Thursday, May 2, 2013

Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) stalemate with China: What history says about the Western Sector?



These are excerpts from my book India and China 1904-2004: A century of Peace and Conflict (2005 Manak Delhi)

Kashmir was the creation of Gulab Singh, a feudatory of Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Gulab Singh conquered Kashmir for Sikhs in 1819-20. For his achievements in Kashmir, the Sikhs made him ruler of the Jammu State.  Gulab Singh deserted his Sikh masters in favour of the British during the First Anglo-Sikh War (1846). The British in turn accepted him the ruler of erstwhile Sikh possessions. Since 1846, Kashmir had its allegiance to the British.

During 1860s Muslims revolted against the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan (present Xinjiang that borders Kashmir, hereafter Xinjiang). By 1867 Yakub Beg brought most of Xinjiang under his control. The British and the Russians hurriedly recognised his rule and concluded treaties with him.  Taking this opportunity, Ranbir Singh, the ruler of Kashmir established a garrison at Shahidulla, north of Sugat Pass in Kunlun mountain range; however, the garrison had to be withdrawn to the south of Karakoram when in 1866 Yakub Beg unified eastern Xinjiang by capturing Khotan. Yakub Beg was finally defeated by the Chinese expeditionary forces in 1876 and Eastern Turkistan converted into a province for the first time in 1881.


In 1885, the British sensing the Russian advances sent Colonel Lockhart to Hunza[1], a tributary state of China on a reconnaissance mission. In 1888 Algernon Durand was sent to Hunza and reported the Russian presence there. Since then the British started to strengthen its northern frontiers, British Political Agency in Gilgit was reopened in 1889. The British though wanted to take up the issue of Aksai Chin with the Chinese but stalled it due to Russian threats.  In 1899 considering the importance of Hunza due to Russian threats, the British were willing to cede Aksai Chin and Qara Qash basin to the Chinese in exchange of Chinese recognition of Hunza and made an offer to the Chinese in March 1899 (Officials Report 1961: 63). The Chinese did not even bother to reply to the British. Most likely this was due to the domestic intrigues as a couple of months back Ci Xi, the Dowager who literally ruled China from 1861-1908, had staged a coup by putting the emperor under house arrest and had ordered the execution of reformers who had advocated constitutional monarchy and other institutional reforms for China. Secondly, there was no effective Chinese control over this vassal due to the latter’s tiny stature and remoteness from Beijing.

Ladakh

Ladakh on its part was an independent state at first but became a part of the Tibetan empire during the 9th century. The Chinese considered it their territory during the Yuan dynasty (Lu 1996: 67).  As for India, it became the part of Mughal Empire (1526-1857) in 1664. Between 1681 and 1683 a mixed force of Mongols and Tibetans invaded Ladakh, and by the treaty of 1684 it entered into a tributary relationship with Tibet (Fisher 1961: 39-40). The Chinese however, are reluctant to recognise the existence of this treaty (Officials Report 1961: CR-12-14), they considered Lapchak missions sent by Ladakh to Dalai Lama, as tributary missions and hence Ladakh’s allegiance to China. India denied the political significance of these missions as Tibet was also sending Chaba missions to Ladakh (Officials Report 1961: 59). After the Manchus drove out the Dzungar Mongols[2] out of Tibet during 1718-20 campaigns, Ladakh forged relations with Tibet based on the threats from the Dzungar Mongols of Xinjiang and Muslims of Kashmir.

In 1834, after having taken Kashmir, Gulab Singh dispatched Zorawar Singh with 4,000 troops to conquer Ladakh. Ladakhi king Tshe-pal Nam-gyal did not offer much resistance and concluded a peace treaty. The king promised to pay an indemnity of 50,000 rupees and an annual tribute of 20,000 rupees (Fisher 1961: 47). Between 1841 and 1842, the period when Manchus were fighting first Opium War with the British (1840-1842) Gulab Singh sent Zorawar Singh to conquer western Tibet. They quickly captured Tashigong, Rudok and Taklakot in western Tibet. However, in the winter of 1841 the Tibetan ambushed Dogra forces and killed Zorawar Singh. With the death of Zorawar Singh died the dream of Gulab Singh to expand into Tibet.

THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 1846-1847

 Many British officials travelled through Ladakh-Tibet border during the 19th century. The travelogues of these travellers have been cited by the Indian officials while contesting their claims in western sector of Sino-Indian border. Indian officials have cited the travels of Desideri, a Jesuit who travelled from Leh to Lhasa in 1715-16. According to him, Tashigong on the Tibetan side was the frontier town between Ladakh and Tibet. Fraser’s 1820 travelogue is also cited whereby he confirms the Ladakh frontier at Demchok and Tibetan at Tashigong (Officials Report 1961: 42-43). Lamb (1964: 62) however, argues that Fraser never visited Demchok; his narratives are based on the information of one Puttee Ram, a native of Bashahar state on the Sutlej. Moorcroft’s travels that have been cited by Lamb (1964: 61-62), however, trace Demchok in Tibet and locates Ladakh-Tibet border between Chushul and place called Punjoor, which Lamb identifies with Spangur. Lamb’s citation of Moorcroft’s assertion is rebuffed by Rao (1968: 25) by arguing that information provided by Moorcroft is of little value for the Ladakh-Tibet border as the farthest point reached by him was Chushul valley. 

After taking Kashmir and Ladakh under its wings, and to ascertain the ancient boundaries between Ladakh and Tibet, Lord Hardinge appointed a boundary commission in 1846. Hardinge addressed a letter to Chinese authorities and requested John Davis, the British Governor of Hong Kong, to approach the Chinese Governor General Ke Ying for the joint demarcation of the Ladakh-Tibet border (Lamb 1964: 65; Officials Report 1961: 43; Wang 1998: 40). The British constituted a border commission in 1846 and deputed Alexander Cunningham and Vanas Agnew as its members. The Chinese reply of January 1847 stated (Lamb 1966: 65; Officials Report 1961: 43) that the borders of these territories have been “sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will be best to adhere to this arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them.” The British deputies left for frontiers and waited for the Chinese but the latter never showed up. Later in 1848 Ke Ying informed Davis that an imperial decree entrusted the Chinese Amban at Lhasa with the management of the affairs but the decree did not reach Lhasa in time (Rao 1968: 27). Nevertheless, Cunningham and his team determined the border alignment of Ladakh and Spiti, which was reinforced by the 1847 boundary commission consisting of Cunningham, Strachey and Thomson. According to the Chinese (Wang 1998: 40), the British unilaterally drew a line from the northern fringes of Pangong Lake to the Spiti River; it showed the Kurnak Fort, a fort inside Tibet on the line. According to Wang, “the line drawn by the 1846-47 British Boundary Commission was never ratified by the Qing dynasty and naturally is also an ineffective and illegal line.” But it is also true that the Qing government never repudiated this alignment and Wang does not cite any evidence in support of his argument.

The main hurdle for the Qing authorities appears to be domestic trouble that must have taken precedence over the frontier question. It could also be argued as Wang (1998:40) has posited, “The Chinese never wanted to negotiate a border settlement from a weak point.” They had already ceded Hong Kong to the British in the Treaty of Tianjin in the wake of First Opium War. Soon after came the world’s bloodiest civil war in the form of Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) that almost toppled the Qing dynasty. Other domestic rebellions such as the Nian (1851-1868), the Moslem rebellions in Yunnan (1855-1873) and Xinjiang (1862-1878) were China’s immediate concern.

