In
view of the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) between India and China, the
year 2014 has been declared as the year of friendly exchanges, and various
activities have been planned throughout the year as part of the celebrations. Vice-President
Hamid Ansari’s China visit is just one of such activities. During his five day
long visit between 26 and 30 June, he had talks with President Xi Jinping,
Premier Li Keqiang and Vice President Li Yuanchao. During his talks with
Chinese leaders, he raised India's concerns over border with China and China’s
plans to build rail links with Pakistan through Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
India and China also signed three MoUs that includes the establishment of Chinese
industrial parks in India and China agreeing to allow Indian hydrological
experts to conduct study tours in Tibet to monitor the flows and flood data of
Brahmaputra River on its upper reaches. Given the primacy of trade relations
between the two countries, Vice President was also companied by Minister of
State for Commerce, Nirmala Sitharaman who in her talks with the Chinese
leaders said that India was open to Chinese investment.
It is certain
that China is proactive in its approach as far as Panchsheel is
concerned; the principles have been enshrined in the constitution of China and
China has reiterated time and again that these have become the norms of
international relations in recent times. Irrespective of their incorporation in
the constitution, China talked less about these and followed the ‘keeping low’
(韬光养晦) approach of Deng Xiaoping all along. Of late as the ‘keeping low’
approach gives way to more ‘assertive’ approach as regards economic and foreign
policy related issues, demonstrated by its brawl with Japan in East China Sea
and with Vietnam and Philippines in the South China Sea, and also the
incorporation of ‘one belt one road’ (一带一路) strategy for building bridges across nations, China under Xi seems to have rekindled the
spirit of Panchsheel. It is perhaps in this light that China has announced an
award and scholarships to groups and individuals who have contributed to the
promotion of Panchsheel. India on
its part though part and parcel of the celebrations seems to have rescinded to
passivity; the kind of enthusiasm it showed to these during the Nehru years is obviously
not there. What are the reasons for such a passivism? Is it owing to our
policies in the 1950s and 60s or is it because of lackadaisical economic and
foreign policy approaches? Let’s revisit the Panchsheel and find
out.
It may be
recalled that the extraterritorial rights acquired by British India in Tibet
was the outcome of 1914 Anglo-British Trade Agreement initialed at Simla by the
British, Tibetans and Chinese plenipotentiaries. The then Chinese government
had repudiated this agreement as they objected to the border alignment between
the Inner and Outer Tibet. Nevertheless, the agreement between Tibet and
Britain was in force, and when the British transferred political power to the
Republic of India, the extraterritorial rights were also transferred to the new
government. India had its representatives at Lhasa, Gyantse and Yadong
accompanied by a small escort. Between Sikkim and Gyantse there was a post and
telegraph service and some rest houses. India continued the British policy of recognizing
Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, however, in somewhat ambiguous
manner with the Republic of China (ROC) as well as the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). However, both the governments in China (ROC from 1912-49 and PRC
from 1949-date) did not recognize the 1914 Agreement. Recognition to the
agreement would have meant to recognize Tibetan identity as an independent
nation.
After signing
the 17-Point Agreement with Tibet in 1951, China had taken full control of
Tibet including its foreign affairs. The erstwhile Tibetan Bureau of Foreign
Affairs was abolished and replaced by Chinese Foreign Office (initially named
as Foreign Affairs Support Office). Now the Indian and Nepalese Missions in
Lhasa were the last two irritants in the Chinese eyes and were perceived as the
residue of imperialist influences in Tibet.
