas who were operating from Mustang Area of Nepal. However, with the resumption of diplomatic ties between India and China during mid 1970s, China probably realised the futility of excessive courting and salvaging Nepal by ferrying goods over Himalayas in the wake of 1989 Indian sanctions on Nepal.
It was perhaps for its international image that China denounced Maoists insurgency in Nepal during the monarchy. However, when Maoists formed the government and Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister, the first country he visited was China during Olympics 2008. This was also the time when China’s assertiveness in the region and beyond had started to take shape. The sheer political capital of the Maoists, and the anti-China Tibetan protests in March 2008 in various parts of Tibet including Sichuan, once again underscored the importance of Nepal to China. In September 2008, China invited Nepalese Defence Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa as an observer to the military exercise ‘Warrior 2008’; during his meeting with Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie, China announced a military aid package of USD 1.3 million to Nepal. In December 2008, Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotan of the PLA visited Nepal and pledged USD 2.6 million in non-lethal military aid to Nepal. Conversely, in 2007 when India sent non-lethal military assistance to Nepal, it created a furore with the Maoists lodging vigorous protests and accusing New Delhi of trying to sabotage the peace process. Even as Prachanda called for the revision of 1950 Treaty, Nepal accepted the draft of a ‘Peace and Friendship Treaty’ with China in April 2009. Nepal also showed its reluctance to sign the Extradition Treaty proposed by India in 2008, thus ignoring India’s concerns over terrorists having links in Nepal. Besides deepening politico-military ties, dozens of China Study Centres across Nepal has also made India apprehensive of Chinese motives. The reconstruction of the Nepal-China highway by China has also not gone well in our security establishments. General perception in China is that since India denies her a free access into the region, therefore, China sees the construction of these projects in India’s vicinity extremely important channels for trade and communication in South Asia. It is believed that China has invested millions of dollars in Nepal’s hydroelectricity projects.
It is obvious that there is a flurry of diplomatic as well as economic activities between China and Nepal. In 2009 alone, an unprecedented 38 Chinese delegations visited Nepal. With China’s increasing economic muscle, its political, economic and diplomatic assertiveness is also increasing. The general perception in India is that China’s engagement with Nepal and other countries surrounding us has been multi-dimensional and designed to diminish the Indian influence in South Asia. Why China has been able to change the perceptions of the people in the subcontinent favourable to China calls for introspection, and requires corrective and immediate measures, for India cannot afford to take our historical and cultural ties with Nepal and other countries for granted.
China is aware of the fact that it would be impossible to shift the cultural influence of India in Nepal to its favour. Therefore, New Delhi’s approach should be if Nepal wishes to renegotiate the 1950 treaty and delink our national security interests with it, so be it. If it wants close the present open border with India, we should be happy, as we have increasingly declared the border as a ‘hotbed of ISI intrigue.’ Meanwhile, India needs to proactively engage and integrate these nations into our economic development, show magnanimity in various disputes and increase our footprints in various domains. This is the policy India not only needs to initiate with its immediate neighbours but also within the fringes of our own borders.
Given China’s military and other quasi-military projects in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan, it is amply clear that China has consistently followed the strategy of pinning India to the subcontinent, and has used our differences with our neighbours’ to their own advantage with a lethal statecraft. However, the question we must ask ourselves is that do we have the capabilities to undertake the projects the Chinese companies are taking in our vicinity, or is it because of the sloppiness of our government as well as private sector to avail such opportunities in our neighbourhood? As far as China’s infrastructural development projects in our neighbourhood are concerned, these may generate multiplier effects and pave way for trade and commerce for Indian companies as well. However, China also must be careful in inciting anti-India rhetoric in these countries, for this may prove the ‘string of pearls’ thesis of containing India true, and force India to move closer to the United States as well as other countries and regions that are antagonistic to China. Therefore, China needs to work closely with India in the shared neighbourhood on the issues of security, including the maritime security.
South Africa in the BRICs: Shifting global economic power away from the developed countries?
Recently Chinese President Hu Jintao formally invited South African President Jacob Zuma to attend the third BRIC leaders’ summit to be held in China in the first quarter of 2011, thus taking the number of BRIC nation to five (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). South Africa had applied and lobbied to join the BRIC at the G20 meeting of the world's leading economies in Seoul in November this year. The acronym, BRIC was coined by Jim O’Neill an economist with the Goldman Sachs in a paper entitled "The World Needs Better Economic BRICs" published in 2001. The notion signals a shift in the global economic power away from the G7 economies toward the emerging economies. The BRIC thesis holds that China and India will become the hub of world’s manufactured goods and services, while Brazil and Russia will become leading suppliers of raw materials.