THE JOHNSON BOUNDARY

 In 1862, the British Indian Government deputed Johnson to do a geographical survey of the region between Pangong Lake and Kun Lun Mountain range in Ladakh district. Johnson, assisted by Godwin Austin carried a survey from Leh to the Chinese frontier. Though not entitled to cross the Indian frontiers, he went to up to Khotan in Xinjiang at the request of Khotanese King Haji Habibulla Khan. Lamb (1964: 83) posits that the Khan appears to have taken interest in Aksai Chin and to explore possibilities of a more easterly route, for his Kingdom was threatened by the ruler of Kashgaria, Yakub Beg. Therefore he had constructed stone shelters (langars) in Aksai Chin; one on Karakash is called Haji Langar after his name. This does not mean that Aksai Chin formed the part of his territory. Aksai Chin as a matter of fact was no man’s land; Haji’s stone shelters were insignificant in face of Ranbir Singh’s fortification at Shahidulla. As a result of his survey, Johnson included Aksai Chin and Changchenmo inside the territory of Kashmir. Since then Johnson’s boundary had been treated as the boundary of Kashmir in Indian political maps. Indian government’s claim to boundary alignment in western sector follows Johnson’s alignment.

Lamb (1964: 84) ridicules Johnson as a political surveyor and feels that he had lent cartographical support to Kashmir’s forward claims.[3]  Lambs remarks have found an echo in recent Chinese works (Wang 1998: 41). They have cited Johnson’s survey as “adventure travel, which stealthily drew Aksai Chin, Chang Chenmo and large tracts of territory north of Karakoram inside the British Kashmir.” Rao (1968: 37) has chided Lamb by citing an abstract from the official report of Survey of India for 1865 that recommended Johnson’s work in following terms:

“Mr. Johnson’s explorations this season completed a most valuable and important work. Throughout the expedition to Khotan and the adjacent countries, he displayed great energy and perseverance to accomplish what he did; and every credit is due to him for being the first to give any account of these previously unknown regions.”

Rao (1968: 34) also argues that the Indian claim has got nothing to with the Kashmiri claim of Shahidulla. However, it is interesting to note that the Government of Kashmir continued to lay their claim to Shahidulla area and even sought permission from the British to reoccupy it during 1890s but neither the British nor the Chinese showed any interest in this area. To this effect the Indian government during their border talks provided various proofs showing that Chinese did not consider Shahidulla area under their jurisdiction until 1890 (Officials Report 1961: 155). The Chinese cites setting up of a boundary mark in Karakoram Mountain Pass in 1892 as their claim of the border in this area. They could establish a boundary mark was a result of the British inducement, as the British wanted China to occupy the area from Shahidulla to Karakoram pass in order to check the Russian advance and thus create a buffer in between. The British specially sent Younghusband to Yarkand and Kashgar for this purpose in September 1890. Rao (1968:35, emphasis added) quotes from a letter dated 19 October 1890 from the Resident in Kashmir to Foreign Department that said:

“His Excellency (the Viceroy of India) had been led to believe that the Chinese considered their frontier extending only as far as the Kilian Pass, and that the intervening country was unoccupied by any power, or, in other words, was a tract of “no man’s land.” This being an unsatisfactory state of affairs, and one that would afford opportunities for lawless proceedings on the part of the Kanjuits, His Excellency was contemplating extending the Indian frontier to the Kilian Pass, and annex all the country situated between it and the watershed. He had since however, learned that the Chinese were undertaking the protection of the trade route, and if he found this to be really the case, he would be unwilling to extend the frontier beyond the Karakoram Range.”

The Chinese sources acknowledge this “support” for exercising their sovereignty in Pamirs. It is recorded (The Institute of Modern History 1980: 330-31) that in 1891, the British Foreign Office secretly called on the Qing government and handed in a few maps. They proposed to demarcate the China-Afghan border and expressed their desire to confirm Chinese claims in Pamirs. “Younghusband also advocated that in order to check the southern advance of this Russian “glacier” the British government must do its utmost to help the Chinese in securing Pamirs.”  It was after this encouragement to the Chinese that they started showing interest and erected a boundary pillar at the Karakoram pass. The Chinese action was protested against by the Government of Kashmir but the British Indian government due to its strategic requirements vis-à-vis Russians pacified the Kashmir Government and accepted the Chinese action.