On August 12, 1952, Zhang Jingwu, the
Chinese representative at Lhasa communicated these guidelines to the Dalai Lama
and Kashag. The Kashag remarked that they have received all the documents
pertaining to the treaties Tibet had signed with the British and is prepared to
discuss these with the Central Government. Yang (1992: 257) records that the
process was stalled due to the interference from two Prime Ministers [Lukhangwa
and Lobzang Tashi] who had opposed the Agreement of peaceful liberation of
Tibet. On 14th, Zhang Guohua,
the commander of the PLA in Tibet, informed the Kashag to convey it to the
Dalai Lama that the Central Government has already decided to convert the
Indian Mission at Lhasa into a consulate Yang (1992: 257). On 14 June 1952, Zhou
Enlai met Panikkar and pointed out that the Indian privileges in Tibet were the
product of unequal treaties. Therefore, the Chinese Government was in favour of
re-establishing the Indo-Tibetan relations through consultations. Since the
resolution of Tibet problem would require considerable time and measures, the
Chinese government is of the view that the Indian Mission at Lhasa may be
converted into Indian consulate. In September 1952, government of India
announced from New Delhi that as the Chinese government was now conducting
Tibet’s foreign relations, the designation of the Indian representative at
Lhasa would be changed to consul general and the trade agencies in Tibet would
be under his supervision (Richardson: 1962: 196).
Under such circumstances, Zhang Jingwu
and Yang Gongsu proposed to the Kashag that Tibet should sever its traditional
ties with India; the Kashag was still hesitant and said it would study the
matter and respond accordingly. The matter was delayed until mid October, when
Zhang Jingwu and Zhang Guohua met the Dalai Lama and raised the question with
him. According to Yang (1992: 259, emphasis added), the 14th Dalai
expressed his approval and subsequently the Kashag made its reply on 6
September. The main points under reference were that India at present has
very unreasonable footing in Tibet; we wish the Central Government would solve
this proposition gradually. That India has stationed its troops in Tibet
and has occupied Dawang [Tawang] etc. places. The Kashag would provide the
Central Government relevant material and hope the Central Government would
recover the lost territories. As regards India establishing consulate
general at Lhasa, the Kashag approves of Central Government’s desire to handle
Indian affairs under a unified command. It is also desired that all the
traders entering India must apply for passport. Since Su Khang, the former
head of the Tibetan Bureau of Foreign Affairs is dead, his responsibilities has
been taken by Liu Xia, the Vice-Chairman of the Bureau in the newly established
Foreign Affairs Support Office.
It is evident from Kashag’s reply that
Tibet at insistence of China, attempted to express that there was no special
relationship with India, irrespective of the fact that most of the Tibetan
trade was with India. China was also successful in bringing up the question of
“lost territories” in Kashag’s reply. This tacitly made Tibet to accept the
fact that the 1914 Simla agreement with India was null and void, and more
importantly, the boundary agreement signed by the Tibetan plenipotentiary
Lonchen Shatra with the British had no validity. Meanwhile, China accused India
for perusing the old British policies in Tibet, for Indian envoys in Sikkim and
Tibet time and again referred to Tibet as a country, and in the winter of 1952
when Tibetan traders went to India in large numbers to fetch huge quantities of
goods that were in demand due to increased presence of the PLA in Tibet, the
Indian government is said to have refused to grant visas on the Tibetan
passports issued by China, for it asked them to acquire travel documents from
the Indian Trade Representative at
Yadong ( Yang 1992: 260-61).
Since 1950, China had employed thousands
of PLA and Tibetan labourers on road construction. Within a span of four years
they built 2000 kilometres of roads. The Qinghai-Tibet Highway was completed by
the end of fourth year with the first vehicle reaching Lhasa on 15th
December [1954], Roads linking Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse were also proceeding
at a rapid pace (Shakya 1999: 121). Secondly, a hostile Pakistan on its western
and eastern fronts that was part of America’s anti-communism coalition and was
receiving American military aid also forced India to initiate a friendly policy
towards China. In September 1953 Nedyam
Raghavan, the Indian ambassador to China delivered a letter from Nehru to Zhou
Enlai, the Chinese Premier that expressed India’s desire to open negotiations
with China on bilateral issues. The subsequent consultations between the
foreign affairs officials of both the countries resolved that negotiations
should be held immediately. India appointed Raghavan, the Indian ambassador to
China as plenipotentiary of the government of India and China appointed Zhang
Hanfu, the Vice-Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs as its plenipotentiary.
