60th anniversary of the Panchsheel: China's Stand on Border then and Now

In view of the 60^th anniversary of the signing of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) between India and China, the year 2014 has been declared as the year of friendly exchanges, and various activities have been planned throughout the year as part of the celebrations. Vice-President Hamid Ansari’s China visit is just one of such activities. During his five day long visit between 26 and 30 June, he had talks with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Vice President Li Yuanchao. During his talks with Chinese leaders, he raised India's concerns over border with China and China’s plans to build rail links with Pakistan through Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India and China also signed three MoUs that includes the establishment of Chinese industrial parks in India and China agreeing to allow Indian hydrological experts to conduct study tours in Tibet to monitor the flows and flood data of Brahmaputra River on its upper reaches. Given the primacy of trade relations between the two countries, Vice President was also companied by Minister of State for Commerce, Nirmala Sitharaman who in her talks with the Chinese leaders said that India was open to Chinese investment.

It is certain that China is proactive in its approach as far as Panchsheel is concerned; the principles have been enshrined in the constitution of China and China has reiterated time and again that these have become the norms of international relations in recent times. Irrespective of their incorporation in the constitution, China talked less about these and followed the ‘keeping low’ (韬光养晦) approach of Deng Xiaoping all along. Of late as the ‘keeping low’ approach gives way to more ‘assertive’ approach as regards economic and foreign policy related issues, demonstrated by its brawl with Japan in East China Sea and with Vietnam and Philippines in the South China Sea, and also the incorporation of ‘one belt one road’ (一带一路) strategy for building bridges across nations, China under Xi seems to have rekindled the spirit of Panchsheel. It is perhaps in this light that China has announced an award and scholarships to groups and individuals who have contributed to the promotion of Panchsheel.  India on its part though part and parcel of the celebrations seems to have rescinded to passivity; the kind of enthusiasm it showed to these during the Nehru years is obviously not there. What are the reasons for such a passivism? Is it owing to our policies in the 1950s and 60s or is it because of lackadaisical economic and foreign policy approaches? Let’s revisit the Panchsheel and find out.    

It may be recalled that the extraterritorial rights acquired by British India in Tibet was the outcome of 1914 Anglo-British Trade Agreement initialed at Simla by the British, Tibetans and Chinese plenipotentiaries. The then Chinese government had repudiated this agreement as they objected to the border alignment between the Inner and Outer Tibet. Nevertheless, the agreement between Tibet and Britain was in force, and when the British transferred political power to the Republic of India, the extraterritorial rights were also transferred to the new government. India had its representatives at Lhasa, Gyantse and Yadong accompanied by a small escort. Between Sikkim and Gyantse there was a post and telegraph service and some rest houses. India continued the British policy of recognizing Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, however, in somewhat ambiguous manner with the Republic of China (ROC) as well as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, both the governments in China (ROC from 1912-49 and PRC from 1949-date) did not recognize the 1914 Agreement. Recognition to the agreement would have meant to recognize Tibetan identity as an independent nation.

After signing the 17-Point Agreement with Tibet in 1951, China had taken full control of Tibet including its foreign affairs. The erstwhile Tibetan Bureau of Foreign Affairs was abolished and replaced by Chinese Foreign Office (initially named as Foreign Affairs Support Office). Now the Indian and Nepalese Missions in Lhasa were the last two irritants in the Chinese eyes and were perceived as the residue of imperialist influences in Tibet.

On August 12, 1952, Zhang Jingwu, the Chinese representative at Lhasa communicated these guidelines to the Dalai Lama and Kashag. The Kashag remarked that they have received all the documents pertaining to the treaties Tibet had signed with the British and is prepared to discuss these with the Central Government. Yang (1992: 257) records that the process was stalled due to the interference from two Prime Ministers [Lukhangwa and Lobzang Tashi] who had opposed the Agreement of peaceful liberation of Tibet. On 14^th,  Zhang Guohua, the commander of the PLA in Tibet, informed the Kashag to convey it to the Dalai Lama that the Central Government has already decided to convert the Indian Mission at Lhasa into a consulate Yang (1992: 257). On 14 June 1952, Zhou Enlai met Panikkar and pointed out that the Indian privileges in Tibet were the product of unequal treaties. Therefore, the Chinese Government was in favour of re-establishing the Indo-Tibetan relations through consultations. Since the resolution of Tibet problem would require considerable time and measures, the Chinese government is of the view that the Indian Mission at Lhasa may be converted into Indian consulate. In September 1952, government of India announced from New Delhi that as the Chinese government was now conducting Tibet’s foreign relations, the designation of the Indian representative at Lhasa would be changed to consul general and the trade agencies in Tibet would be under his supervision (Richardson: 1962: 196).