JOHN ARDAGH BOUNDARY  

Though the Chinese had erected their boundary pillar at Karakoram pass, by 1893 the sombre reality of a few Sino-Russian clashes that forced the Chinese to abandon Somatosh and other places in the vicinity drove home the British policy makers that China had failed to offer a strategic buffer. This doubt was further confirmed by Chinese defeat in the hands of Japanese during 1894-95 Korean War. Meanwhile, the 1895 Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Commission while securing the Afghan border for British, however, had left the northern Kashmir bordering Xinjiang wide open for Russian threats.

John Ardagh, the Director of British Military Intelligence in 1896, proposed that full use should be made of the northern territorial claims of the Mir of Hunza and the Maharaja of Kashmir. The alignment suggested by Ardagh ran along the Kunlun range, crossed Yarkand River and met at Mushtagh Mountains. In other words, the alignment suggested by Ardagh was roughly similar to Johnson boundary of 1865. 

THE MACARTNEY-MACDONALD LINE 


George Macartney, the British representative in Kashgar when approached by the British Indian Government about his views about border alignment, proposed after consulting the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang that Aksai Chin be divided between British and the Chinese. North of Lokzhung range – the Aksai Chin watershed be controlled by the Chinese and south of Lokzhung range – the Lingzitang plateau be controlled by the British. In March 1899, the British formulated new proposals and were conveyed by Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Beijing, to the Chinese government. The proposals relinquished Hunza’s claim except excluded territories north of the Mushtagh range in turn for what Rao (1968: 53) calls ‘her [China’s] shadowy claim to suzerainty over the state of Kanjut’. Hunza’s claim in Tagdumbash and Raskam were also abandoned and the Macartney alignment of Aksai Chin was accepted.

The Chinese did not reply to these proposals, however, Macartney was told by the Taotai[4] of Kashgar that he had reported in favour of its acceptance (Rao 1968: 58). However, the British changed their mind in following years. McMahon, now Foreign Secretary, proposed upholding the claims of Hunza and subsequently the alignment proposed by Ardagh was accepted. Wang (1998: 44) asserts that the British adhered to the Macartney MacDonald alignment before 1911. According to him, though the British had included Aksai Chin in Chinese territory, they insisted on its inclusion in Tibet rather than Xinjiang. His logic is that in accordance with 1907 Convention, Russia and Britain had committed not to enter Tibet, and therefore if Aksai Chin were included in Tibet Russia would not be able to enter in this area. Wang concludes that the Macartney-MacDonald boundary alignment was the only official alignment that Qing government received from the British; nevertheless, since China never replied to this arrangement officially, the boundary from Bhutan to Nepal awaited demarcation.




[1] Hunza was a princely state ruled by the Mirs, and had tributary relations with China since 1761. The state was also known as Kanjut. The state bordered Gilgit Agency to the south, China, to the north and Afghanistan to the northwest. 

[2] The Dzungars were a confederation of several Oirat tribes that emerged in the early 17th century, the confederation rose to power in what became known as Dzungaria between the Altai Mountains and the Ili river valley in Xinjiang. Dzungar in Mongolian means left hand; it formed the left wing of the Mongol army.

[3] In 1865 Kashmir government had claimed Aksai Chin as a part of Kashmir
[4] Taot’ai:  the superintendent of a circuit. The name was changed to Xingzhengzhang (head of the executive administration) during the Republic of China.

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

China silent on incursion but reports escalation of tensions





The reports of at least 40 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops intruding and camping at Debsung Bulge, 30 km south of Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and almost 10 kilometer inside the Indian territory has once again cast the shadow of mutual distrust and security deficit between India and China. It has also vitiated the atmosphere in India and perhaps in China too just before the forthcoming visit of the newly elected Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang to India in May. It appears that we are heading towards the repeat of Hu Jintao’s India visit in 2006.