The negotiations started in Beijing on 31
December 1953 and went on for four months. Contrary to the Indian approach
towards these negotiations, China attached great importance to its “first ever
negotiations with a non-socialist country” and set up an eleven member
“Commission for Sino-Indian negotiations.” Yang (1992: 226, emphasis added) who
represented the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Zhou Enlai,
writes that the Commission had its first meeting on 7 January 1954. Zhou Enlai
made a speech and remarked:
“India has inherited some British
privileges in Tibet. However, since the return of Tibet to the folds of
motherland’s big family, India has accorded China an equal and reciprocal
treatment albeit it still desires to maintain its privileges in Tibet.
Nonetheless, it has agreed to recall its forces when it saw the futility of
keeping them there. We may surmise that the stronger we emerge and the firmer
all nationalities unite, Indian attitude is bound to change. China’s India
policy should be to win India for peaceful-coexistence with us on the basis of
five principles, to make her fight against the American invasion and war.
On the other hand, the UK and the US exert great influence on India, and we
have dispute with her on several issues. We should endeavour to influence
and make her believe that our policy of peace has the force. During present
negotiations, we are only prepared to negotiate the problems that are ripe, the
problems that are not ripe, for example, the border problems including the
“McMahon Line” by way of which Tawang and Loyul etc. regions that originally
belonged to Tibet were ceded to India, would be regarded as outstanding issues
and would not be raised due to insufficient material, however, would be raised
at an opportune time.”
It could be gleaned from Zhou’s speech
that China was willing to discuss the issues, which it thought were remnants of
imperialist influence in Tibet. It was only interested in negotiating the
issues of trade representatives, post and telegraph facilities and the Indian
garrison in Tibet for now. China wanted to discuss Tibetan trade with India, as
there were no effective supply routes with mainland China at that point of
time. China was successful in scuttling Indian trade a few years later when it
laid a strong network of roads that connected Lhasa with other Chinese cities.
On the boundary question, China preferred to maintain silence and had decided
that in case the Indian side raised the issue, it would simply say that it was
difficult to reach an agreement at this stage. It is evident from the
negotiations that China was bent on to “drive away the last imperialist
influence” from Tibet. It is rather strange that why Indian side didn’t raise
the border issue. The problem in fact would have opened the entire issue of
boundary for discussion or negotiations. It would have been a trade off between
India relinquishing its interests in Tibet and accepting it as a region of
China, and the Chinese accepting the 1914 border alignment between Tibet and
India. Therefore, it could be regarded as a diplomatic disaster for India.
Nevertheless, the negotiations went on
and after four months an agreement was reached on various issues. On 29 April
1954, India and China signed the “Agreement Between the Republic of India and
the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of
China and India.” The main provisions of the Agreement and notes exchanged
between the two governments provided:
1.
The Government of India agrees
that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi,
Calcutta and Kalimpong. Similarly, India may establish trade agencies at
Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.
2.
Government of China agrees to
specify Yatung, Gyantse and Phari as trade markets, India in turn named
Kalimpong, Siliguri and Calcutta as trade marts.
3.
Pilgrims from India may visit
Kailash (Rimpoche) and Mansarovar (Mavam Tso) in Tibet and pilgrims from Tibet
may visit Indian Buddhist sites such as Benaras, Sarnath, Bodh Gaya and Sanchi.
4.
The traders and pilgrims from
both India and China would carry passports and other travel documents issued by
respective governments.
5.
The Government of India would
withdraw within six months from now; the military escorts stationed at Yatung
and Gyantse in Tibet, and would hand over to the Government of China at a
reasonable price 12 rest houses, the postal, telegraph and public telephone
services together with their equipments.
It was the preamble of this agreement
that included the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or the Panchsheel,
and it was agreed that the Agreement would remain in force for eight years. The
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) of 30 April 1954 lauded the
“reestablishment of relations between India and China on new basis.” The Daily
editorialised that relations between India and China in the “Tibet Region of
China” were remnants of the British aggression against China in the past and
therefore, were not the responsibility of the Government of India. In turn
India thought that it had won the tacit acceptance of the McMahon Line by
China, and that Panchsheel would guarantee her good neighbourliness from
China.
The agreement of 1954 was indeed first
confidence building measure (CBM) between India and China. Lauding the
agreement Nehru spoke in the Parliament that “By this agreement we ensure peace
to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia” and that by subscribing to
these principles， “one could
create an environment wherein it becomes a little more dangerous to the other
party to break away from the pledges given (Deepak 2005: 154).”