Under such circumstances, Zhang Jingwu and Yang Gongsu proposed to the Kashag that Tibet should sever its traditional ties with India; the Kashag was still hesitant and said it would study the matter and respond accordingly. The matter was delayed until mid October, when Zhang Jingwu and Zhang Guohua met the Dalai Lama and raised the question with him. According to Yang (1992: 259, emphasis added), the 14^th Dalai expressed his approval and subsequently the Kashag made its reply on 6 September. The main points under reference were that India at present has very unreasonable footing in Tibet; we wish the Central Government would solve this proposition gradually. That India has stationed its troops in Tibet and has occupied Dawang [Tawang] etc. places. The Kashag would provide the Central Government relevant material and hope the Central Government would recover the lost territories. As regards India establishing consulate general at Lhasa, the Kashag approves of Central Government’s desire to handle Indian affairs under a unified command. It is also desired that all the traders entering India must apply for passport. Since Su Khang, the former head of the Tibetan Bureau of Foreign Affairs is dead, his responsibilities has been taken by Liu Xia, the Vice-Chairman of the Bureau in the newly established Foreign Affairs Support Office.

It is evident from Kashag’s reply that Tibet at insistence of China, attempted to express that there was no special relationship with India, irrespective of the fact that most of the Tibetan trade was with India. China was also successful in bringing up the question of “lost territories” in Kashag’s reply. This tacitly made Tibet to accept the fact that the 1914 Simla agreement with India was null and void, and more importantly, the boundary agreement signed by the Tibetan plenipotentiary Lonchen Shatra with the British had no validity. Meanwhile, China accused India for perusing the old British policies in Tibet, for Indian envoys in Sikkim and Tibet time and again referred to Tibet as a country, and in the winter of 1952 when Tibetan traders went to India in large numbers to fetch huge quantities of goods that were in demand due to increased presence of the PLA in Tibet, the Indian government is said to have refused to grant visas on the Tibetan passports issued by China, for it asked them to acquire travel documents from the   Indian Trade Representative at Yadong ( Yang 1992: 260-61).

Since 1950, China had employed thousands of PLA and Tibetan labourers on road construction. Within a span of four years they built 2000 kilometres of roads. The Qinghai-Tibet Highway was completed by the end of fourth year with the first vehicle reaching Lhasa on 15^th December [1954], Roads linking Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse were also proceeding at a rapid pace (Shakya 1999: 121). Secondly, a hostile Pakistan on its western and eastern fronts that was part of America’s anti-communism coalition and was receiving American military aid also forced India to initiate a friendly policy towards China.  In September 1953 Nedyam Raghavan, the Indian ambassador to China delivered a letter from Nehru to Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier that expressed India’s desire to open negotiations with China on bilateral issues. The subsequent consultations between the foreign affairs officials of both the countries resolved that negotiations should be held immediately. India appointed Raghavan, the Indian ambassador to China as plenipotentiary of the government of India and China appointed Zhang Hanfu, the Vice-Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs as its plenipotentiary.

The negotiations started in Beijing on 31 December 1953 and went on for four months. Contrary to the Indian approach towards these negotiations, China attached great importance to its “first ever negotiations with a non-socialist country” and set up an eleven member “Commission for Sino-Indian negotiations.” Yang (1992: 226, emphasis added) who represented the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with Zhou Enlai, writes that the Commission had its first meeting on 7 January 1954. Zhou Enlai made a speech and remarked:

