Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Leadership Transition in China: What it holds for China


China’s leadership transition in the wake of the 18th Party Congress and the “two sessions” concluded in December last and yesterday has been orderly except a few hick ups created by the by the Bo Xilai episode. With this Xi Jinping is at the helm of China’s military, party and state, and Li Keqiang has taken the reins of government affairs. The going would not be as smooth as the transition had been for the new leadership, for the macro as well micro socio-economic and political environments are not as conducive as these were a decade back. A year or two or even more would be invested in consolidating and strengthening leadership positions before making big decisions. The top priority of the leadership would be to focus on the domestic economy, the “three rurals” corruption and other welfare measures as regards the education and health. It would be extremely challenging to further consolidate post reform achievements, and the task of making China a fully well off society by 2020. Let’s examine the major challenges new leadership would face in the coming decade:

1.      High expectations and pressure on economic front
Topmost priority for the new leadership would be to maintain the momentum of the growth so that the social stability is maintained and unemployment rate controlled to manageable levels. Urban registered unemployment rate at the end of 2012 stood at 4.1%. Hu -Wen decade witnessed a strong growth, high employment and stable polity. 

Hu’s tenure witnessed China’s GDP touching to 8.3 trillion USD from a meager 1.20 trillion USD when he assumed the office a decade back, registering an impressive 10% and above growth per year. Not only the financial crisis was effectively dealt with, but it also contributed almost 50% of the world’s economic growth during the slump. Rapid growth catapulted China to second largest economy of the world leaving behind countries like UK, France, Germany and Japan. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 brought in export boom, registering almost 30% annual growth until 2007 capturing more than 10% of the global market. The trend in recent years have shown that the room for further expansion is limited, for the wages have been rising, the Yuan appreciating and China focusing on high end products.  The so called famous “Wenzhou Model” of yesteryears is showing cracks.

Individual income increased rapidly, with urban per capita disposable income reaching 24,565 yuan (3962 USD) and rural per capita net income reaching 7,917 yuan, (1276 USD) up 9.6% and 10.7% respectively in 2012. China thus came out of the ranks of poor nations and gate crashed into the middle income level countries. 

The urbanization has registered fastest ever growth anywhere in the world, by the end of 2012 over 52% Chinese were living in the urban areas. The urbanization opened up real estate sector, and in fact became catalyst in maintaining and sustaining rapid growth; as a result the ghost cities in China also registered an increase.  Despite that, the gap between China’s haves and have-nots has widened as could be seen from the rural urban income. Moreover, it is estimated that 10% of the Chinese own 56% of the wealth in China.

2.      Three “rurals” or sannong issue
Chinese peasantry has been subjected to harshest of taxes and levies by the Central as well as provincial government throughout its history. The taxes levied on peasants by the Central government were 93 types, and those levied by the local governments included some 269. Besides, there were fines and penalties that are not counted for (Chen et. al (2004). The exorbitant taxation, illicit fees, charges, and fines lead to a widespread discontent in rural areas, especially the grain producing provinces.  According to reports there were 180,000 mass incidents in 2010. That’s up from 50,000 in 2002 when Hu Jintao took over. Governing a less harmonious society will be a challenge for China’s new leaders. Though the agricultural tax and levies have been totally abolished since 2006, and there is a massive drop in the petitions, almost 80% according to my research in 2007, however, the mass protests have gone unabated. The most recent one being Shangpu in Guangdong on 5th March 2013 over illicit land sales, it was the day when Wen Jiabao was delivering his Government Work Report, reviving the memories of the Wukan village rebellion of 2011 in the same province. China experiences more than 180,000 “mass incidents” every year – street marches, strikes or violent disturbances. Almost two-thirds of these incidents are related to the seizure of farmland for development.

This year Chinese government has earmarked 1.3799 trillion RMB (225 billion USD) for “three rurals” an increase of 11.4% over the last year. The money would be spent on enhancing agricultural production, subsidies, and promoting rural education and health. I believe, following are the areas where the new leadership would like to focus their energies on:

2.1 Uniform rural-urban property right system
The present property system has many anomalies, for example the urban land is under the state ownership, whereas the land in the rural areas is under the ownership of village collectives. Under the present urbanization drive, when the cities are expanding towards the suburbs, land property right are subject to conflict and contradictions, which is not conducive to the efficient and effective use of land resources as well as labor force mobility. In the light of this, there is an urgent need to implement a compensatory and transferable urban land system. The system would enable peasants to lease and transfer their land for a reasonable compensation through proper channels. 

2.2 Uniform HR and employment system
The present HR system in China violates the basic principles of market economy, which not only has divided the labor market into rural and urban, but also discriminates rural areas on account of a series of preferential treatment enjoyed by the urban areas. The education system also creates rural-urban divide, for the government is responsible only for the employment registration of the city people not the rural, even the migrant laborers are not incorporated into the urban labor employment management system. Even if there have been some attempts to reform the present HR system, the peasants still do not enjoy the rights enjoyed by the urbanites in the fields of employment, education, housing and social guarantees. Therefore, there is a need that the reforms in HR and employment etc. systems are synchronized.   

