Death of the 16 December Rape Victim is not due to the spread of gangrene and multi-organ failure but due to the gangrenous India and its systems

Just returned from a 6 km long peaceful protest carried out by JNU community - From Ganga Dhaba to the bust stop where The  rape victim boarded the bus, and back to Ganga dhaba. Have the following thoughts about death:

Our society is full of utterly dirty, dreadful gangrenous toxic; the politico-bureaucratic class is the produce of this very toxic; the toxic is deeply entrenched in their minds. Its takes the death of a victim of heinous, horrendous and barbarous crime to talk about this toxic, but nothing happens once the matter dies down. I believe it is not the death of a victim, but the death of free India, if at all India is a free nation; it is not the gangrene that spread to her body, it is the gangrene that is festering in the body of India; it is not the multiple organs failure of the victim, but the multiple organ failure of the Indian system, be it the colonial police, judiciary, bureaucracy, railways and road transport, politics, governance or any other system, it is the failure of these systems where ugly, dirty and gangrenous toxic has alarmingly spread and still festering. I also believe that there is a strata of people in our society across all walks of life who have the conscience and sensitivity as to what needs to be done to this gangrenous toxic; and this is the time to wake up, and kill and remove the gangrenous sections of our systems for once and all, and transplant it with better mechanisms and systems where every citizen men, women, old and young live a dignified life.! Therefore, there is a need for a national campaign and continue the struggle for a better system!

From China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’: The rhetoric and more

Published in http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/ paper 5336 December 25, 2012

In the wake of China’s mammoth economic growth that catapulted China as the second largest economy of the world in 2010, and the military expenditure corresponding to its economy, everyone including the Chinese is talking about China’s rise and its emergence as a challenger to the unipolar world. Chinese think tanks and government alike on their part have been looking for their own answers in the best Confucian tradition where the rectification of names is attached great importance.  They came up with the concept of “Peaceful Rise of China” (Zhongguo de heping jueqi 中国的和平崛起) during the 1990s. However, the term became a fad after it was used by Zheng Bijian, the former Vice Principal of the Central Party School in November 2003 during the Boao Forum for Asia, and later by the outgoing Chinese President Hu Jintao in a speech on the occasion of the 110^th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong in December 2003. Hu Jintao (2003) had remarked that adherence to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics is adherence to the “developmental road of peaceful rise.” Following this, the term was used by Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting, and a speech at the Harvard University during his visit to the United States. Wen had tried to justify China’s rise and reassure the world when he said (Guo 2004: 2 in preface), “the developmental road China has taken is different from that taken by some major powers, and China’s developmental road is the road of peaceful rise.”

The jargon emphasizes the emergence of China as a “soft power” implying that China’s rise is not a threat to its neighbors and the world as a whole, and that China seeks to avoid conflict. According to Duan Bingren (2004:2-3 preface), the road of peaceful rise is a major innovation of China’s developmental strategic thought. Duan asserts that “the developmental road, China has sought, is a unique road seeking peace and mutual benefits; this not only will harmonize the international order, but will also enable China to uphold its independence, social system and choice of life style. The developmental road of peaceful rise, seeks harmony with others, partnership with China’s neighbors, and friendly coexistence with other countries on the basis of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Economically, it seeks integration with the globalization, and naturally seeks China’s new role in global development equations, thus becoming a constructive and responsible player in the international economic activities. Politically, the notion would enable China to actively and constructively participate in the international affairs, be a challenger rather than a moot spectator to the events and aspire for a democratic, peaceful and multi-polar world.” Therefore, the peaceful rise of China is an antidote to “hegemony”, “hot war”, “cold war”, “China threat”, “disintegration of China” etc. theories and notions; it is a promise to the world that the rise of China is peaceful.”  

 

However, the lexicon ran into rough weather as the think tanks in China tried to debate the pros and cons of the term. Many felt that the word “rise” would put its neighbors at unease, while others argued that it is premature to talk about the rise, as China largely remains a developing country. In the backdrop of such a debate, China changed the term ‘rise’ to ‘development’ when it published a white paper entitled “China’s peaceful development” in the beginning of 2006. Nevertheless, the terminology is still being widely used in government as well as academic circles across China.