“India has inherited some British privileges in Tibet. However, since the return of Tibet to the folds of motherland’s big family, India has accorded China an equal and reciprocal treatment albeit it still desires to maintain its privileges in Tibet. Nonetheless, it has agreed to recall its forces when it saw the futility of keeping them there. We may surmise that the stronger we emerge and the firmer all nationalities unite, Indian attitude is bound to change. China’s India policy should be to win India for peaceful-coexistence with us on the basis of five principles, to make her fight against the American invasion and war. On the other hand, the UK and the US exert great influence on India, and we have dispute with her on several issues. We should endeavour to influence and make her believe that our policy of peace has the force. During present negotiations, we are only prepared to negotiate the problems that are ripe, the problems that are not ripe, for example, the border problems including the “McMahon Line” by way of which Tawang and Loyul etc. regions that originally belonged to Tibet were ceded to India, would be regarded as outstanding issues and would not be raised due to insufficient material, however, would be raised at an opportune time.”

It could be gleaned from Zhou’s speech that China was willing to discuss the issues, which it thought were remnants of imperialist influence in Tibet. It was only interested in negotiating the issues of trade representatives, post and telegraph facilities and the Indian garrison in Tibet for now. China wanted to discuss Tibetan trade with India, as there were no effective supply routes with mainland China at that point of time. China was successful in scuttling Indian trade a few years later when it laid a strong network of roads that connected Lhasa with other Chinese cities. On the boundary question, China preferred to maintain silence and had decided that in case the Indian side raised the issue, it would simply say that it was difficult to reach an agreement at this stage. It is evident from the negotiations that China was bent on to “drive away the last imperialist influence” from Tibet. It is rather strange that why Indian side didn’t raise the border issue. The problem in fact would have opened the entire issue of boundary for discussion or negotiations. It would have been a trade off between India relinquishing its interests in Tibet and accepting it as a region of China, and the Chinese accepting the 1914 border alignment between Tibet and India. Therefore, it could be regarded as a diplomatic disaster for India.

Nevertheless, the negotiations went on and after four months an agreement was reached on various issues. On 29 April 1954, India and China signed the “Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India.” The main provisions of the Agreement and notes exchanged between the two governments provided:

1.      The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong. Similarly, India may establish trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

2.      Government of China agrees to specify Yatung, Gyantse and Phari as trade markets, India in turn named Kalimpong, Siliguri and Calcutta as trade marts.

3.      Pilgrims from India may visit Kailash (Rimpoche) and Mansarovar (Mavam Tso) in Tibet and pilgrims from Tibet may visit Indian Buddhist sites such as Benaras, Sarnath, Bodh Gaya and Sanchi.

4.      The traders and pilgrims from both India and China would carry passports and other travel documents issued by respective governments.

5.      The Government of India would withdraw within six months from now; the military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet, and would hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price 12 rest houses, the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipments.

It was the preamble of this agreement that included the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or the Panchsheel, and it was agreed that the Agreement would remain in force for eight years. The Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) of 30 April 1954 lauded the “reestablishment of relations between India and China on new basis.” The Daily editorialised that relations between India and China in the “Tibet Region of China” were remnants of the British aggression against China in the past and therefore, were not the responsibility of the Government of India. In turn India thought that it had won the tacit acceptance of the McMahon Line by China, and that Panchsheel would guarantee her good neighbourliness from China.

The agreement of 1954 was indeed first confidence building measure (CBM) between India and China. Lauding the agreement Nehru spoke in the Parliament that “By this agreement we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia” and that by subscribing to these principles， “one could create an environment wherein it becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to break away from the pledges given (Deepak 2005: 154).”

It was sold aggressively by both India and China at various forums such as during the Afro Asian Conference in Bandung; and Colombo Conference in May 1954.  During his India visit in 1954 and 1956, Zhou Enlai time and again emphasized the need to adhere to these principles. In a press conference on 27 June, Zhou further elaborated the principles of Panchsheel and allayed fears of neighbouring countries about Chinese brand of communism. He said,

“It is possible for various countries of world to have a peaceful coexistence irrespective of their size and social system. The people of each country should have the right to choose its way of life and system of governance, and should not be interfered by other countries. The revolution cannot be exported. At the same time, the common will of a nation in any country should not be interfered with. If all the countries of the world handle their relations in accordance with these principles, then the question of threat and invasion of one country by another does not arise, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the countries could be realised (Wang 1998: 97).”