At present, the BRIC account for more than 25% the world’s land mass; more than 40% of world population; over 50% of world economic growth; and around 15% of the world economy. The economic indicators are bound to further shift the balance in favor of emerging economies given the astounding growth rate of over 9% in India and China. Now, with South Africa, the world’s 31st-largest economy joining the ranks, the BRIC will wield even more influence in the world economy. Even though, South Africa’s 286 billion $ economy and population of 49 million pales if compared to other BRIC members, especially China and India, however, it is the most advanced economy in Africa; the largest trade partner of China in Africa; and more importantly will provide a gateway to the BRICS into Africa.
South Africa’s entry has definitely given the BRIC a voice in African Continent, and is bound to strengthen the economic base of a multi-polar world on the one hand, and create conditions for the strengthening of global peace and security on the other. The BRIC nations call for the reforms of the world organizations, including the financial institutions and the United Nations, and demand greater role for the emerging economies in these bodies. This is obvious from the BRIC foreign ministerial meeting on May 16, 2008 in Yekaterinburg prior to the first BRIC summit at the same place in 2009. During the meeting, the BRIC nations called for the emerging economies to play more assertive role in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A week prior to the Yekaterinburg summit, Brazil and Russia offered $10 billion each to the IMF and China announced plans to invest a total of $50.1 billion. India on its part has committed to contribute $ 3 billion. This was also approved by the G20 summit held in South Korea in November 2010. The reforms of the world financial institutions are considered as an important step towards a more legitimate, credible and effective bodies that will ensure greater quotas and representation reflecting the new global economic realities.
There are various agreements and frameworks concluded among the BRIC countries such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where India is included in the capacity of an associate member and could become a full member in future as Russia has supported its candidature; the IBSA, which unites Brazil, India, and South Africa in annual dialogues; and more importantly, all BRIC nations including the new entrant are the members of G20. South Africa, India and Brazil will also take up a two-year seat on the United Nations’ Security Council from next year, resulting in all BRIC nations being represented on the council.
Impressive growth trajectory of the BRIC nations, and the currency appreciation especially in India and China has provided a huge opportunity for the investors in BRIC assets; meanwhile, the BRIC countries are also contemplating to buy each other’s bonds and swap currencies so as to reduce the dependence on dollar; and why not when the combined reserves of these countries are around $ 3 trillion and are the biggest holders of the US treasuries.
Regardless of the potentials and opportunities, and the reach through every continent, the BRIC countries will face enormous challenges as they do not have a common agenda. Added to this, they are not an economic block like the European Union or a political alliance like the NATO, albeit capable of converting their economic prowess into a greater geopolitical clout; all have diverging interests, and at times conflicting.
First of all, the mammoth economic growth of the BRIC counties is dependent on the manufacturing based on raw materials such as iron ore, copper, aluminum, fossil fuel and natural gas; technological breakthrough in renewable energy could shift the balance again in favor of G 7, and could result in slower economic growth than anticipated. Secondly, the so-called currency manipulation by some BRIC countries has ‘harmed’ the manufacturing in some countries, as admitted by the Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega recently. Thirdly, there is an asymmetric relationship between the polities and economies of the BRIC nations. For example, the economy of China is bigger than the rest 4 and holds over $2.45 trillion of reserves, over 30% of the world reserves; its political clout is also bigger, as it holds the veto power in the UNSC besides being talked as G2 partner with the US. Fourthly, the political equations between India, China and Russia are impregnated with ‘mutual mistrust’ and huge ‘security deficit’, especially between India and China on the issue of border, and China’s entente with its ‘all weather friend’ Pakistan. Fourthly, some other regional flashpoints weather in the South China Sea or in the subcontinent could make the cooperation between major BRIC countries irrelevant. And, finally the domestic issues, especially the increasing social imbalance in the BRIC nations could also pose serious challenges to the internal security and economic development in these countries.
Nevertheless, the South African entry into the folds of BRIC is a welcome move, and could open this ‘alliance’ to other emerging economies. Some of the aspirants in Asia could be Vietnam, and China may be keen to put Saudi Arabia on board. We can hope that the BRIC becomes an example for all emerging economies, promote economic cooperation, ease tensions by settling bilateral disputes, and guarantee prosperity, peace and security not only in the region but also in the world at large.