It was sold aggressively by both India
and China at various forums such as during the Afro Asian Conference in
Bandung; and Colombo Conference in May 1954.
During his India visit in 1954 and 1956, Zhou Enlai time and again
emphasized the need to adhere to these principles. In a press conference on 27 June,
Zhou further elaborated the principles of Panchsheel and allayed fears
of neighbouring countries about Chinese brand of communism. He said,
“It
is possible for various countries of world to have a peaceful coexistence
irrespective of their size and social system. The people of each country should
have the right to choose its way of life and system of governance, and should
not be interfered by other countries. The revolution cannot be exported. At the
same time, the common will of a nation in any country should not be interfered
with. If all the countries of the world handle their relations in accordance
with these principles, then the question of threat and invasion of one country
by another does not arise, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence between
the countries could be realised (Wang 1998: 97).”
According
to Wang, Zhou also proposed to Nehru that by adhering to the Panchsheel,
India and China should set an example to the world, proving that countries can
coexist peacefully. Nehru in fact had been doing exactly the same thing. This
is evident from his speeches during Colombo Conference. In a broadcast from
Colombo Nehru (1996: 253) had emphasized the significance of Panchsheel
and had remarked that although the political and economic structure of India
and China were different, India was nevertheless able to sign an agreement with
China on the basis of these principles. Since the Panchsheel in his view
would guarantee peace in Asia, he recommended the concept to other members of
Colombo Conference
Going
by the arguments given by Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the CBM was aimed at creating
trust and confidence in each other, and it did create the environment of peace
and friendship, the atmosphere of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai
(Sino-Indian Brotherhood) could be rightly attributed to this CBM, albeit was
hyped beyond reality by both the sides. Also as Swaran (1998: 505) puts it, “Indian response has to be understood
in view of Nehru’s personality and beliefs, He had been India’s sole
spokesperson on foreign relations and following the death of Gandhiji (1948)
and Sardar Patel (1950) Jawaharlal Nehru had clearly emerged as the single most
important leader of the monolith Indian National Congress…a man who sought
security in peace..” The academics have looked these
issues from differing perspectives. While some argues that the Dalai Lama’s
escape and India granting asylum derailed the CBM (Swaran 1998) for India
refused to renew it in 1962 at its expiry after eight years; Swaran also
maintains Bhai-Bhai atmospheric and Nehru’s single handily China policy
could be another reason; I believe more than anything, it was the Indian
perception of entire border issue as well as the obduracy it showed towards the
border negotiations with China. Had India handled the relationship carefully,
perhaps we would not have wasted time on other CBMs including the latest Border
Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2013. Many experts including the
Chinese posits that the swap of Eastern and Western Sectors that points to the
ground realities on border is the best possible and plausible solution to the
border, it still remains, however, going by what Zhou Enlai meant in 1954, the
contest for territories may indeed be a protracted one!
References:
Deepak, B R (2005) India and
China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict, Manak, New Delhi
Nehru, Jawaharlal (1996) Selected
Speeches 1953-57, Vol 3, Publication Division, New Delhi
Richardson, H. E (1962). Tibet
and its History. Oxford University Publication, London
Shakya, Tsering (1999). The
Dragon in the Land of Snow: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. Pimlico,
London.
Singh, Swaran
(1998) “Building Confidence with China” in Tan Chung (ed.) Across the Himalyan
Gap, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Gyan Publishers, New Delhi
Wang, Hongwei, (1998). 喜马拉雅山情节：中印关系研究 ximalayashan qingjie: zhongyin guanxi
yanjiu (The Himalayas Sentiment : A Study of Sino Indian Relations).
China Tibetology Publication, Beijing.
Yang, Gongsu 杨公素(1992).
中国反对外国侵略干涉西藏地方斗争史 zhongguo fandui waiguo qinlue ganshe
xizang difang douzhengshi ( History of China’s Struggle and Resistance
to Foreign Invasion and interference in Tibet). China’s Tibetology
Publications, Beijing.
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