The debate apart, the crux is whether the “rise” or “development” of China is going to be a smooth sail? If not what could be the dangers or challenges China would face? While contemplating on these questions, Xin Xiangyang (2004:2-3, preface II) posits that China would face four major external challenges: 1) Trade and commerce (challenges from world markets, world energy resources, and trade protectionism); 2) National security (traditional security threat, number of variables in its surrounding security environment, as well as non-traditional security issues); 3) External political challenges (disintegration and westernization of China, the penetration of Non Government Organizations (NGOs) in China, international terrorism and the increasingly large number of international criminal activities); 4) The US containment of China. Besides, Xin also outlines the following four internal challenges: 1) Population; 2) Resources and energy; 3) Environmental degradation; and 4) Social imbalance.

It has been widely speculated by the analysts that the priority of the fifth generation leadership under Xi Jinping would keep a low key profile as far as China’s foreign policy is concerned, and concentrate more on the internal challenges, especially the challenge of social imbalance. The challenge has manifested itself in China in various shapes and forms. Whether it is the question of food security, rural urban divide, peasant’s protests, the issue of rural education or migrant laborers, each and every issue is related to peasants, agriculture and the countryside, and is capable of derailing China rise or peaceful development.  Therefore, economic development, deepening of reforms and opening up is going to remain the top priority of the new leadership. It not only would help China to overcome the social imbalances but also equip it to deal with the external challenges in a better way.

Contrarily, it appears that of late China has shown signs of discarding the time tested strategy of Deng Xaoping as is well explained by his maxim “hide your strength, bide your time.’ Ever since the middle of the first decade of this century, especially the successful convocation of the Olympic Games in 2008, China started to take maximalist positions vis-à-vis conflicts with the neighboring countries, be it the Diaoyu/Senkaku row with Japan in the East China Sea, or with Vietnam, Philippines and other smaller disputing countries in the South China Sea, or its dispute with South Asian neighbors.  As China has started to define South China Sea as an area of core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet, it has taken the disputes to new stages by way of sending unmanned surveillance plane over disputed Diaoyu; standoff with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal; Chinese fishing vessels cutting the cables of Vietnamese Oil & Gas Group seismic ship in Vietnam controlled waters; announcing new rules for the region that authorize its police in the southern province of Hainan to board and seize foreign ships in the South China Sea; raising threats of conflict by establishing Sansha on Yongxing Island in the southernmost province of Hainan; threats to disrupt ONGC Videsh exploration in South China Sea and reiterating China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ in the region; initiating a new passport design containing a map claiming the South China Sea and disputed areas along the Sino-Indian border; and even flexing economic muscle against the smaller neighbors in the region by banning their exports on flimsy grounds.

Besides, since China’s economy has grown with a neck breaking speed all these years, its military spending has also increased manifolds. For example a decade back, it only spend around 20 billion USD on defense, the same has increase around five times in recent years. Last year when the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates met Hu Jintao in Beijing, China showcased its new fighter jet, the J-20 in Chengdu, Sichuan. China has also showcased its own drones that resemble the US Predator and Global Hawk. The US suspects Iran for giving China access to the US drone that was shot down by Iran within its territory. If People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has showcased its new assets, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has also commissioned its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning earlier in September this year. Two months later China landed J-15 on the Liaoning. Analysts believe that the aircraft carrier will allow Beijing to help project its military might in territorial disputes. China has also aggressively furthered its space program. Since 2007, China twice shot down its dysfunctional satellites with anti-satellite missiles thus displaying its capabilities to destroy spy satellites and space-based missile defense system of other countries, especially the US. These gestures from China has not only sent shockwaves to its neighbors, but has also challenged the US power projections. 

It is in this context that the US ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia should be seen. It is also in the light of above that smaller neighbors of China are increasingly looking at the US for countervailing China. Even countries like Philippines and Vietnam that have suffered the aggression from Japanese and the US are willing to forge closer ties with these countries. It is for the very reason that ASEAN countries are taking common and united position on the disputes in South China Sea, but they are equally aware of the fact that even if united it is still impossible to confront China.

Therefore, even if China frantically defends it ‘rise’ or ‘development’ as peaceful, the ‘China threat’ has once again raised its head to the discomfort of every party.  The situation may be changed to better once Xi Jinping takes charge of the party and military, as in recent pronouncements we have seen him showing difference. For example, in his interaction with foreign experts in China on December 5^th, he seems to have reiterated the essence of China’s peaceful development. He said China will not seek hegemony or expansionism and continue to open to the outside world. He also pronounced that China’s peaceful development does not seek selfish interests, and benefits by harming others, it seeks mutual benefits. Again between December 7 and 11, 2012 while touring southern China, he reiterated that ‘reforms and opening up is unstoppable.’ I believe this doesn’t prove to be a mere rhetoric as has been the case in recent times. China being a developing country still needs Deng’s wisdom as regards the disputes relating to sovereignty. China has resorted to military means to solve its disputes or exerts sovereignty several times, if that happens again, the long-term goals of China, especially attaining the level of a moderately developed country by the middle of this century would be seriously subverted, and the fruits of being a beneficiary of globalization lost for a few reefs and rocks here and there.