According to Wang, Zhou also proposed to Nehru that by adhering to the Panchsheel, India and China should set an example to the world, proving that countries can coexist peacefully. Nehru in fact had been doing exactly the same thing. This is evident from his speeches during Colombo Conference. In a broadcast from Colombo Nehru (1996: 253) had emphasized the significance of Panchsheel and had remarked that although the political and economic structure of India and China were different, India was nevertheless able to sign an agreement with China on the basis of these principles. Since the Panchsheel in his view would guarantee peace in Asia, he recommended the concept to other members of Colombo Conference

Going by the arguments given by Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the CBM was aimed at creating trust and confidence in each other, and it did create the environment of peace and friendship, the atmosphere of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai (Sino-Indian Brotherhood) could be rightly attributed to this CBM, albeit was hyped beyond reality by both the sides. Also as Swaran (1998: 505) puts it, “Indian response has to be understood in view of Nehru’s personality and beliefs, He had been India’s sole spokesperson on foreign relations and following the death of Gandhiji (1948) and Sardar Patel (1950) Jawaharlal Nehru had clearly emerged as the single most important leader of the monolith Indian National Congress…a man who sought security in peace..” The academics have looked these issues from differing perspectives. While some argues that the Dalai Lama’s escape and India granting asylum derailed the CBM (Swaran 1998) for India refused to renew it in 1962 at its expiry after eight years; Swaran also maintains Bhai-Bhai atmospheric and Nehru’s single handily China policy could be another reason; I believe more than anything, it was the Indian perception of entire border issue as well as the obduracy it showed towards the border negotiations with China. Had India handled the relationship carefully, perhaps we would not have wasted time on other CBMs including the latest Border Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2013. Many experts including the Chinese posits that the swap of Eastern and Western Sectors that points to the ground realities on border is the best possible and plausible solution to the border, it still remains, however, going by what Zhou Enlai meant in 1954, the contest for territories may indeed be a protracted one! 

References:

Deepak, B R (2005) India and China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict, Manak, New Delhi

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1996) Selected Speeches 1953-57, Vol 3, Publication Division, New Delhi

Richardson, H. E (1962). Tibet and its History. Oxford University Publication, London

Shakya, Tsering (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snow: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. Pimlico, London.

Singh, Swaran (1998) “Building Confidence with China” in Tan Chung (ed.) Across the Himalyan Gap, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Gyan Publishers, New Delhi

Wang, Hongwei, (1998). 喜马拉雅山情节：中印关系研究  ximalayashan qingjie: zhongyin guanxi yanjiu (The Himalayas Sentiment : A Study of Sino Indian Relations). China Tibetology Publication, Beijing.

Yang, Gongsu 杨公素(1992). 中国反对外国侵略干涉西藏地方斗争史  zhongguo fandui waiguo qinlue ganshe xizang difang douzhengshi ( History of China’s Struggle and Resistance to Foreign Invasion and interference in Tibet). China’s Tibetology Publications, Beijing.

Deng Xiaoping: Interpreter of the Chinese Dream

1.       Courtesy The Equator Line, vol. 3 April-June 2014 pp. 40-49

In 1976, with the demise of Mao Zedong, the curtains on the ‘Great Proletariat Revolution’ were also brought down. The people who were purged and imprisoned started to walk out of the prisons. Three men, who were walking out of the jail’s gate, enquired about the reasons why they were incarcerated. The first said: “I have been imprisoned for supporting Deng Xiaoping.” The second replied: “It’s ridiculous! I have been framed for attacking Deng Xiaoping!” The duo then turned and asked the third: “What about you?” The third man replied: “I am Deng Xiaoping.” This may be a political satire, but demonstrates the realities of the Chinese politics during Mao’s times, and the man who withstood all these tumultuous times, and not only emerged victorious but also de-Maoised China was none other than the architect of modern China, Deng Xiaoping!  

