Prof. B. R. Deepak
Professor B. R. Deepak (狄伯杰) was trained in Chinese history and India-China relations at the Peking University and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and University of Edinburgh, UK. He has been the Nehru and Asia Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing. Dr. Deepak's latest publications include India and China: Foreign Policy Approaches and Responses (2016) and Confucius Sukti Sangrah (The Analects of Confucius).
Tuesday, November 24, 2020
Friday, December 30, 2016
UNSCR 1267: Will China let the 'Hold' go or Block it?
China’s ‘technical
hold’ on India's move to put a ban on the Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Maulana
Masood Azhar under the 1267 Sanctions
Committee of the UN expires on 31 December. China could either let the ‘hold’
lapse or ‘block’ the move. In former’s case move will put a ban on Azhar, and
in latter’s case save him from the sanctions. If China let the hold lapse, it
will demonstrate a shift in China’s stand on terrorism vis-a-vis India and
Pakistan, and its intention to push India-China relations to new heights. It
will also earn huge goodwill in India and the stereotype image of China in
India may change for better. Conversely, if it blocks the move, rather than
earning goodwill, its image as a troublemaker rather as the supporter of cross
border terror in the subcontinent will be too obvious to the Indian people,
which in effect will further jeopardize bilateral relations. Will China change
its course on cross border terror?
I believe, given China’s
huge stakes in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and its eagerness to
collaborate with India on various projects that could well form part of the
ambitious Belt and Road initiative, China may change its course. On 28 December
2016 former Chinese consulate general in Kolkata, Mao Siwei indicated in an
article on his blog that ‘China must hold high moral ground’ as regards
counter terrorism spat between India and Pakistan. He argued
that “it is time for China to list Masood Azhar in 1267 terror list respecting
the sentiments of 1.3 billion Indian people, and tell the world that it would
like to play a responsible role in the global governance, at the same time will
indicate to Pakistan that no doubt we are iron brothers but don't fish in the
troubled waters!’ These are perhaps succinct, straightforward yet strongest
words coming from a former Chinese diplomat and a columnist in China. He argues
that Indian Prime Minister Modi’s goodwill visit to Pakistani Prime Minister
Sharif was responded to an attack on the Pathankot Air Base by the ‘non-state
armed group’ thus scuttling the reconciliations before it could kick off. He says, ‘this incident proved once again that Pakistan's non-state
armed groups do have the capacity to influence the state-to-state relations
between India and Pakistan.’
The former diplomat posits that ‘the
issue of sanctions against Azhar has became a major issue affecting Sino-Indian
relations.’ According to him, the issue is an important factor for the decline
of Sino-Indian relations in 2016. Giving minute details of terror activities of
the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed right from the attack on the Indian
Parliament in 2001, Mumbai terror attack which he terms as India’s 9.11, to
this year’s Pathankot attack, and the formation of the 1267 Sanction Committee
of the UN and the role China played in it since its inception, he posits that
‘it is the time that China must take advantage of the Indian move, give it a
serious thought, adjust China’s position, and get out of the diplomatic
passivity that 1267 list has put China in. China adjusting its position
will send very positive signals to all the parties concerned. ‘As regards
Pakistan, China cherishes its strategic partnership with Pakistan, but also
urges it not to fish in the troubled waters; as far as India is concerned, China’s
desire to develop friendly relations with India is sincere, and that it attaches
importance to the sentiments of 1.3 billion Indian people; and to the world, China
will demonstrate that it is a responsible major power, willing to play more
active role in global governance.’
If China readjusts it
position, we will find an upward movement in India-China relations, and perhaps
the initiation of dialogue process with Pakistan too. Also, the counter terrorism engagement with China could be deepened. Above all, the goodwill China will
earn in India will necessarily translate into greater level of economic
engagement between the two.
Friday, December 9, 2016
India-US Relations: Hard to tell which way the wind will blow?