References:

Duan Binren (2004). “破解世界性、世纪性课题” (Topic of this century and of worldwide importance). Guo Wanchao (2004). 中国崛起：一个东方大国的成长之路 (The Rise of China: Developmental Path of an Oriental Nation) Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang.

Guo Wanchao (2004). 中国崛起：一个东方大国的成长之路 (The Rise of China: Developmental Path of an Oriental Nation) Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang.

Hu Jintao (2003). “胡锦涛在纪念毛泽东同志诞辰110周年座谈会 上的讲话” (Hu Jintao's Speech at the 110^th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong” in Liberation Daily, December 27, 2003.

Xin Xiangyang (2004). “大视野中的中国崛起” (Grand vision of China’s Rise). Guo Wanchao (2004). 中国崛起：一个东方大国的成长之路 (The Rise of China: Developmental Path of an Oriental Nation) Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang.

Dr. B R Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. The views expressed are his own. He could be reached at bdeepak@mail.jnu.ac.in

狄伯杰:中国领导人交替对印度的意义

（2012-12-24）新加坡早报导读 ● 狄伯杰（B R Deepak）

除了薄熙来事件造成的一些干扰，中共十八大高层权力的交替可以说是顺利 的。从明年3月开始，习近平将集党、政、军重任于一身；李克强则将出任国务院总理。然而，同10年前相比，中国的宏观与微观经济与政治环境都更为艰巨。因 此，平稳接过领导棒子的新领导人将面对诸多挑战。在能够制定重大决策前，他们需要一、两年甚至更多的时间来巩固领导地位。新领导人的首要考虑，是因为出口 锐减、社会不平衡及贪污加剧而受损的国内经济。
　 新领导人面对人民期望很高的压力。这是因为胡锦涛掌权期间，中国的国内生产总值（GDP）从区区的1.2万亿美元，跃升至7.2万亿美元。要在改革开放的势头上取得进一步发展，及到2020年全面实现小康社会是非常艰巨的工作。

　 政治上，胡锦涛在同邻国边界纠纷的课题上采取了坚定的立场，新领导人要退却或更强硬都很困难。有鉴于此，中国的外交政策将是低调的，强调持续性并在不同的层次上维持现状。让我们来看看，在这个着重持续性和维持现状的模式里，印度应如何自处。

边界问题：
　 胡锦涛对解决同邻国的边界纠纷，采取了前所未有的强硬立场。经历了过去30年的38轮谈判后，中国和印度双方官员仍然未能达成任何协议。
　 就像之前的正式双边谈判一样，即将于明年3月退下来的中国国务委员戴秉国与印度国家安全顾问梅农（Shiv Shankar Menon）于12月3日举行的非正式谈判，也没有任何实质效果，虽然梅农在访问中国后表示在边界争议上取得“相当的进展”。
　 梅农是不是说在“实际控制线”（Line of Actual Control）的课题上有了协议？如果是这样，就真的可以称得上是“相当的进展”。然而，一般的看法，是这些特使水平的谈判已经没有意义了，双方只是勉 为其难的让它继续下去。15轮的特使谈判的结果，只是一份将提呈给双方政府的“共同认知报告书”。
　 依我看，要取得任何突破几乎是不可能的，因为双方对不同地段的“实际控制线”有截然不同的意见。中印在今年1月于新德里召开的第15轮谈判期间建立的“边 境事务磋商和协调工作机制协定”（Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs），及中国外交部长杨洁篪于今年3月提出的海事合作建议（联合对付海盗与分享海床研究的科技），只是为安全课题增添了一些新层面，并没有显 示解决问题的决心。
　 因此，在接下来的四、五年，我们只能期望中国在边界纠纷上维持同样立场，把问题留给下一代。