Chinese media has been silent on the incident of incursion but have frequently reported the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector ‘camp confrontation’ regularly in its media, primarily reporting the coverage of the incident in the Indian print and electronic media. These have been published in military and non military websites such as  http://www.junshiniba.com/qinggan/2013-04-24/4166.html ,http://www.qianzhan.com/indynews/detail/256/130424-888bc4e9.html , http://www.daozhou.net/news/china/20130424/43060.shtml , http://i.ifeng.com/news/guoji/news?aid=58968452&mid=, http://www.daozhou.net/news/china/20130424/43044.shtml including People’s Daily’s tabloid  the Global Times. The Chinese media reports say that the confrontation has flared up with the Indian decision to mobilize an infantry regiment from the nearby region to put pressure on China. Quoting Indian sources, these reports mention that the stand-off has continued even after the second flag meeting between the troops.  These reports have covered the statements of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs that have sought withdrawal of the Chinese troops and call for a status quo in the area. Summoning of the Chinese ambassador in India has also been reported.  The websites have also quoted China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswomen, Hua Chunying making a statement that "the two parties have maintained good communication and coordination on the border issue." Denying the reports of incursion Ms Hua has maintained that the Chinese troops had "patrolled the border line and did not go one step across the Line of Actual Control."

In India it has also been reported that it was not just an intrusion by the PLA border guards, but also the violation of Indian air space, as the intrusion was supported by the PLA Choppers. Ever since the incident has been reported, India has tried to play down the incident and has attempted to resolve it through existing mechanisms even though it has blamed China for increased assertiveness and frequent incursions in recent years. India has asked China to revert back to the pre incursion position and maintain status quo. Indian Defense Minister, Mr. Antony has also expressed that talks are on at various level to find a peaceful solution to the problem. The fact that Indian Foreign Minister, Salman Khurshid putting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit above these incursion, and also that India has dispatched a defense delegation to China to work out the details of forthcoming hand-in-hand military exercises, shows that India is serious in maintaining good neighborly relations with China, and wishes the same from China. However, even though China has called for a calm it has also been reported that China is adamant to pull back, it has rather asked India to dismantle its posts from the disputed territory.   


It is understood that these incursions do occur from both sides owing to different perceptions and positions on the LAC, for the Sino-Indian border has never been demarcated on the ground and both sides hold their own version of the boundary line, and hence the LAC. Between 1993 and 2005 both countries have agreed to a set of confidence building measures (CBMs) along the LAC and have suggested ways and methods to resolve such issues. For example the Article 1 of the 1993 CBMs clearly stipulates that “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the line of actual control between the two sides. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control. In case personnel of one side cross the line of actual control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the line of actual control. When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment.” Article 4 of the same agreement says “In case of contingencies or other problems arising in the areas along the line of actual control, the two sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly consultations between border” Article 5 talks about air intrusion and states that adequate measures should be taken to ensure that “air intrusions across the line of actual control do not take place and shall undertake mutual consultations should intrusions occur.”


Article 1 of the 1996 CBMs in the same vein calls thatno side should engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace. Article 6 and section 4 of the agreement which has also been quoted by the MEA stipulates that “if the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.” Interestingly, Article 9 of the agreement stipulates that “in case a doubtful situation develops in the border region, or in case one of the sides has some questions or doubts regarding the manner in which the other side is observing this Agreement, either side has the right to seek a clarification from the other side. The clarifications sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through diplomatic channels.”

Article 9 of the 2005 agreement between India and China also invokes these two agreements when it states that “Pending an ultimate settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should strictly respect and observe the line of actual control and work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas. The India-China Joint Working Group and the India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group shall continue their work under the Agreements of 7 September 1993 and 29 November 1996, including the clarification of the line of actual control and the implementation of confidence building measures.”

