Nirupama Rao, the Foreign Secretary of India during her Nepal visit between January 18 and 20 accessed the halted peace process and discussed bilateral and other issues of common concern with the caretaker Nepalese Prime Minister and other senior government officials including the leader of opposition Maoist Party, Prachanda. She also attempted to pull out the jittery relations from the quagmire, which nose dived in October 2010 in the aftermath of Unified Maoists' Party cadres hurling shoes at the Indian ambassador to Nepal. China is considered as the main weight behind the Maoists, and has been increasing its footprints in Nepal with a feverish pace that has made India increasingly apprehensive of its moves.
Historically, Tibet factor has determined the direction of Nepal-China relationship. Nepal’s expansion in Tibet in 1788 resulted in the 1791-92 war with China, by virtue of which Nepal was reduced to a vassal of China. The 1854-56 war with Tibet resulted in Tibet being forced to pay tribute to Nepal; Nepal also acquired extraterritorial and trading rights in Lhasa. However, Nepal’s southern expansion and subsequent Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816 reduced Nepal into a British protectorate. During the mid 19th century, after capturing power, the Ranas forged good ties with the British, and in the early 20th Century, in recognition of the contribution of Nepal during the World War I, the “Treaty of perpetual peace and friendship,’ was signed in December, 1923 between the two. The treaty was replaced with the ‘India and Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship’ on July 31, 1950. Even though the treaty allows the free movement of people and goods between India and Nepal, it continued to interlock Nepalese economic and security interests with those of India owing to the China factor.
India-Nepal relations throughout the monarchy, except Tribhuvan’s time, have been full of discord and distrust. After Tribhuvan’s death in 1955, the relations further deteriorated and China seized the opportunity to develop ‘special relations’ with Nepal. China accused India of ‘expansionism’ and ‘hegemonism’ and signed peace and friendship treaty with Nepal in 1960, also concluded the border agreement, and commenced the construction of Kathmandu-Tibet highway a year later. China’s another interest in Nepal during this time was to flush out the Tibetan guerrillas who were operating from Mustang Area of Nepal. However, with the resumption of diplomatic ties between India and China during mid 1970s, China probably realised the futility of excessive courting and salvaging Nepal by ferrying goods over Himalayas in the wake of 1989 Indian sanctions on Nepal.
It was perhaps for its international image that China denounced Maoists insurgency in Nepal during the monarchy. However, when Maoists formed the government and Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister, the first country he visited was China during Olympics 2008. This was also the time when China’s assertiveness in the region and beyond had started to take shape. The sheer political capital of the Maoists, and the anti-China Tibetan protests in March 2008 in various parts of Tibet including Sichuan, once again underscored the importance of Nepal to China. In September 2008, China invited Nepalese Defence Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa as an observer to the military exercise ‘Warrior 2008’; during his meeting with Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie, China announced a military aid package of USD 1.3 million to Nepal. In December 2008, Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotan of the PLA visited Nepal and pledged USD 2.6 million in non-lethal military aid to Nepal. Conversely, in 2007 when India sent non-lethal military assistance to Nepal, it created a furore with the Maoists lodging vigorous protests and accusing New Delhi of trying to sabotage the peace process. Even as Prachanda called for the revision of 1950 Treaty, Nepal accepted the draft of a ‘Peace and Friendship Treaty’ with China in April 2009. Nepal also showed its reluctance to sign the Extradition Treaty proposed by India in 2008, thus ignoring India’s concerns over terrorists having links in Nepal. Besides deepening politico-military ties, dozens of China Study Centres across Nepal has also made India apprehensive of Chinese motives. The reconstruction of the Nepal-China highway by China has also not gone well in our security establishments. General perception in China is that since India denies her a free access into the region, therefore, China sees the construction of these projects in India’s vicinity extremely important channels for trade and communication in South Asia. It is believed that China has invested millions of dollars in Nepal’s hydroelectricity projects.
It is obvious that there is a flurry of diplomatic as well as economic activities between China and Nepal. In 2009 alone, an unprecedented 38 Chinese delegations visited Nepal. With China’s increasing economic muscle, its political, economic and diplomatic assertiveness is also increasing. The general perception in India is that China’s engagement with Nepal and other countries surrounding us has been multi-dimensional and designed to diminish the Indian influence in South Asia. Why China has been able to change the perceptions of the people in the subcontinent favourable to China calls for introspection, and requires corrective and immediate measures, for India cannot afford to take our historical and cultural ties with Nepal and other countries for granted.
China is aware of the fact that it would be impossible to shift the cultural influence of India in Nepal to its favour. Therefore, New Delhi’s approach should be if Nepal wishes to renegotiate the 1950 treaty and delink our national security interests with it, so be it. If it wants close the present open border with India, we should be happy, as we have increasingly declared the border as a ‘hotbed of ISI intrigue.’ Meanwhile, India needs to proactively engage and integrate these nations into our economic development, show magnanimity in various disputes and increase our footprints in various domains. This is the policy India not only needs to initiate with its immediate neighbours but also within the fringes of our own borders.
Given China’s military and other quasi-military projects in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan, it is amply clear that China has consistently followed the strategy of pinning India to the subcontinent, and has used our differences with our neighbours’ to their own advantage with a lethal statecraft. However, the question we must ask ourselves is that do we have the capabilities to undertake the projects the Chinese companies are taking in our vicinity, or is it because of the sloppiness of our government as well as private sector to avail such opportunities in our neighbourhood? As far as China’s infrastructural development projects in our neighbourhood are concerned, these may generate multiplier effects and pave way for trade and commerce for Indian companies as well. However, China also must be careful in inciting anti-India rhetoric in these countries, for this may prove the ‘string of pearls’ thesis of containing India true, and force India to move closer to the United States as well as other countries and regions that are antagonistic to China. Therefore, China needs to work closely with India in the shared neighbourhood on the issues of security, including the maritime security.
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