Most authoritative works on Deng such as Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (2013) by Harvard sociologist Ezra F. Vogel; Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China (1997) by British ambassador to China, Richard Evan, and Deng: A Political Biography (1998) by Benjamin Yang, a Harvard trained professor of People’s University, Beijing; My Father Deng Xiaoping: ‘Cultural Revolution’ Years 《我的父亲邓小平：“文革”岁月》by his daughter Deng Rong (2000) and An Autobiography of Deng Xiaoping 《邓小平自述》published in 2009 have tried to reconstruct the personality and character of Deng, however, most of these except the last one are loaded with post 1977 Deng construct and give very little account of Deng during the Mao years. The autobiography throws some light on his Childhood and formative years in France and Moscow. Deng Xixian (the original name of Deng Xiaoping) was born in Paifang Village in Xiexing township, Guang'an County of Sichuan in 1904. According to Deng Xioping’s brother Deng Ken, ‘their father was a petty landlord with around 6 hectares of land. Deng was eldest of three brothers. Besides they have two sisters. After their mother’s demise in 1924, their father remarried a widow called Xia Bogen. Their step mother was very hard working and treated the kids very well. Deng went to a traditional school at the age of five and passed out middle school from the native county. In 1919, he was selected to be part of a work-study program to go to France and got enrolled in Chongqing Preparatory School. These were the turbulent times in China under the warlords; the May 4^th Movement of the Peking University students had attracted young people from across the country. Deng had also participated in the sloganeering and boycott of the Japanese goods, even though their father was old fashioned and represented the old society but never stopped his sons to join the revolution.’   

In the summer of 1920, upon graduating from the Chongqing Preparatory School, Deng, a young boy of 16 along with 80 of his schoolmates boarded a ship for France and landed in Marseilles in October. As the economic condition of his family back home was deteriorating, and money wasn’t forthcoming, he had to do odd jobs while pursuing his studies. Even here French workers were preferred over the Chinese, and discriminated in terms of wages according to Deng’s own diaries. Thanks to Zhou Enlai and others who were also studying in France and were indoctrinated into Marxist thought, Deng also joined the group and started to study Marxism.  In 1922 Deng joined the Communist Party of Chinese Youth in Europe, and two years later Communist Party of China (CPC). Deng’s five year stay in France, was indeed a decent beginning of his revolutionary career, he Co-edited a magazine called ‘Red Light’ and contributed articles. In the aftermath of October Revolution, as Soviet Union was supporting communist movements across the world, many young students were drawn to Soviet Union. Moreover, Sun Yat-sen himself has turned towards Soviet Union for help, which has resulted in the First United Front between the CPC and the Kuomintang (KMT) in the 1920s. Deng was no exception and left France for Moscow in 1926. He initially registered as a student in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, but soon after transferred to the Sun Yat-sen University, where Feng Funeng, the eldest daughter of Feng Yuxiang,  and Chiang Chingkuo, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek were also studying. 

While in Sun Yat-sen University, Deng recalls that his family had great hopes on him. ‘They wanted me to fulfil their dreams of becoming an official and turn around the fortunes of the family. They wanted me to get married and settle down early in life, and also decided to get me married to a daughter of Tang family. They believed in the Confucian adage of ‘not having a progeny is one of the biggest filial sins.’ However, I was having different thoughts about marriage while in France and Russia. ‘I thought that an illiterate girl would certainly be an impediment rather than an advantage in my revolutionary work. I started to believe in ‘love marriage’ and wrote to my parents about it. I was severely scolded by my father as a rebel, un- filial and warned that if I did not mend my ways I would be ostracised by the family. I chose to be ostracised.’

In 1926, after a year’s stay in Sun Yat-sen University, Deng was sent by the Communist International to China to assist the army of Feng Yuxiang, commander of national army in Northwest China. Deng reached China in the spring of 1927 as Chief of the Political Section as well as Secretary of the Communist Party organization at the Sun-Yat-sen Military and political Academy in Xi’an, a time when the CPC-KMT coalition has crumbled, and the KMT had started to purge the communists. Under such circumstances Deng left for Hankou where the situation was even worse. The communists were forced to go underground, and Deng Xixian took the name of Deng Xiaoping to avoid white terror. In 1929 Deng joined Li Mingrui, General Commander of the Seventh and Eighth Armies in the capacity of Political Commissar to launch uprisings against the KMT government. In fact these armies were built under the guidance of Deng, which were successful in establishing Youjiang etc. revolutionary bases. In the base areas, the land was confiscated from the landlords and distributed amongst the peasants. According to Deng he also has a close shave with life during Guangxi White Uprising when he was attacked by the armed bandits and at the point of knife robbed him of 20 silver dollars.’ 