The
outgoing US Defense Secretary, Aston Carter included India in his last overseas
trip besides the close allies of the US such as Japan, Bahrain, Israel, Italy
and the UK. He will reach India on 8 December and will hold wide ranging
discussions with Indian Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar and other leaders. Strategic
and technological cooperation between India and the US has been at its best
during Carter’s tenure, which saw both inking the landmark Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and India joining the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
Ahead of his India visit, speaking at the
Regan
National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California on 4 December, Carter said, “The
US-India defense relationship is the closest it’s ever been. Through our
strategic handshake – with America reaching west in the re-balance, and India
reaching east in what Prime Minister Modi calls his Act East policy – our two
nations are exercising together by air, land and sea like never before.” As
regards technological cooperation, he said, “We also have a technological
handshake — as the US — India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),
grasps hands with Prime Minister Modi's Make in India campaign — that's helping
our countries move toward more diverse co-development and co-production of
weapons systems.” Though the agenda of Carter’s
this visit appears to be limited, no progress is expected on the two pending
foundational agreements – the Communications Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) that
would have enabled both countries to exchange
communication between the militaries, and the sharing of geospatial data. However, it is speculated that the agenda may include
M777 and Predator Guardian for the Indian Navy.
Yet,
with president-elect Donald Trump in White House from mid January, there are
anxieties in the power corridors in both the countries albeit it has been expected
that strategic, economic and technological partnership between India and the US
will be further consolidated and the labor Carter has put in will not be lost.
Since Major Defense Partner (MDP) status bestowed by the US on India, a
nomenclature exclusively created for India, and the (LEMOA) remains in limbo
and non-operational, and uncertainties outweighs the optimism as of now.
Especially when Trump has picked up Lt. Gen James “Mad Dog” Mattis for the
office of Defense Secretary, who, is thought to be inclined favorably towards Pakistan,
as has been demonstrated when he headed the US Central Command from 2010 to
2013.
However,
Pakistani establishment having written off the US as a declining power and
having embraced China even tightly may change such an equation, nonetheless,
Pakistan will work hard to encash Mattis’ goodwill. If General Mattis is
favorably inclined towards Pakistan, India has found solace in the new National
Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, a former Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency who have vociferously spoken about Pakistan’s betrayal of
the US and sheltering of terrorists by the former. Moreover, as Trump’s
domestic and foreign policy is being speculated to be that of retrenchment and
de-escalation, the US would no longer be a cash cow, not even to its allies. Furthermore,
in strategic circles in India, India-US relationship has long been
de-hyphenated from Pakistan, albeit it has been increasingly looked through the
prism of China.
More
than these speculations, during Carter’s visit, both sides are likely to
discuss the impact of the political transition in Washington on the strategic
and technological cooperation between the two. It is widely believed that both
sides would continue to work along the institutional mechanisms such as the
DTTI and MDP created during the Obama administration. It is also believed that Prime
Minister Modi has established a good rapport with president-elect Trump. Modi’s
take on the transition was that there is no reason to apprehend any dramatic
change in bilateral relations. He believes that Trump would be favorably
inclined towards India. Yet, it is too early to predict the unpredictable Trump,
it is hard to tell which way the wind will blow, therefore, one really needs to
wait and watch!
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Sino-US Rivalry in South China Sea: A New Normal?
South China Sea (SCS) which encompasses
an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan,
consisting of Dongsha, Xisha (known as Paracel), Zhongsha (also Huangyan
in Chinese) and Nansha (Spratly) islands, has long been a bone of
contention between China and Southeast Asian countries. Presently of
these Zhongsha and Xisha are under the actual jurisdiction of China;
Dongsha under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, and Nansha being fiercely
contested by various countries in the region. The western, northeastern
and southwestern areas of Nansha are under the actual jurisdiction of
Vietnam, Philippine and Malaysia respectively. Of these islets 8 are
controlled by China, 1 by Taiwan, 29 by Vietnam, 8 by Philippine, 5 by
Malaysia and 2 by Brunei.
Various claimants have been passing
legislations claiming certain islets. Last year in February, Philippines
Senate and House of Representatives passed Baseline Bill and declared
its ownership over Scarborough (Huangyan) island and some others in
Spratly. A few months later Vietnam too passed its Maritime Law
declaring indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands.
China claims the entire South China Sea and has expressed outrage over
these declarations, and further reinforced its claims by increasing the
level of governance on the disputed islands; the establishment of Sansha
city, a garrison in Zhongsha, inviting bids to explore resources in
some of the disputed islands, and now the dredging and reclamation of
some of the islets and reefs are manifestations of China’s show of
strength and above all the assertion of its sovereignty in the region.