2.3 Uniform rural-urban education system
At present huge gap exists between the rural and urban education system. Chinese Government’s investment in rural education is far behind the investment in urban areas. The discriminatory policy has had a bearing on the overall quality of the rural residents; as a result the rural labor force has been put in an unfavorable situation in the labor market competition. Especially a lot has to be done as regards the 9 year compulsory education and secondary education in the rural areas. During my field investigations in Anhui, the peasants I interviewed revealed that the secondary education was getting very expensive and there are hardly people going to the high school. They revealed that annual expenditure of sending a child to a high school is between 1,500 and 2000 Yuan, which was about 70 to 80 percent of their annual income. I did not find a single student going to the university during my Anhui investigations. Meanwhile, the peasants favored vocational training at township and towns levels; this they said would enhance their human capital accumulation level and fetch good money in the market. 

2.4 Uniform rural-urban social guarantee system
The social guarantee system in China has not yet covered a large number of rural populations. Social guarantees such as medical insurance, old age pension, housing, minimum subsistence, labor protection etc. guarantees have largely remained confined to the urban areas. Therefore, various kinds of insurance system have to be introduced in the rural areas. Of late there have been attempts to establish a rural cooperative medical insurance system (2.2 trillion yuan ($354 billion) to support the ongoing medical reform that was launched in 2009), but the system as such is imperfect, for it only calls for reimbursement to peasants only for major diseases. Moreover, the central government pool to the rural medical fund is very small per household.  
2.5 Uniform rural-urban taxation and financial system
Almost 80% of the revenues are spent in the urban areas that have only 40% of China’s population. Hitherto, the peasantry was subject to various taxes, levies and pool funds. As regards the rural financial capital, most of it has been diverted to the cities and townships. Under these circumstances, the peasantry in China has been subjected to various burdens but has not enjoyed corresponding benefits and rights.  

2.6 Scale management of land
Scale management could augment the income levels of peasants. However, at present due to the highly fragmented land holding, scale management is not possible. Other factors such as HR and property rights are also hindrance to the scale management. The township government or the collectives could explore the idea of renting land which the relevant household or households do not wish to cultivate to agricultural enterprises or peasant households who are willing to enlarge their production scale. The household which surrenders his land should be given appropriate compensation after carrying out the valuation of land. Qiaoan Township, Tianchang County in Anhui province has adopted such a method and has been quite successful. The township government did a survey of the households who were engaged in nonagricultural sectors or who thought that engaging in agriculture was not a profitable proposition. The survey took account of their yearly inputs and outputs as well as the profit on contracted land. Contracts were signed after negotiation between the respective parties and conditions such as rent, contract period, rights and responsibilities of parties concerned were clearly stipulated. The township rent some or all of the land from these households temporarily or permanently. 
  
According to Lin Yifu, the leading authority on sannong in China, to achieve the goal of building a new socialist countryside, China need to spend about four trillion RMB towards public infrastructure development by 2020, implying that an average annual capital investment of 270 billion RMB. However, in 2005, China’s investment in rural infrastructure construction is only 29.3 billion RMB; in the year 2006, the entire outlay for “sannong” was 44.2 billion RMB. There is a huge gap between an annual projected expenditure of 270 billion RMB and the entire outlay for agriculture. Even if the public infrastructure investment is mobilized from cities, banks and other channels the spending on rural infrastructure is going to be a big problem. 

3.      Dealing with corruption
Government control of major investment projects, and key resources like land, offers multiple opportunities for graft. Out of 176 countries in the world, China ranks 80th in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Nothing to cheer about as India ranks 94 even worse than China. Along with problems like land grabs and environmental degradation, corruption has contributed to an increase in social unrest. It would be the top concern for the new leadership and Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang has pronounced this very categorically in their speeches. 

 It could endanger social stability and the legitimacy of the CPC, for the 1989 Tiananmen protests were triggered by the corruption issue itself.  According to a recent report in February a former vice president of the Shenmu Rural Commercial Bank in the northwestern province of Shaanxi, Ms. Gong Aiai (popularly known as House sister, there are many house brothers and house uncles in China) owned 41 residential and commercial properties in Beijing alone.  Such exploits, however, appear puny next to those of Zhao Haibin, a party official and former public security chief in Lufeng in southern China, who was accused by a local businessman of accumulating at least 192 apartments and other units of real estate (New York times Feb 5 2013). These are still smaller fish in the ocean of corruption. The very top party leaders including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji have been airing their views against the corruption.  Former Premier Zhu Rongji vowed to give his life in the fight against official malfeasance. He pronounced in 1998 shortly after assuming office:  “I’ll have 100 coffins prepared, ninety-nine are for corrupt officials, and the last one is for myself.” However, his son, Zhu Yunlai, became head of one of China’s biggest investment banks shortly after Zhu left office. Jiang Zemin’s son, Jiang Mianheng has stakes in China Netcom Telecommunications Limited, Shanghai Automobile Industry, Shanghai Information Network, and Shanghai Airport Corporation.  Wen Jiabao, China’s departing prime minister, have controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion according to a New York Times October 2012 story. According to public documents compiled by Bloomberg, Xi Jinping’s extended family expanded their business interests to include minerals, real estate and mobile-phone equipment.  Those interests include investments in companies with total assets of $376 million; an 18 percent indirect stake in a rare-earths company with $1.73 billion in assets; and a $20.2 million holding in a publicly traded technology company. Other influential leaders such as Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, Shanghai Mayor Chen Liangyu have all been fired and punished for alleged corruption charges. Zheng Xiaoyu, the director of the State Food and Drug Administration was found guilty of personally approving unproven and unsafe medicines after taking bribes from eight pharmaceutical companies totaling more than 6.49 million and executed in 2007. Lai Changxin, the business man who built a business empire under the nose of influential party chiefs including Xi Jinping the then governor of Fujian, have been sentenced to life after China secured his extradition from Canada in 2011. 