All these agreements clearly stipulate the rules of engagement in the LAC areas clearly. However, it appears that owing to different perceptions these stipulations have not been followed and implemented in right spirit. Especially, in the face of such incursions, one may ask whether the Indian side has invoked Article 9 of the 1996 CBMs previously/presently or not. Whether they have sought any clarification from China when in doubt that China was not observing the agreement? It appears that India has been reactive to such incidents and has not been persistent in its approach. Many in India are also apprehensive about China’s definition of India-China boundary, for it does not consider the western sector as part of the disputed border thus trying to match the so called fait accompli of India in the eastern sector to its own in the western sector. If such is the case, China has deviated from its earlier position about the border whereby it has considered all the three sectors of India-China boundary as disputed. If there is such a shift, it definitely is a cause of concern, and we would see the situation deteriorating and escalating to dangerous proportions.    

The need of the hour is not to flare up the tension, as both India and China cannot afford to not respect the wishes of their people for a better livelihood and an environment that is conducive for economic development and peace.  The media on both sides need to play an increasingly constructive and responsible role, and desist from sensationalizing the issue. The issue must be settled as soon as possible using each and every existing mechanism at various levels. The issue should not be allowed to snowball lest it jeopardize exchanges at all levels including the trade and investment. Finally, it also reminds us of the fragility of our bilateral relations, and urgency to settle the   border once and for all so as a way is paved for an all round and robust relationship. 

Sunday, April 21, 2013

On China's White Paper on National Defense 2013



China on April 16, 2013 issued a White Paper on national defense entitled “The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces.” The document is the eighth in series since the Chinese government issued a White Paper on defense in 1998. The entire text of the document has 15, 271 Chinese characters consisting of five sections namely:  new Situation, new challenges and new missions;  building and development of China's Armed Forces; defending national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; supporting national economic and social development; and safeguarding world peace and regional stability. Besides, there is a preface and some concluding remarks and appendices.

At the outset, the White Paper reiterates China’s resolve to pursue independent foreign policy; need for comprehensive, cooperative and common security; and denounces any form of hegemony and expansionism. It also maintains that the modernization of its defense forces commensurate with China's international standing, security needs and development interests.

The White Paper builds on the existing features of the earlier white papers, and has perfected and enriched the framework and basic contents of the subject matter. For the first time, it has added a theme to the white paper that makes its different from the papers issued during yesteryear. Under the first section, pointing its fingers at the US, it says that there are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism while referring to the US rebalancing its Asia Pacific strategy, and names Japan for making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. It reiterates its military strategy of winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, and the diversification of PLA’s military tasks in the areas such as safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; supporting China’s peaceful development; intensifying military preparedness; formulating the concept of comprehensive security and effectively conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW); deepening security cooperation and fulfilling international obligations; and following the well established international laws.

The second section talks about the strategic administration of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the actual strength of the PLA. It elaborates the composition of China’s armed forces and briefly touches upon its constituents i.e. the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) and the militia. For the first time, it revealed the code numbers of the PLA Army combined corps, as well as the strength of the PLA. It says that the PLA Army mobile operational units include 18 combined corps, plus additional independent combined operational divisions (brigades), and have a total strength of 850,000. The PLA Navy (PLAN) has a total strength of 235,000 officers and men, while the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has a total strength of 398,000. The total defense budget for this year has been pegged at 114 billion US dollars and 123 billion USD has been earmarked for public security. Surprisingly, the white paper remains silent on the number PAPF that performs the functions of paramilitary forces and public security, as well as the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) in charge  China’s strategic weapons and missiles.  China perhaps would like to tell the world that its armed forces are modest in size, that China is transparent about its forces, and that the PLA is much more confident and capable than ever before.

Third section is dedicated to defending national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, which it says includes safeguarding a borderline of 22,000 km and a coastline of more than 18,000 km. China has signed border cooperation agreements with seven neighboring countries, and established mechanisms with 12 countries for border defense talks and meetings. The white paper says that based on different tasks, the PLA assume different levels of readiness (Level III, Level II and Level I), from the lowest degree of alertness to the highest, carries out scenario-based exercises and drills, and is intensifying blue water training of its naval forces. It states that since 2007, the PLAN has conducted training in the distant sea waters of the Western Pacific involving over 90 ships in nearly 20 batches. From April to September 2012, the training vessel Zhenghe completed global-voyage training, paying port calls to 14 countries and regions.