SCS reclamation row
Recent reclamation of islands and
building soft infrastructure such as lighthouses on reclaimed islets has
escalated not only into a war of words between the US and China but
also flared tensions in the region as the US PACOM has initiated
surveillance of Chinese reclamation activities and installation of
mobile artillery vehicles in the reclaimed reefs and shoals. The US
believes that China is fortifying these areas and may threaten the
regional stability. Conversely China argues that the facilities are
primarily for public services. The war of words was carried out all the
way to Shang-Ri La Dialogue held in Singapore between 29 and 31 May
2015. The US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reiterated the US
position that it was within its right to protect the freedom of
navigation and overflight, and called for an “immediate and lasting halt
to land reclamation by all claimants.” Though Carter made reference to
reclamation by others too, however, the criticism was primarily directed
towards China, which he said, has reclaimed over 800 hectares, more
than all other claimants combined and has done so in only the last 18
months. Though he did not directly accuse China of moving artillery
vehicles to the reclaimed areas, but was categorical when he said that
they “oppose any further militarization of disputed features.”
Rejecting Carter’s contentions, China’s
Deputy Chief of General Staff, Admiral Sun Jianguo retorted that
reclamation work in anyway does not affect the freedom of navigation and
overflight, it is the US who in the garb of freedom of navigation wants
to interfere in the dispute. Explaining the kind of reclamation
activities China was undertaking, he said it has built an ocean survey
station for the United Nations on Yongshu reef, and have initiated the
construction of two multi-functional lighthouses on the Huayang and
Chigua reefs with an objective to provide better international public
services in the realms of maritime search and rescue operations,
disaster prevention and relief, marine research, meteorological studies,
environmental protection, navigation safety and fishery production etc.
therefore, China’s reclamation is “justified, legitimate and
reasonable.” Back in Beijing, Hua Chunying, the spokeswomen of Ministry
of Foreign affairs reacted fiercely to Carter’s criticism of China when
she said no one has the right to dictate China’s moves.
China’s perceptions
First and foremost, China believes that
apart from controlling most of the choke points in Indo-Pacific, the US
is also attempting to control other swathes of marine territory and
vital lanes, so that the US has greater maneuverability on the one hand
and contain China on the other. Conversely, Reclamation by China will
deny that strategic space to the US. Moreover, in long run the Malacca
Straight dilemma would be overcome by ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy,
especially the Sino-Pak Economic Corridor; therefore, no wonder the US
is becoming more aggressive in the SCS. Two, China considers the US as
an outsider in the region as it is neither located in the region nor
does it have any sovereignty disputes with China or any other country in
the region, therefore, besides maintaining it hegemony and containing
China, the US has no locus standi in the SCS. Three, China
perceives the US as an instigator of the dispute encouraging countries
like Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and of late inciting South Korea and
India to join the chorus in its policy of containing China. It feels
that the US meddling will internationalize, complicate the situation and
more importantly dent China image internationally. Four, China blames
the US for having double standards, for the latter “chooses selective
silence” toward those who illegally occupy territories claimed by China
as was stated by Hua Chunying recently. It believes that the US has
never objected to the reclamation activities of other claimants such as
Vietnam which has ‘occupied’ maximum area in Spratly; asking all claimants to
halt reclamation is just a lip service. Five, the US which is not the
signatory of the UNCLOS, has on the contrary argued that the UNCLOS
grants foreign ships and planes free access beyond a 12 nautical mile
territorial limit. The PA-8 surveillance aircraft of the US has followed
these norms, however, have been warned by China to leave the area as
China claims that military flights cannot cross its 200 mile exclusive
economic zone without its permission. The US fears that China’s
intentions are to make a fait accompli in the region by
dredging and reclamation that will adversely impact on the freedom of
navigation in the region. Had the US been a signatory to the UNCLOS, it
might have taken China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea on the navigation issue. Six, China is aware that the US has
maintained neutrality as far as the issue of sovereignty is concerned,
therefore, has preferred to engage the claimants bilaterally, and has
expressed its commitment towards the Code of Conduct negotiated by the
ASEAN in 2002. However, if the US has not taken sides, it has also
objected to China’s sovereignty over these reclaimed reefs. This is
evident when Carter told his audience at Shang-Ri La that “Turning an
underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of
sovereignty.” Seven, China is optimistic and confident about its
success, and knows that most of the world including the US shares this
viewpoint including some of its legal basis in the dispute, as was
demonstrated by Barack Obama on June 1st before leaving to
Jamaica. Obama said that “the truth is, is that China is going to be
successful, it’s big, it’s powerful, its people are talented and they
work hard and, and it may be that some of their claims are legitimate.”
But he also warned China to stop “throwing elbows” in SCS. Finally,
China is aware that the US would not like to confront China seriously in
the region and will not cross the 12 nautical miles territorial limit
for surveillance, if it does, there may be miscalculation and the
stability in the region will be threatened.