Deng and 7^th Army were also victims of the ‘Li Lisan line’- the communists should take to the big cities first – the line proved fatal as the uprisings were crushed mercilessly by the KMT army. Deng opposed the line and joined the Jiangxi revolutionary base in 1931. Deng in fact was subscribing to Mao’s line that called for ‘encircling cities from the countryside’ against dictates of the then CPC leadership influenced by the Comintern representative in China, Otto Braun, and a pro-Soviet faction trained in Moscow that included Wang Ming and others. The Comintern line suffered a heavy blow in October 1934, when the fifth campaign against ‘encirclement and suppression’ failed and the Red Army was forced to retreat to countryside what in history is known as the Long March. The factionalism within the CPC came out in open during Zunyi Conference in 1935 where Mao lambasted the military strategy of the CPC and propounded his own line that was supported by Moscow trained Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, albeit Deng was just there in the capacity of secretary of the Central Committee. Zunyi conference could be said as the fist stepping stone in Mao Zedong’s long march for power, and also Deng’s albeit he remained in smaller positions during CPC’s retreat in Shaanxi. 

During the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45) when Red Army was reorganized into Eighth Route Army, Deng Xiaoping took charge of the Political Commissar of the 129th Division under Liu Bocheng. Following this, Deng with Liu lead various campaigns in Shanxi-Hebei-Henan border area and established anti-Japanese bases. Deng’s first major military victory could be the annihilation of KMT’s 97th Army in March 1940, albeit the offensive was also supported by Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei Military Command. Deng and Liu also engaged the Japanese in various sporadic campaigns which are recorded as ‘Hundred- Regiment Campaigns’ in Chinese history. It was amidst these campaigns that he married Zhuo Lin, one of his comrades.   Deng during all these years seems to be a mere foot soldier of the CPC, however, rose to prominence during the War of Liberation after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. In one of the famous battles in September 1945, Deng-Liu defeated the 13 divisions of Yan Xishan.  A heavy blow to the KMT was dealt in June 1947 when Liu-Deng armies crossed Yellow River to enter Shandong and routed 56,000 enemy forces thus paving the way for CPC’s advance to the south. The much bigger campaign was Huai-Hai Campaigns that started in September 1948 and lasted over two months. Gradually the KMT was routed from China, when Mao proclaimed the establishment of New China from Tiananmen on October 1, 1949, Deng stood witness the ceremony. 

It took Deng Xiaoping more than two decades to rise to the higher echelons of the Party; in 1956 he gate crashed to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee and shared the stage Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Chen Yun etc. stalwarts. This was the period when China declared that the ‘restoration period’ of the national economy was over, and that the ‘socialist transformation’ of agriculture, cottage industries and industry and commerce was complete; indicating that China was tightening the stranglehold of state ownership. The First Five Year Plan (1951-56)   saw the GDP growing by over 10%, and the CPC, especially Mao started to become impatient for quicker results. ‘Catch up with Great Britain, surpass USA’ caught imagination of the entire CPC leadership and the time scale to achieve this was reduced from 75 to 8 years. Fearing aggressive attack on the CPC leadership, Mao kicked off an “anti-rightist” campaign (1957-58) across China. Deng being the Party boss was at the centre of these campaigns, supervised these and sent people voicing decent to labor camps in the countryside. Deng argued that many in the party possessed ‘bourgeois individualism to a serious degree, and were zealously craving for personal enjoyment.’ Mao’s impatience for better and quicker results resulted into even bigger and disastrous campaign called ‘The Great Leap Forward (1958-60). ‘Backyard blast furnaces’ and ‘people’s communes’ that were set up across China proved catastrophic and a human made famine was in the offing. Deng himself investigated the causes of human made calamity and concluded that mistakes should be rectified, especially ‘everyone sharing the big pot’ a reference to commune canteens amidst collectivization need to be rectified. He pointed out that ‘relations of production should be one that is acceptable to the masses.’  Not only this, he must have invited the fury of the helmsman of China when he pointed out that all the people who have been wronged by the political movements should be rehabilitated. It is an irony that Deng was himself wronged during the so called ‘decade of turmoil’ in China. 