It could be seen that there are “tigers” as well as “flies” in the battle against corruption. Xi Jinping, who became president on last Thursday, has been driving an anti-graft campaign ever since he was made party chief in November. He has told that he would deal with both the “tigers” and “flies” sternly. He has identified fighting corruption as a priority It has been speculated that Xi will put a broad anti-corruption law on its legislative agenda for the coming five years. Other measures could be the declaration of assets by the party officials on the lines of Guangdong experience; Law on whistleblowers, to bring in transparency and rule of law; the publication of family backgrounds even private lives of the leading party members is an inkling in this direction. Finally the crackdown would be another measure, as more than 160,718 people were punished in China for disciplinary violations in 2012 and 7.83 billion yuan (around 1.24 billion US dollars) in economic losses were recovered. Wang Qishan, the new secretary of the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection of the CPC, is going to have a tough time ahead. The Commission is already busy drafting a working plan on punishing and preventing corruption between 2013 and 2017. However, many in China say the problem cannot be rooted out unless the party undertakes fundamental political reforms, such as the development of an independent judiciary and media.

4.      Political reforms?
Wen Jiabao, the outgoing premier has been the strongest votary of political reforms in China in recent times. Wen had joined the student protesters at Tian Anmen with the then Party Secretary, Zhao Zeyang, who was equally sympathetic about the cause of the students, and political reforms being one of their demands. Zhao got booted out for his sympathy, whereas Wen survived. Since then, especially in his last stint as Premier, he did reveal his thinking, on and off about the political reforms in public. Last he spoke about these reforms was in March 2012 when he said during the National People's Congress meeting in a live broadcast on March 14 that "Without the success of political structural reforms, economic structural reforms cannot be carried out in full.” So far his remarks proved to be no more than rhetoric. 

As far as the President designate Xi Jinping’s attitude towards political reforms is concerned, he has been talking a lot about reforms, but what he is indicating so far is his commitment towards economic reforms. His south China visit between December 7-11, 2012 is an indication, and more symbolic in terms of market reforms. And, why not, he represents the Shanghai clique in the Party who has vociferously advocated the deepening of reforms without touching the sensitive political reforms. 

The hue and cry about political reforms in China has been kept alive in its best political tradition by the Peking University, which was at the forefront of these movements, be it the May Fourth New Culture Movement of 1919, or the Tian Anmen demonstrations of 1989 or the recent 8,000-word petition drafted by Peking University Law Professor, Zhang Qianfan, and signed by 70 odd renowned legal experts, political scientists, economists, journalists and writers. Professor Zhang came to limelight last in 2011 when one of his classroom lecture entitled “The Xinhai Revolution and the Chinese constitutional government” went viral on the You Tube and China’s own version of You Tube, the Youku. Zhang took the stock and unleashed scathing attack on China’s present situation, and called for political reform, so as the sufferings of China are done away with. He said, although the reforms and opening up brought China a relative peace for three decades or so, brought China out of the dangers of famine and ‘great revolution’; brought China to the folds of the comity of world civilizations, but the nature of the totalitarian structure of the power has not changed at all.  Prof. Zhang continued, “In a century after the Xinhai Revolution, civil rights have remained constricted as against the unprecedented expansion of the government power. Extortion, unlawful acquisitions, indiscriminate demolitions, and even disregard for human life are rampant.”  Prof. Zhang further says that “today, China seems calm on the surface, but it is sitting on a powder keg. China could draw lessons from the fall of the Manchus, only the swift implementation of constitutional reforms can prevent the tragedy of the revolution. Past hundred years of history and ups and downs demonstrates that only a constitutional government can save China. We must rely on people to get rid of the totalitarianism…”

The petition drafter by Professor Zhang was released on 25 December 2011 and sought milder political reforms in China. This is in contrast to the Charter 2008 when signatories asked for democracy and end to the single-party rule. The architect of the Charter, Liu Xiaobo, a dissident writer ended in prison for inciting subversion, even though the Nobel Committee found him suitable for the Nobel Peace Prize.

It is too early to predict the impact of such petitions in China, however, I believe Xi would require a few years to consolidate his power before initiating drastic changes, we can expect, however, him enhancing intra-party democracy; greater transparency as regards the assets of CPC leaders. Administrative reforms could be another area where we can see Xi initiating some steps. For example The Ministry of Railways will be dissolved, and amalgamated into the ministry of Transport; The National Family Planning Commission will be merged with the Ministry of Health; General Administration of Food and Drug, the newly formed body will have the responsibility of taking over the duties of Food Safety Office of the State Council; the merger of two main media watchdogs - the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television as well as the General Administration of Press and Publication; National Oceanic Administration will come under Ministry of Land and Resources; State Electricity Regulatory Commission will also be dissolved and its responsibilities transferred to the reorganized National Energy Administration. The kind of political reforms dissidents in China and abroad are seeking would be a distant dream as China has categorically said that it will never go down the path of western democracy.   