贸易：
　 中国新领导人真正关注的会是双边贸易。它可以在一定程度上维持中国的国内增长，也提供维持双边关系的基础。其次，因为美国将在印度寻求更多贸易、投资、创造就业及经济增长，中国肯定也会在印度市场里争取大份额，不论是在基础建设、电力与能源、电信或银行领域。
　 一个超过200人的中国代表团出席了于11月26-27日在新德里举行的中印“战略经济对话”便是明证。这也显示，经济已在双边关系中变得比其他任何悬而未决的课题重要，包括边界纠纷。
　 日益扩大的贸易逆差与萎缩的贸易额，让双边贸易的前景看来很暗淡。中印双边贸易总额在去年创下739亿美元历史新高，但印度对中国的贸易逆差也增至270 亿美元。今年，双边贸易额下滑，在头10月只有556亿美元，贸易逆差则是230亿美元。双方都已承诺在2015年把双边贸易总额提高到1000亿美元， 但贸易逆差的加剧和贸易额的萎缩，却给双方未来领导人带来了新的挑战。
　 不过，中印在“战略经济对话”上所签署的11项总值高达52亿美元的合作备忘录可能有所帮助。大多数投资是在私人领域，主要项目是中国广东明阳风电集团与 印度信实能源（Reliance Power Ltd）间金额高达30亿美元的合作，及印度NIIT集团投资8亿美元与海南省在海南共同建立一个资讯科技知识园。
　 这是中印的第二次“战略经济对话”，因此，印度自然可以期待中国的第五代领导人放弃较谨慎和渐进的传统方式，采取更积极的态度。
　 若中国可以让印度公司更容易进入其广大市场来解决贸易逆差问题，印度也会加以回报。高铁和其他基础建设项目的投资，对两国都是大好机会。
　 对印度来说，这是学习中国经验的机会。过去30年积累的经验，让中国有能力研发自己的技术、改良制造业设施、引进新的管理方式并在许多领域变得自力更生， 比如重型机械和电脑硬件。印度也可以借鉴中国开放零售业的经验，研究中国如何保护农民的利益、农民如何被引进新的供应链、及中国如何成功开发自己的零售业 品牌，给西方品牌如沃尔玛（Walmart）和家乐福（Carrefour）有力的竞争。
　 若一切进展顺利，双边贸易额在习近平当权期间，可能跃升到2500亿美元或更多。

西藏：

西藏和边界问题是相连的。边界问题一日不解决，中印关系便一直会受西藏问题影响。截至今年11月30日，在西藏自治区和其他藏族居住区引火自焚的藏人已高 达90人，并引起国际社会的关注。中国把矛头指向“达赖集团”，指它领导这些“分离主义阴谋”。胡锦涛指派心腹令计划负责西藏政策，在西藏实行“严打”行 动，一方面以维持稳定和安全为理由，另一方面则是针对推动“分离主义”的达赖喇嘛。
　 中国新领导人应该会延续胡锦涛对西藏的政策。习近平的父亲习仲勋在80年代负责西藏工作，对达赖和少数民族采取较温和的态度。如果习近平有受到父亲的任何 影响，对西藏就可能稍微没有那么强硬。这从哪些人出任真正制定西藏政策的中共中央西藏工作协调小组成员便可以看出端倪。
　 既然中国领导人的重点是经济发展，我相信西藏会获得更多基础设施上的投资，比如公路和铁路，其旅游业也会有进一步发展。
　 西藏的基础设施建设已引起印度的关注。印度国防部长安东尼（A K Antony）去年3月说：“西藏自治区公路网络总长在2010年估计约为5万8000公里。青藏铁路至日喀则的延伸线，及新疆自治区喀什－和田铁路的工 程正在进行”。此外，西藏还有五个为战机提供支持的机场。
　 安东尼进一步表示，印度正采取符合其国家安全利益的“必要步骤”。除了军事现代化，我们可以看到，印度和中国都尝试加强边界的军事力量。这些可以让沿“实际控制线”地区的局势变得更紧张，并破坏区域的安全环境。
　 对中国新领导人和2014年后的印度新领导人来说，探讨更好的机制来维持和平，和更好的方式来解决悬而未决的课题，将是一大挑战。

恐怖主义：
　 美国在2014年从阿富汗撤军后，普遍的看法是阿富汗－巴基斯坦区域动荡不安的情况将进一步恶化。新的局势对中国新领导人将是重大的考验。
　 习近平会不会延续中国目前力挺巴基斯坦的政策，还是会顾及印度与美国对恐怖主义和跨国恐怖主义的担忧？中国学者承认，“单维性”的中国－巴基斯坦关系重点在军事安全合作，完全没有“内生性”目标，纯粹是为了对抗印度的“外部安全关切”。
　 他们进一步表示，“在很大程度上，这种合作关系是建立在巴基斯坦与印度及中国与印度的长期敌对关系上。印度有很长一段时间一直是巴基斯坦的头号敌人，也对 中国西部的安全构成严重威胁。因此，中国不承认跨界恐怖主义的说法，尤其是在南亚，虽然它清楚知道跨界民族主义的存在，及这对同包括印度在内的八个国家接 壤的新疆的影响。