During the turmoil, Deng was twice purged, criticized and repudiated. Together with the then President of China, Liu Shaoqi, he was labelled as ‘No.2 Capitalist Roader in China.’ Even the family members were not spared, his son Deng Pufang, a student in Beijing University was mimed for life; his youngest brother lost his life. Thanks to Lin Biao’s ‘counter-revolutionary coup’ and his death in an air crash in Mongolia (1971) that he was rehabilitated at the age of 68 with Zhou Enlai’s help. Zhou’s ill health also made him to take the portfolios of Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA in 1975. However, his open confrontation with Mao’s wife Jiang Qing and her cohorts [Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan] known as the ‘Gang of Four’ and an open criticism of mistakes committed during the ‘cultural revolution’ invited the fury of Mao as well as Jiang Qing, and Deng was purged for the second time. The gang accused him of being ‘behind-the scenes instigator of the Tiananmen Incident of April 5, 1976’ in which people had swarmed the square out of their love for Zhou Enlai. A few months later on 9 September 1976, the helmsman of China breathed his last. Departure of Mao from the Chinese political scene witnessed an intense power struggle. Jiang Qing and her cohorts conspired to usurp power and assassinate the Politburo members including Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. The latter with Deng’s supporters in the PLA, in a swift move on 6 October arrested the gang. The four were stripped of their party positions and levelled as conspirators and counterrevolutionaries. In July 1977, at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, Deng was rehabilitated and reinstated to all the posts.

The ‘ten year’s turmoil’ drove home the truth that the ‘ultra left thinking’ has driven China down to a disastrous path, and that Mao’s policy were not sacrosanct. Deng who had been wronged by such policies understood the fallacy of these better than anyone else in CPC. In the third plenary session of the CPC, Deng in his speech called upon ‘participants to ‘emancipate their minds and seek truth from facts.’ ‘Class struggle’ paved way to nation building and socialist modernization albeit ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ (keeping to the socialist road and upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, Communist Party leadership, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) were retained. Though the ‘cultural revolution’ was condemned but Mao’s contributions was lauded and mistakes rendered secondary. The ‘communes’ and ‘public canteens’ were shut down and land redistributed to farmers on 15 year’s lease. Subsequently, Deng invented terms such as socialism with Chinese characteristics, and contrary to Mao’s wishful thinking of realizing socialist modernization within 8-15 years, Deng pronounced in 1982 that China was at the ‘primary stage of socialism.’ If Mao advocated ‘politics in command’, Deng advocated ‘economy in command.’ 

In 1991 when I visited China for the first time, I could witness a total but gradual transformation of Mao era planned economy to Deng's socialist market economy. Under Deng’s guidance, China initiated reforms in three stages. During the first stage (between 1978 and early 1980s), rural reforms were initiated that involved the de-collectivization of agriculture, the opening up of the country to foreign investment, and allowing the entrepreneurs to establish private business. During the second stage (between mid 1980s and 1990s) China initiated privatization of the state owned enterprises and liberalization of the prices, and the decentralization of state control. During the third stage (between early 1990s and mid 2000) large scale privatization got intensified, most of the state enterprises, except a few large monopolies, such as banking, oil and telecom sectors were liquidated and their assets sold to private investors. Deng initially experimented with the model in a few Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and then gradually replicated them to the other parts of the country. During first phase of the economic reforms, when China carried out agricultural reforms, it simultaneously established four SEZs in the form of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou for foreign investment that were relatively free of the bureaucratic regulations and government intervention.  Once these regions became engines of growth, China created Pudong in Shanghai and Hainan province as two more SEZs in 1990.

This does not mean that Deng forsook the long term policy goals for China; he realistically defined ambitious goals for China’s modernization during the 13^th national Congress of the CPC held in 1987. A three-stage modernization formula for the next 62 years was advocated as: Doubling the 1980 GDP to end shortages of food and clothing; quadrupling the 1980 GDP by the end of 20^th century and achieving a relatively comfortable life for all the people; and basically completing China’s modernization by mid 21^st century, raising the per capita GDP to that of moderately developed countries.  The strategy required that political structure must conform to the requirements of economic reforms, as a result functions of the Party and the government were separated and power delegated to lower levels.