A zero sum game?
Freedom of navigation may not be a
serious an issue comparing the territorial claims, especially when more
than 700 islets, reefs and shoals estimated to have oil reserves of 7
billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are at stake.
All the 9 ASEAN claimants are pitched against China and dependant on
the US for diplomatic and military support. However, as the economic
interests of these countries are highly intertwined with those of China,
they may not like to confront China openly and alone. China has
declared South China Sea as one of its core interests along with Tibet
and Xinjiang where negotiations are out of question. The hard-line
emanating from Zhongnanhai is that China will continue its reclamation
activities and resist the US by various psychological, media, political
and legal etc. warfare. As for the US, with its ‘pivot to Asia’ the US
Navy would be testing China’s claims in the South China Sea, and may
cross the 12 nautical mile limit as well, which may force China to
impose a new ADIZ over SCS on the lines of Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, and
the rivalry may lead to mishaps and miscalculations.
Since China is also gradually transiting
from a continental power to maritime power, the confrontation in the
Indo-Pacific between the established global power and a rising one may
be a new normal in coming times. China is aware of the asymmetry in
force structure with the US irrespective of its second strike
capability. Nevertheless, as China grows economically, the gaps are
likely to be plugged in and new anti access/area denial weapons included
its armor. While China is expected to engage the US as well as ASEAN
at the highest level and sell its common development and win-win
cooperation, nonetheless, it will also heighten its military
preparedness for any eventuality and protracted contest with the US. If
the push comes to shove, the US may abandon its present position on
freedom of navigation, unimpeded passage for commercial shipping, which
anyway is not tenable, in favor of greater economic concessions from
China, for asking or threatening China to halt its reclamation
activities will not work at all.
Monday, May 18, 2015
Chinas humanitarian and international aid: Background and goals
1.
China
has paid increasing effort in humanitarian aid in the past few years. What do
you think is the background and goal of this move?
First and foremost, I believe
event in the late 1980s eroded some of the credibility of the Party and the
forces, therefore, the Party as well as the PLA undertook various tasks to
restore the reputation and rebuild ties with the people and society. Disaster
relief operations at home and abroad and peacekeeping operations abroad
provided a excellent platform to ‘serve the people’ again. We may refer to
humanitarian efforts in 1998 amidst Yangtse, Nenjiang, and Songhua Jiang flood
relief operation, combating the SARS in 2003; Wenchuan earthquake relief
operations in full media glare in 2008 and recent overseas evacuation of
Chinese civilians from Libya and Yemen, as well as disaster relief during Nepal
earthquake.
Secondly, couple of decades back,
China neither had standardized norms nor the scientific and technological
support for such operations, obviously owing to weak economy. The robust
economic growth in the past three decades provided an impetus to perfect the
mechanisms as well as employ technology in such efforts. For example it was
only in 1997 that disaster relief for the first time was officially brought
under the ambit of PLA military operations. In June 2005 more elaborate regulations as regards the army joining relief and rescue
operations were promulgated by the State Council and Central Military
Commission, whereby, the task, organisation, command, coordination and
logistics were clearly defined. Therefore, we can say that once China had set its
house in order and displayed some confidence in handling such crises it was
easier for it to go trans borders to signal the arrival of a benign power in
neighborhood if not at global stage.
2. What
are the characteristics of China’s international aid and what have changed over
the years?
China’s
international aid is in sync with its status as a developing country, however, is
also part of its international obligations. As stated by a White Paper issued
on foreign aid in 2011 China does not attach any political strings to the
international aid. It was again in the 1990s that China started to streamline
its international aid policy. In 1993, it set up the Foreign Aid
Fund for Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects with interest-free loans; in
1995, Export-Import Bank of China, began to provide medium- and long-term
low-interest loans to developing countries. Most of the aid has gobe for
building capacities and developing skills and thus becoming partner in the
development of other developing countries.
China has carefully chosen
quantity of international aid depending upon the kind of relationship it has
with certain country. With pivot countries like Pakistan and other friendly
countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan etc. that could be converted into
pivots China has whole heartedly supported their cause; however, it has
differentiated with those with whom it has problems, for example the
Philippines. China and Philippines are embroiled on territorial issues in South
China Sea, and Philippines has even approached the International Court of
Justice for arbitration.
3. China
is still a developing country and some Chinese netizens find it unfair that the
government is diverting money overseas. What do you think about this situation?