Section four of the White paper deals with PLA’s role in China’s economic and social development. It reveals that since 2011, the PLA and PAPF have contributed more than 15 million work days and over 1.2 million motor vehicles and machines, and have been involved in more than 350 major province-level projects that include building airports, highways, railways and water conservancy facilities. The hydraulic unit of PAPF has undertaken the construction of 115 projects concerning water conservancy, hydropower, railways and gas pipelines in Nuozhadu (Yunnan), Jinping (Sichuan) and Pangduo (Tibet). PAPF’s transportation units have undertaken the construction of 172 projects, including highways in the Tianshan Mountains in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the double-deck viaduct bridge over the Luotang River in Gansu Province and the Galungla Tunnel along the Medog Highway in the Tibet Autonomous Region, with a total length of 3,250 km. As far as conservation is concerned, it says the PLA and PAPF have planted over 14 million trees over the last two years.

The final section talks about China’s contribution towards world peace and regional stability, as it says that China has been actively participating in the UN peace keeping missions since 1990, international disaster relief and humanitarian aid since 2002, has been safeguarding the security of international SLOCs, and carrying out joint military exercises and training with foreign armed forces since 2002.

As far as India is concerned, it figures at four places in all five sections. The reference is made in the context of joint military exercises and training; the defense and security consultations with neighboring countries, and escort schedules and convoy deployment. In final analysis the series of White Papers on defense demonstrates China’s economic as well as military self assurance. It is also an attempt to enhance the level of transparency as regards military spending, its defense policy and goals, and hence to showcase China as a responsible stakeholder in the global system. 


Friday, April 12, 2013

Xi Jinping Favours Common Security, Common Development Lauds China’s Role in Global Economic Growth



During the recently concluded 12th Bo Ao Forum for Asia, considered as ‘China’s Davos’, which was attended by people from political, business and academic affiliations, Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech talked about peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefits. The most remarkable feature of his speech was that China would continue to be a powerful engine for global growth, especially in face of the global economic slowdown. This is significant as over 82% of the delegates were from the corporate world. He also emphasized that China will seek common development. 

Lauding Asia’s contribution towards world economy, of which China remains a crucial component, he said the continent has contributed to over 50% of global growth in recent times, and will continue to play a positive role in the world economy, for it has huge potentials even though the region is impregnated with many difficulties and challenges. He proved his point by saying that during the first decade of this century, trade within Asia has increased from 800 billion US dollars to 3 trillion US dollars, and its trade with other regions has grown from 1.5 trillion US dollars to 4.8 trillion US dollars. 

Above all, Xi advocated inclusive growth between nations and regions and tried to win the confidence of global market players by citing a couple of key indicators as far as China’s prospective contribution to world economy is concerned.  He said that by 2020, China's GDP and per capita incomes for urban and rural residents will double the 2010 figures (4433 USD according to WB), thus complete the task of making China a well off society or moderately prosperous society. This according to Xi will also mark the realization of Chinese dream. Secondly, China’s trade with its neighbors has grown from 100 billion US dollars and more to 1.3 trillion US dollars in the last decade. Thirdly, he said it is projected that in the coming five years, China's import will reach some 10 trillion US dollars. Fourthly, China outbound investment will reach 500 billion US dollars; and fifthly, the number of its outbound tourists may well exceed 400 million people. 

On geopolitical issues, Xi said China will continue to play a constructive role in addressing regional and global hotspot issues. As far as differences and frictions with neighboring and other countries are concerned, it would handle these properly by encouraging dialogue and negotiations in a peaceful manner. In this context, Xi also encouraged regional cooperation and integration in Asia and beyond, and called for win-win cooperation amongst countries for the benefit of the Asian people and the people around the world. In a veiled attack on North Korea’s adventurism, Xi said, “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” He also emphasized the need for a vision of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security.