Tuesday, February 19, 2013

China’s Dams in Tibet-Qinghai Plateau: Unwarranted Indian Anxiety

Of late the Indian electronic and print media has raised a great hue and cry about China building three more dams, namely Dagu, Jiacha and Jiexu in the middle stream of the Brahmaputra River inside Tibet in addition to the earlier reported Zangmu. Our TV anchors and the so called China specialists have given vent to their imaginations, fears and anxieties, which I think are like the man of Qi state in ancient China who was haunted by the fear that the sky might fall and cause destruction to his hearth and home. I think there is a need to do some homework and see how things are poised for India. 

At the outset, India has been a victim of psychological warfare of China, and it continues to be happy playing the same role time and again, demonstrating no confidence in its people, government, systems and even army; from this perspective China has indeed used water as a psychological weapon and scored a point over India. Secondly, we must be sensitive towards China’s water security (at moment it appears difficult as we are insensitive about our own water security) as well as the massive economic growth that is taking place in China; hordes of new cities that are coming up not only in hinterland but also in the far flung areas of southwest and western China; presently almost half of the Chinese population is residing in the cities. Thirdly, even though Huanghe (the Yellow River) has been regarded as the cradle of the Chinese civilization, it is however, the Yangtze where around 80% of the water resources are found in its basin. Almost a similar percentage is used for agricultural purposes in China, as some 500 million tons of food grains are produced to feed 1.4 billion people by the agrarian sector, thus making the water resources the life line of China. However, the water resources are scarce in the north and there are frequent droughts year after year, added to the vows is the alarming desertification that has gobbled up almost 28% of China’s landmass. Fourthly, if people talks of Tibetan water as global commons, then why don’t both India and China sign the 1997 U.N. convention on transnational rivers? Fifthly, the water volumes of our tributaries alone in the Northeast tantamount to the size of 10 Yellow rivers, and we seriously need to tap those sources and provide electricity, the basic human amenity to our citizens living in the dark cities of northeast and rest of India. Finally the real cause of worry for India should be in case China diverts the flow of Brahmaputra River altogether, and I am sure China is wise enough to know what a havoc the diversion would cause to the people as well as ecology in China and the region. The diversion for sure is not going to happen for sure.
Now, let’s examine China’s water security and the damming of river policy: In order to meet this scarcity in the north, China has advocated massive water diversion called as the South-North Water Transfer Project (南水北调工程). The idea has been supposedly put forth by Mao Zedong in 1952 while on an investigation tour of the Yellow River. After years of deliberations and delays, the project commenced in 2002. The main idea is to divert abundant water of Yangtze to Yellow and Hai River, a tributary of Yangtze. In order to realize the project, China has defined three lines of diversion, namely the eastern, central and the Great western line. 

The Eastern Line would use the course of Grand Canal (also known as Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal), a 6th -7th century vintage canal, one of the largest artificial river in the world; the canal has been upgraded in recent times. Water from the Yangtze will be drawn into the canal at Jiangdu where a huge pumping station has already been built during the 1980s; after pumping the water into canal, another canal under Yellow River will take it to the reservoirs near Tianjin. The work commenced in 2002 and was supposed to be completed by 2012. The projected water diversion is estimated at 14.8 billion cubic meters with an investment of 130.0 billion yuan (around 20billion USD). The problems are environmental related, as the water on this line is heavily polluted and require serious processing. Moreover, since the water needs to be pumped at Jiangdu, power consumption would be huge. 

The Central Line envisages diverting 13 billion cubic meter water from Han River to Beijing and Tianjin from Danjiangkou reservoir after elevating its height. This would require 1276 kilometer long canal to Beijing connecting 365 big and small rivers with an estimated investment of 170 billion yuan (around 30 billion USD). The estimated project period is 15 years. Work on the Central Line commenced in 2004. At present the water is primarily coming from reservoirs in Hebei rather than the Han River, as the river has been continuously receding, it is advocated by the experts that it is useless to divert water from Han River. As an alternate plan, another canal from the Three Gorges to Danjiangkou reservoir in Hebei has been initiated, however, since the canal routes through densely populated areas of Hubei, Henan, and Hebei the problems related to migration, water resource management, and operational costs are huge, the progress has been very slow. It has also been stated that the real capacity of the diverted water till it reach Beijing would be only 800 million cubic meters.

The Great Western Line as it is known was conceived in the 1950s but did not make any head start. Of late Guo Kai郭开, a 73 year old a water engineer and chief proponent of the massive Western Line advocates that with one engineering project, China would be able to solve all of its water problems. In fact Guo advocated and drummed support for the “Great Western Line Water Transfer Project” in the 1990s. In 2006 Li Ling drumming up support for the plan wrote a book entitled Tibet Water will Save China 《西藏之水救中国》. The plan envisages diverting the water from Yangtze to Yellow River by way of digging hundreds of kilometers of tunnels and reservoirs across Qinghai Tibetan plateau. The plan calls for constructing a canal intersecting six rivers “五江一河” namely Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra), Nu, Lancang, Jinsha, Yalong, and Dadu (雅鲁藏布江、怒江、澜沧江、金沙江、雅砻江、大渡河). The distance between Yarlung Zangbo and Yellow River would be bridged by a 240 kilometer long tunnel. Guo Kai and his supporters believe that there would be only 25000 people who would need to be rehabilitated; the water diverted would be around 200 billion cubic meter (equaling 4 Yellow rivers) and the investment would be as little as 225 billion yuan. The opponents, however, posits that only 17 billion cubic meter water could be diverted with an investment of 390 billion yuan, and the project completion would require 40 years too huge an investment for little diversion. Moreover, they argue that environmental hazards would be of unimaginable magnitude. 