China is considerably a well off
society at present; the living standards of the people have been enhanced
tremendously over the past three decades of reforms. Today China is the second
largest economy of the world with a whopping 4 trillion dollars foreign
exchange reserves. Even during the worst of times China did commit
international aid to poor and developing countries in cash or kind; and today
when it can afford, it would be failing Chinese leadership as well as society
for not undertaking its desired international obligations. There may be a bunch
of overzealous and radicalized nationalist ‘angry youths’ in China here and
there, but the kind of credibility and responsibility international community would
like China to undertake with its rising economic and military stature weigh
heavier than the howling of the netizens. By way of international aid
both your hard and soft power is at play, China’s image and acceptability would
be dented severely if it does not responds swiftly to humanitarian crises and
aid swiftly.
4. Any
thoughts on the Chinese state propaganda on this issue? Are they doing a good
job?
If your words match your deed
then propaganda is justifiable, if it does not the propaganda may backfire. It
connects Party and Army to the society or vice versa, and also encourages those
who are engaged in relief and rescue operations. Above all it also eases some
of the concerns of China’s growing military power internationally.
5. From
Yemen evacuation to Nepal disaster relief, do you think China is taking its
responsibility or claiming its rising power in those regions? In the same way,
what do you think about China’s aid in Africa?
I believe it is natural for China
to react this way, it is the need of the hour, for as China integrates into
world economic system, its overseas interests gets intertwined with its
national interests. Be it Chinese national engaged in business and
developmental projects abroad or China’s involvement in overseas energy and
resources or the sea lines of communication, defending these interests have
been integrated to PLA’s new historic missions. On the other hand while
chartering into new waters it signifies that China is also ready to shoulder
new responsibilities. However, it may be
too early to say that China would be seeking a role of a new regional power in
the regions; however, the day may not be far when China would be able to
project its power beyond its traditional spares of influence.
Notwithstanding the western
criticism that emerging economies of Asia are neo-colonialists of Africa, the
local governments in Africa and China see the relationship and Chinese
investment as a ‘win-win’ partnership. Contrary to International Monetary
Fund’s and World Bank’s stringent debt financing to these countries, China’s
credit lines have been likened by most African countries. Besides, China
is also engaged in humanitarian projects in Africa. During the5th Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing in July 2012, Chinese President Hu
Jintao listed 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20
agricultural technology demonstration centers for such projects across
Africa. Thousands of unutilized hectares of land has been leased to Chinese
companies by many African countries for developing agriculture in various
African countries, which obviously has been termed as ‘land grab’ by many
western countries.
China-Africa cooperation has
contributed to Africa's development with a keen focus on social development and
people's wellbeing. The aim is to improve Africa's investment environment and
its people's lives. Numerous infrastructure projects built with Chinese
assistance, including schools, hospitals, stadiums and urban water and power
supply systems, have improved the living and working conditions of African
people. To lessen Africa's burden, China had altogether canceled RMB20 billion
worth of debts owed by African countries by the end of 2013.’ He revealed that
in 2013, China-Africa trade reached US$210 billion, 2,000 times that of 1960.
China has been Africa's biggest trading partner for five years running. More
than 2,500 Chinese companies are operating in Africa, creating over 100,000
jobs for the local communities. In 2013 over 1.4 million Chinese visited Africa
generating huge amount of exchange revenue for Africa.
6. Is
the PLA Navy gaining more responsibility in overseas aid programs now? If so, why? And in what form?
Ever since China
established a response mechanism for emergency humanitarian relief and aid in
foreign countries in September 2004, the PLA navy has acted very swiftly. For
example, during 2004 tsunami, China launched one of the largest ever emergency
relief operations, and provided over 100 million dollar aid to the disaster hit
countries. Obviously, owing to China’s overseas interests listed above in
future, we will see the PLAN and PLAAF taking such more responsibilities as we
witnessed during the Libyan and Yemen crisis.
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Modi's China visit: Can India and China think differently?
In the times of globalization and
intertwining economic interests at regional and trans-regional levels, the
cooperation and crisis management has become increasingly important for a
sustainable domestic as well as external economic development and environment. No one denies the role played by confidence building measures (CBMs) in
maintaining peace and tranquility along the border, avoiding conflict, and thus
creating a congenial atmosphere for cooperation not only at bilateral level but
also at regional and multilateral organizations. CBMs signed between India and China in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and latest
Border Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2013 is a pointer as most of the border
negotiations have been held under the aegis of these mechanisms. However, the
sensitive nature of the border has also called for ‘out of the box’ resolutions,
for these have fallen short of finding a solution.