中国政府表示，中国西部的安全已经受到恐怖主义、分离主义、极端主义及毒品走私活动的威胁。根据来自中国的消息，新疆有超过50个东突厥斯坦分离主义组织；1990-2001年间共发生360宗恐怖袭击事件，造成162丧生，超过440人受伤。
　 中国向来把极端主义或宗教原教旨主义归咎于源自乌兹别克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦的泛伊斯兰原教旨主义，指其追随者进行走私武器、支持东突厥斯坦解放组织、及在新疆制造不稳定和极端主义。
　 对巴基斯坦，中国则保持沉默，虽然自2001年开始，中国便承认卡伊达一直同新疆“恐怖主义者”紧密合作。维基泄密名为关塔那摩（Gitmo）的文件清楚 显示，中国的“全天候朋友”巴基斯坦确实为维吾尔分离主义分子提供训练营。除了数以百计的塔利班人，关塔那摩监狱中还有22名维吾尔人，他们大多数是在巴 基斯坦被捕的。
　 在这样的背景下，中国新领导人会不会停止从同巴基斯坦的关系来看待恐怖主义？美国从阿富汗撤军后，中国支持巴基斯坦在那里扮演主导角色上会不会持谨慎态 度，还是会倡议一个所有国家，包括印度、巴基斯坦和中国都有利害关系的区域处理方式？必须紧记的，是巴基斯坦和阿富汗若出现不稳定，不但对南亚有灾难性后 果，对中国也是如此，尤其是在新疆。

南中国海：
　 中国是在近年才开始把南中国海定位为除了台湾和西藏外的“核心利益”。印度在这个区域的存在受到中国多种方法的挑战：2011年7月22日对印度海军攻击 舰“INS Airavat”号的威胁；2012年6月中国解放军海军一艘护卫舰，向印度护卫舰INS Shivalik F-47）发出“欢迎来到南海，Foxtrot-47。”的信息；及干扰印度国有石油天然气公司（ONGC）海外投资子公司Videsh在南中国海的勘探 工作。此外，中国也重申对南中国海拥有无可争议的主权。
　 印度则响应美国的立场，呼吁维护南中国海航运自由，因为全球三分之一的商船航线经过这里。中国希望美国和其他区域尊重其“核心利益”，它不希望美国插手南中国海事务，在与菲律宾、越南、文莱、马来西亚和日本等区域国家陷入主权纠纷之际，更不愿意谈什么民主国家联盟。
　 中国在今年11月宣布新规定，授权海南省公安登临和扣押进入南中国海的外国船只。这做法已经受到其他主权声索国的批评，尤其是越南和菲律宾。新规定将让区域局势更为紧张，较小的国家也会投入美国怀抱。
　 美国宣布把60％军力集中在亚太地区并大力呼吁维护南中国海航运自由，让中国感到不安。
印 度海军总司令乔什（D.K Joshi）在11月3日表示，中国海军的快速现代化让人“深切关注”，并表示印度不排除向南中国海派遣武力来保护它在那里的利益。中国立刻发表声明，表 示“中国反对在南中国海有争议地区任何单边的石油和天然气勘探活动，希望有关国家尊重中国的主权和国家利益，及区域内国家通过双边谈判解决纠纷的努力。”

不管印度是否有能力维护它在区域的利益，印度决策者应该很清楚，从历史来看，每当美国与中国立场一致时，印度便处于不利地位。相反的，每当美国向印度靠拢时，中国对印度便没有那么强硬。
　 中国对美国把战略“重心”转移到亚洲感到担忧，而美国总统奥巴马在他的第二个任期内可能进一步巩固和加强这个转移。然而，阿富汗与中东的经验，让美国不太可能真正在区域的冲突中进行干预。美国将继续扮演离岸平衡者（offshore balancer）的角色。
　 中国在同邻国的领土争端上已采取了坚定的立场，新领导人可以让课题进一步升级或维持现状。然而，有鉴于其宏观与微观政治经济环境，中国第五代领导人更有可 能维持现状，并回到邓小平“搁置争议，共同开发”的主张。在这样的情况下，比起前几年，印度将引起中国更多的注意力，虽然美国依然会是中国的焦点。
作者是印度尼赫鲁大学
中国与东南亚研究中心主任。