The Present scenario
Damming Brahmaputra is not new for China, for it has built many dams on its tributaries that numbers around 198. Of these tributaries 130 has a drainage area greater than 100 sq. km and 64 with drainage area more than 1000 sq. km, and 5 more than a drainage area of more than 10,000 sq. km, namely the Lhasa River, Palongzangbu, Nyang Qu, Duoxiongzangbu and Nianchu. Water resources of Brahmaputra are very rich; theoretical potential of hydropower resources amount to 113.5 million kW. The preliminary investigations in China indicate that it is possible to develop hydro potentials of about 47.4 million kW, of which about 46.4 million kW would be on the main river. 

China has proposed to build 13 cascade power stations with a total installed capacity of 46.336 million kW accounting for annual power output of 276.411billion kW.h. As far as the development of cascade power stations is concerned, China has proposed two plans. Plan A is to build Gangke (270,000 kW), Gu Lu (170,00 kW) Qingding (150,000 kW), Bosha (130,000 kW), Pengcuolin (300,000 kW), Jiangdang (50,000 kW), Suolang Gatu (500,000 kW) Qushui (96,0000 kW) Jiacha (1.65million kW), Langxian (1.2million kW), Rixue (420,000 kW), Motuo (38million kW), Jie Riguo in the downstream (3.5 million kW) etc. power stations above Motuo. Plan B is instead of Motuo, build a large dam at Daduka, straighten the river bends, excavate a number of large-diameter tunnels; single-hole single-tunnel would be around 41 km in length. The power station head reaches 2,400 m, and the installed capacity around 43.8 million kW. However, the technical difficulty is too great. Since Yarlung Zangbo is located in the Tibetan plateau, therefore, due to high altitude, thin air, poor project conditions, transportation difficulties, complex engineering and geological conditions, engineering marvels are required. As such very little survey and design work has been done. At present most of the river basin is almost undeveloped except a few small size power plants and irrigation projects in some of its tributaries. 

Prior to 1980 31 small reservoirs were constructed on the Zangbo river that irrigated around 0.7000 sq. hm; built 97 diversion projects that irrigated around 40,200 sq. hm, besides 3755 embankments, irrigation and other works were completed, irrigating around 0.3000 sq. hm of farmland. The total irrigated area by these undertakings reached 50,100 sq. hm, with the water conservation level of 33%. At present, in order to overcome the electricity problem in areas such as Lhasa , Xigaze, Nyingchi etc. cities and regions, a few small power stations have been constructed on Lhasa and Niyangqu etc. tributaries. The main stream of the Yarlung Zangbo remains undeveloped. On the tributaries where power station of more than 1000kW have been built are Nagin, Tanghe, Woka, Xijiao, “606″, and “8.1″ etc. power plants, the rest are below 1000kW capacity. The installed capacity of the Nagin on Lhasa River is 7500kW, which is the largest hydro plant on the Yarlung Zangbo basin. The guarantee levels of these plants in the dry season are very little. During dry season the output of the plants that are more than 1000kW is only 1/3-1/2 of the installed capacity. Those which are below 1000kW are basically seasonal. The installed capacity of hydropower stations that have been built along the entire basin is about 50000 kW, which is only 0.1% of the entire developable capacity of Yarlung Zangbo. 

The Indian Scene and debates
Yarlung Zangbo flows out of China and enters India’s Assam via Sadia. This section of the river is known as Diheng River. In Sadiya it confluences with Dibaing and Lohit and is called as Brahmaputra. Brahmaputra according to China is about 1000km, of which 725 kms is in India and 274 inside Bangladesh. The annual mean annual runoff of its tributaries such as Lohit, Subansiri, Kameng, Manas etc. is 618 billion m3. It could be discerned therefore that the Indian fear is unwarranted. 

Since the introduction of the project, not only the western line, but also the rest two, it has created widespread controversy in China. Those who have supported the projects are people like Guo Kai, Li Ling, many other government officials and the some army officers. Guo Kai seems to have the support of 13 or so high ranking army officials. Some scientists, especially professor He Zuoxiu 何祚庥 a physicist with the Chinese Academy of Sciences is the leading supporter of Great Western Line. Rather than framing his argument on scientific data, Prof He takes refuge in the well known ‘scarce water resources of the north’ paradigm, the desertification, east-west disequilibrium etc. Opponents, however, seems to have the upper hand at moment, and have been supported by the netizens, especially the micro blog community in China. There have been an anonymous article entitled “The Great Western Line Project: Already Gone Mad”《大西线调水工程——已经疯了》that have opposed the project tooth and nail. It has also castigated various viewpoints raised in Li Ling’s book. It posits that The Great Western Line Project is simply a project on paper; and argues that whenever China has tamed the rivers it not only did not have brought any benefits but caused serious problems such as flooding. They argue that to make a 636 – 1205 meter wide canal on the roof of the world and Hengduan Mountain ranges, is easier said than done. 