Deng who had just initiated the large scale reforms in the urban areas, witnessed the fury of thousands of angry protesters at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The protesters shouted slogans against the autocratic government, and corruption. Protesters swelled and frightened the government to declare the protesters as ‘counter revolutionary’ wanting ‘total westernization of China.’ Deng being the Chairman of the Central Military Commission called in the army and cleared the square on June 4 1989 by killing many. This is perhaps the only incident that the party is too scared to talk about, forget about reevaluating the event and the role Deng and other played in it. Tiananmen apart, Deng has been lauded for his innovative ‘one country, two systems’ policy as regards Hong Kong and Macao questions, and their subsequent return to China in 1997 and 1999 respectively. He was hopeful that the approach would also bring Taiwan to the folds of mainland China, albeit the question is more complex. Not only this, Deng’s ‘one country and two systems’ found its reverberations in Dharamsala too, as the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan émigré in India and elsewhere viewed it as a possible solution to the Tibetan problem. To everyone’s surprise, in 1979, Deng invited the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Gyalo Dhundup for talks in Beijing. Deng told Gyalo that apart from the issue of total independence, all other issues could be discussed and resolved. Deng even permitted fact-finding missions to Tibet from Dharamsala, and a more flexible policy for Tibet was initiated. 

Deng's foreign policy was in sync with his policy of reforms and open door. Upon resuming leadership, he restored ties with Japan, consolidated China’s relations with the US and traveled to many Southeast Asian countries, so as China could replicate their economic development. His famous ‘24 character’ guideline – ‘observe calmly, secure our position; cope with our affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership’ guided China’s foreign policy under three generations of leadership. However, it appears that of late, the Chinese leadership has brought into play second unstated part of the allegorical saying ‘hide our capacities and bide our time, and make a difference.’ Had Deng being alive, he may still have hold to his version and declared the CPC leadership of being impatient for success, as was the case with Mao during the 1950s. His guidelines were applicable to any thorny issue China was facing. On Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, he had pointed out in 1978 that ‘it would be wise to shelve the issue if both sides fail to reach an agreement.’ A year later he proposed that China was willing to put aside the issue and seek common development of the resources in the vicinity of the island without referring to the sovereignty. The argument has been extended to the South China Sea as well but has not gone well with the disputed partied.

As regards India’s border dispute with China, Deng was hopeful of settling the issues peacefully. In 1982 while receiving a delegation from the Indian Council of Social Science Research led by G. Parthasarthi, he reiterated his “package deal” for the resolution of boundary issue. He told the delegation that when he met Vajpayee in 1979, he proposed to him the same and that ‘a little compromise from both the sides will solve the problem... if it cannot be solved immediately, we can put it aside....’ A few years later on December 21, 1988, 84 years old Deng had a historic 90 minutes long meeting with Rajiv Gandhi. Clasping Rajiv Gandhi’s hands for pretty long time he told the Indian Prime Minister that ‘let us forget the past and do everything with an eye on the future.’ The real ‘Century of Asia Pacific’ cannot have said arrived until India and China along with other developing countries in this region is not developed.  In 1992, in order to give another push to the reforms, he visited SEZs in south China and called for creating Chinese brands. Sincethen we have seen the emergence of Lenevo, Huawei, Haier, ZTE and many other brands in the international market. In 1996, the man who transformed China breathed his last ending his long March in the Chinese politics.

In conclusion, we see a versatile, authoritarian yet flexible personality in Deng Xiaoping, the person who salvaged China out of ‘movements’ that were full of political intrigues, internecine strife and purges. The ‘revisionists’ like Deng who were purged for ‘not raising the banner of Mao Zedong thought’ emerged paramount in post Mao China and replaced Mao’s thought with his own ‘theory.’ His demise did not witness any internecine political struggle and disruptions as Mao’s demise saw. The policies left by Deng were clearly future oriented and not as dysfunctional as during Mao’s time. One may say that if Mao was successful in turning China powerful (qiang), Deng Xiaoping succeeded in showing China how to acquire wealth (fu); the construct of fuqiang or a Chinese dream continues and it has to be seen how the fifth generation of Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping shapes this dream!