Indian side on the other hand has been a victim of the psychological warfare of China, and China has definitely scored another point in this front. They have frantically argued that the damming would dry up the Brahmaputra. Some have even argued that China is employing water as a weapon. Allaying the anxieties of many riparian states, Jiao Yong, vice minister at China’s ministry of water resources, told a press conference in Beijing on 12 October 2011 that although there is a demand among Chinese to make greater use of the Brahmaputra but “considering the technical difficulties, the actual need of diversion and the possible impact on the environment and state-to-state relations, the Chinese government has no plan to conduct any diversification project in this river.” India, China and other downstream countries, however, need to initiate steps to institutionalize a mechanism by way of which all the information is shared as regards any natural or human activity on the river so as unwarranted fears are not allowed to jeopardize the bilateral relations.

Tuesday, January 1, 2013

Xi Jinping to promote political reforms in China?



Wen Jiabao, the outgoing premier has been the strongest votary of political reforms in China in recent times. Wen had joined the student protesters at Tian Anmen with the then Party Secretary, Zhao Zeyang, who was equally sympathetic about the cause of the students, and political reforms being one of their demands. Zhao got booted out for his sympathy, whereas Wen survived. Since then, especially in his last stint as Premier, he did reveal his thinking, on and off about the political reforms in public. Last he spoke about these reforms was in March 2012 when he said during the National People's Congress meeting in a live broadcast on March 14 that "Without the success of political structural reforms, economic structural reforms cannot be carried out in full.” So far his remarks proved to be no more than rhetoric.

As far as the President designate Xi Jinping’s attitude towards political reforms is concerned, he has been talking a lot about reforms, but what he is indicating so far is his commitment towards economic reforms. His south China visit between December 7-11 is an indication, and more symbolic in terms of market reforms. And, why not, he represents the Shanghai clique in the Party who has vociferously advocated the deepening of reforms without touching the sensitive political reforms.

The hue and cry about political reforms in China has been kept alive in its best political tradition by the Peking University, which was at the forefront of these movements, be it the May Fourth New Culture Movement of 1919, or the Tian Anmen demonstrations of 1989 or the recent 8,000-word petition drafted by Peking University Law Professor, Zhang Qianfan, and signed by 70 odd renowned legal experts, political scientists, economists, journalists and writers. Professor Zhang came to limelight last in 2011 when one of his classroom lecture entitled “The Xinhai Revolution and the Chinese constitutional government” went viral on the You Tube and China’s own version of You Tube, the Youku. Zhang took the stock and unleashed scathing attack on China’s present situation, and called for political reform, so as the sufferings of China are done away with. He said, although the reforms and opening up brought China a relative peace for three decades or so, brought China out of the dangers of famine and ‘great revolution’; brought China to the folds of the comity of world civilizations, but the nature of the totalitarian structure of the power has not changed at all.  Prof. Zhang continued, in a century after the Xinhai Revolution, civil rights have remained constricted as against the unprecedented expansion of the government power. Extortion, unlawful acquisitions, indiscriminate demolitions, and even disregard for human life are rampant.  Prof. Zhang further says that today, China seems calm on the surface, but it is sitting on a powder keg. China could draw lessons from the fall of the Manchus, only the swift implementation of constitutional reforms can prevent the tragedy of the revolution. Past hundred years of history and ups and downs demonstrates that only a constitutional government can save China. We must rely on people to get rid of the totalitarianism…

The petition drafter by Professor Zhang was released on 25 December 2011 and sought milder political reforms in China. This is in contrast to the Charter 2008 when signatories asked for democracy and end to the single-party rule. The architect of the Charter, Liu Xiaobo, a dissident writer ended in prison for inciting subversion, even though the Nobel Committee found him suitable for the Nobel Peace Prize.

It is too early to predict the impact of such petitions in China, however, I believe Xi would require a few years to consolidate his power before initiating drastic changes, we can expect, however, him enhancing intra-party democracy; greater transparency as regards the assets of CPC leaders; Guangdong has already started to declare assets of leaders and officials; this is also linked to fight against corruption and would be on the agenda of Xi Jinping; this could also be the part of administrative reforms another area where we can see Xi initiating some steps. The kind of political reforms dissidents in China and abroad are seeking would be a distant dream as China has categorically said that it will never go down the path of western democracy.   

Therefore, rather than talking about political reforms, fighting corruption would be on top agenda of the new leadership. In this regards, we see him making various statement. For example last month he told party members to “take the lead to spread a healthy spirit, and reject unhealthy trends and evil influences". Xi Jinping is aware of what the Chinese press says, the undeclared ‘gray’ income of the party leaders and officials. It is precisely due to this that last decade saw outflow of money through corruption, crime, and tax evasion reaching as high as $3.72 trillion in China.

The most we can expect from the new leadership is the investigation of hundred thousands of party leaders and officials for corruption, and cutting or reducing their access to public money spent on banquets, renovations and conveyance etc. The leadership would try to bring in transparency and rule of law; the publication of family backgrounds even private lives of the leading party members is an inkling in this direction. However, it would be extremely difficult for Xi to put a complete check, and be transparent as many of the businesses are in the hands of the kiths and kins of the former party bigwigs. Netizens may also give him a helping hand as have been proved in recent cases of corruption over the micro blogs, but the kind of regulations China is bringing in by forcing the users of popular microblogs to register their real names. Even on this front the going would be not so smooth for Xi Jinping.

Saturday, December 29, 2012

Death of the 16 December Rape Victim is not due to the spread of gangrene and multi-organ failure but due to the gangrenous India and its systems

Just returned from a 6 km long peaceful protest carried out by JNU community - From Ganga Dhaba to the bust stop where The  rape victim boarded the bus, and back to Ganga dhaba. Have the following thoughts about death:

Our society is full of utterly dirty, dreadful gangrenous toxic; the politico-bureaucratic class is the produce of this very toxic; the toxic is deeply entrenched in their minds. Its takes the death of a victim of heinous, horrendous and barbarous crime to talk about this toxic, but nothing happens once the matter dies down. I believe it is not the death of a victim, but the death of free India, if at all India is a free nation; it is not the gangrene that spread to her body, it is the gangrene that is festering in the body of India; it is not the multiple organs failure of the victim, but the multiple organ failure of the Indian system, be it the colonial police, judiciary, bureaucracy, railways and road transport, politics, governance or any other system, it is the failure of these systems where ugly, dirty and gangrenous toxic has alarmingly spread and still festering. I also believe that there is a strata of people in our society across all walks of life who have the conscience and sensitivity as to what needs to be done to this gangrenous toxic; and this is the time to wake up, and kill and remove the gangrenous sections of our systems for once and all, and transplant it with better mechanisms and systems where every citizen men, women, old and young live a dignified life.! Therefore, there is a need for a national campaign and continue the struggle for a better system!

Tuesday, December 25, 2012

From China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’: The rhetoric and more



Published in http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/ paper 5336 December 25, 2012

In the wake of China’s mammoth economic growth that catapulted China as the second largest economy of the world in 2010, and the military expenditure corresponding to its economy, everyone including the Chinese is talking about China’s rise and its emergence as a challenger to the unipolar world. Chinese think tanks and government alike on their part have been looking for their own answers in the best Confucian tradition where the rectification of names is attached great importance.  They came up with the concept of “Peaceful Rise of China” (Zhongguo de heping jueqi 中国的和平崛起) during the 1990s. However, the term became a fad after it was used by Zheng Bijian, the former Vice Principal of the Central Party School in November 2003 during the Boao Forum for Asia, and later by the outgoing Chinese President Hu Jintao in a speech on the occasion of the 110th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong in December 2003. Hu Jintao (2003) had remarked that adherence to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics is adherence to the “developmental road of peaceful rise.” Following this, the term was used by Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting, and a speech at the Harvard University during his visit to the United States. Wen had tried to justify China’s rise and reassure the world when he said (Guo 2004: 2 in preface), “the developmental road China has taken is different from that taken by some major powers, and China’s developmental road is the road of peaceful rise.”

The jargon emphasizes the emergence of China as a “soft power” implying that China’s rise is not a threat to its neighbors and the world as a whole, and that China seeks to avoid conflict. According to Duan Bingren (2004:2-3 preface), the road of peaceful rise is a major innovation of China’s developmental strategic thought. Duan asserts that “the developmental road, China has sought, is a unique road seeking peace and mutual benefits; this not only will harmonize the international order, but will also enable China to uphold its independence, social system and choice of life style. The developmental road of peaceful rise, seeks harmony with others, partnership with China’s neighbors, and friendly coexistence with other countries on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Economically, it seeks integration with the globalization, and naturally seeks China’s new role in global development equations, thus becoming a constructive and responsible player in the international economic activities. Politically, the notion would enable China to actively and constructively participate in the international affairs, be a challenger rather than a moot spectator to the events and aspire for a democratic, peaceful and multi-polar world.” Therefore, the peaceful rise of China is an antidote to “hegemony”, “hot war”, “cold war”, “China threat”, “disintegration of China” etc. theories and notions; it is a promise to the world that the rise of China is peaceful.”  
 
However, the lexicon ran into rough weather as the think tanks in China tried to debate the pros and cons of the term. Many felt that the word “rise” would put its neighbors at unease, while others argued that it is premature to talk about the rise, as China largely remains a developing country. In the backdrop of such a debate, China changed the term ‘rise’ to ‘development’ when it published a white paper entitled “China’s peaceful development” in the beginning of 2006. Nevertheless, the terminology is still being widely used in government as well as academic circles across China.

The debate apart, the crux is whether the “rise” or “development” of China is going to be a smooth sail? If not what could be the dangers or challenges China would face? While contemplating on these questions, Xin Xiangyang (2004:2-3, preface II) posits that China would face four major external challenges: 1) Trade and commerce (challenges from world markets, world energy resources, and trade protectionism); 2) National security (traditional security threat, number of variables in its surrounding security environment, as well as non-traditional security issues); 3) External political challenges (disintegration and westernization of China, the penetration of Non Government Organizations (NGOs) in China, international terrorism and the increasingly large number of international criminal activities); 4) The US containment of China. Besides, Xin also outlines the following four internal challenges: 1) Population; 2) Resources and energy; 3) Environmental degradation; and 4) Social imbalance.

It has been widely speculated by the analysts that the priority of the fifth generation leadership under Xi Jinping would keep a low key profile as far as China’s foreign policy is concerned, and concentrate more on the internal challenges, especially the challenge of social imbalance. The challenge has manifested itself in China in various shapes and forms. Whether it is the question of food security, rural urban divide, peasant’s protests, the issue of rural education or migrant laborers, each and every issue is related to peasants, agriculture and the countryside, and is capable of derailing China rise or peaceful development.  Therefore, economic development, deepening of reforms and opening up is going to remain the top priority of the new leadership. It not only would help China to overcome the social imbalances but also equip it to deal with the external challenges in a better way.

Contrarily, it appears that of late China has shown signs of discarding the time tested strategy of Deng Xaoping as is well explained by his maxim “hide your strength, bide your time.’ Ever since the middle of the first decade of this century, especially the successful convocation of the Olympic Games in 2008, China started to take maximalist positions vis-à-vis conflicts with the neighboring countries, be it the Diaoyu/Senkaku row with Japan in the East China Sea, or with Vietnam, Philippines and other smaller disputing countries in the South China Sea, or its dispute with South Asian neighbors.  As China has started to define South China Sea as an area of core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet, it has taken the disputes to new stages by way of sending unmanned surveillance plane over disputed Diaoyu; standoff with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal; Chinese fishing vessels cutting the cables of Vietnamese Oil & Gas Group seismic ship in Vietnam controlled waters; announcing new rules for the region that authorize its police in the southern province of Hainan to board and seize foreign ships in the South China Sea; raising threats of conflict by establishing Sansha on Yongxing Island in the southernmost province of Hainan; threats to disrupt ONGC Videsh exploration in South China Sea and reiterating China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ in the region; initiating a new passport design containing a map claiming the South China Sea and disputed areas along the Sino-Indian border; and even flexing economic muscle against the smaller neighbors in the region by banning their exports on flimsy grounds.

Besides, since China’s economy has grown with a neck breaking speed all these years, its military spending has also increased manifolds. For example a decade back, it only spend around 20 billion USD on defense, the same has increase around five times in recent years. Last year when the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates met Hu Jintao in Beijing, China showcased its new fighter jet, the J-20 in Chengdu, Sichuan. China has also showcased its own drones that resemble the US Predator and Global Hawk. The US suspects Iran for giving China access to the US drone that was shot down by Iran within its territory. If People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has showcased its new assets, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has also commissioned its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning earlier in September this year. Two months later China landed J-15 on the Liaoning. Analysts believe that the aircraft carrier will allow Beijing to help project its military might in territorial disputes. China has also aggressively furthered its space program. Since 2007, China twice shot down its dysfunctional satellites with anti-satellite missiles thus displaying its capabilities to destroy spy satellites and space-based missile defense system of other countries, especially the US. These gestures from China has not only sent shockwaves to its neighbors, but has also challenged the US power projections. 

It is in this context that the US ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia should be seen. It is also in the light of above that smaller neighbors of China are increasingly looking at the US for countervailing China. Even countries like Philippines and Vietnam that have suffered the aggression from Japanese and the US are willing to forge closer ties with these countries. It is for the very reason that ASEAN countries are taking common and united position on the disputes in South China Sea, but they are equally aware of the fact that even if united it is still impossible to confront China.

Therefore, even if China frantically defends it ‘rise’ or ‘development’ as peaceful, the ‘China threat’ has once again raised its head to the discomfort of every party.  The situation may be changed to better once Xi Jinping takes charge of the party and military, as in recent pronouncements we have seen him showing difference. For example, in his interaction with foreign experts in China on December 5th, he seems to have reiterated the essence of China’s peaceful development. He said China will not seek hegemony or expansionism and continue to open to the outside world. He also pronounced that China’s peaceful development does not seek selfish interests, and benefits by harming others, it seeks mutual benefits. Again between December 7 and 11, 2012 while touring southern China, he reiterated that ‘reforms and opening up is unstoppable.’ I believe this doesn’t prove to be a mere rhetoric as has been the case in recent times. China being a developing country still needs Deng’s wisdom as regards the disputes relating to sovereignty. China has resorted to military means to solve its disputes or exerts sovereignty several times, if that happens again, the long-term goals of China, especially attaining the level of a moderately developed country by the middle of this century would be seriously subverted, and the fruits of being a beneficiary of globalization lost for a few reefs and rocks here and there.

References:

Duan Binren (2004). “破解世界性、世纪性课题” (Topic of this century and of worldwide importance). Guo Wanchao (2004). 中国崛起:一个东方大国的成长之路 (The Rise of China: Developmental Path of an Oriental Nation) Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang.
Guo Wanchao (2004). 中国崛起:一个东方大国的成长之路 (The Rise of China: Developmental Path of an Oriental Nation) Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang.
Hu Jintao (2003). “胡锦涛在纪念毛泽东同志诞辰110周年座谈会 上的讲话” (Hu Jintao's Speech at the 110th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong” in Liberation Daily, December 27, 2003.
Xin Xiangyang (2004). “大视野中的中国崛起” (Grand vision of China’s Rise). Guo Wanchao (2004). 中国崛起:一个东方大国的成长之路 (The Rise of China: Developmental Path of an Oriental Nation) Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang.

Dr. B R Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. The views expressed are his own. He could be reached at bdeepak@mail.jnu.ac.in