From border to more complex issues
It was argued by most of the Indian and
Chinese scholars that if there is an issue between India and China, it is the
border issue. Padma Bhushan Prof. Ji Xianlin called it a ‘dark cloud’ shadowing
the brilliance of two great civilizations. However, six decades down the
independence, we have been overshadowed by more complex issues such as Sino-Pak
entente, China’s involvement in the POK, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific,
and many more non-traditional security issues including the trade deficit and trans-border
rivers. As far as the border is concerned, it has acquired complexity as both
India and China has made fait accompli of the border, China in the
western sector and India in the eastern sector especially when the issue is
being discussed at the special representative level. In such a situation forget
about the resolution, even defining the LAC could be a herculean task. The onus
is on the Chinese side, if they want to have normal diplomatic and economic
relations with India, it should be China in a hurry to resolve the issue not
India, for it cast a negative shadow on China’s image in India, and we cannot
expect to have normal and robust economic engagement which is necessary for
developing and sustaining economies on both side of the Himalayas. China has to take India on board for
realizing the Asian Century, and also for rewriting the rules of global
political architecture.
India an opportunity for China and vice
versa
At the outset India needs a new and
realistic farsighted foreign policy strategy that transcends conventional
approaches. Conventional thinking has argued that we must not open for China be
it the border regions or maritime domain. But did we succeed in preventing
China making forays in our neighborhood? If not it’s better to be the part of
value chain rather than being a moot spectator from outside. Today, China is
our largest trading partner in goods, albeit there are issues pertaining to the
trade deficit and market access to some of the Indian companies in China. While
market access to the Indian company is well argued, the issue of Chinese
investment in India has been seen with much skepticism and caution, but there
are clear dividends. For example Chinese investment in telecom sector in India
has successfully universalized mobile phone connectivity in India with
affordable rates. It is not because of Nokia and Ericson, but because of the tough
competition these companies received from Chinese telecom giants like Huawei
and ZTE. Similarly, if India would like to build state of the art express ways,
high speed railways, renewable energy capacity, even commercial ports and ship
building with Chinese expertise, capital and competitive prices should be
welcome.
‘Belt and Road’ initiative of China
So far India has maintained silence towards
joining the initiative, for such initiatives have been construed as part of ‘strategic
encirclement’ of India by security analysts and has clubbed with China’s
similar but smaller initiatives such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the prospective Trans-Himalayan
Economic Zone of Cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan, and the BCIM Economic
Corridor that connects India’s northeast to China’s southwest, Bangladesh and
Myanmar. Here again, if India tend to benefit from Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank’s (AIIB) membership, it
will also benefit from Chinese initiative as an insider rather than remaining
outside the supply chain, notwithstanding the fact that projects along the
‘Belt and Road’ could be selected on case by case. China is apprehensive of the
US-Japan-India alliance, therefore, it is keen to take India on board and sees
‘Make in India’ , ‘Act East Policy’ and even project ‘Mausam’ as complementary
to Chinese initiative.
The Chinese understands India’s predicament
and anxiety, nevertheless, are also open to the idea of establishing a new
mechanism under the aegis of ‘Belt and Road’ initiative where all possible
issues pertaining to the cooperation could be discussed. Secondly, in the face
of soaring maritime ambitions of both the countries and their forays in
Indo-Pacific, it is essential that both initiate a substantive maritime
dialogue, which has remained a non starter even if the same was advocated in
2012. It is better if more such mechanisms are initiated between India and
China so that trust is built which certainly will prove beneficial for finding
solutions to various bilateral problems. For example between China and ASEAN
there are over 1000 flights per week with an annual flow of around 5 million
people. Can we think of such an economic integration and flow of people between
us!
Can China support India’s UN bid?
From Indian perspective while India could
participate in Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, and be a partner in
bilateral economic development, why cannot China show greater magnanimity to India’s
aspirations for a permanent membership to the UN Security Council? India has
supported China’s case in the UN over 30 times, and even after the 1962 war.
China’s support for India will create enormous goodwill for China in India and
the bilateral relations could touch a new high, albeit everyone knows that the
membership may never happen anytime sooner! However, we would be insensitive
towards China’s Japanese sensitivities if India pushes its case together with
Japan, in turn we may not get that support.
Wider people to people exchanges
More and wider people to people contacts
and a relaxed visa regime not only for tourists and business people but also
for students and academicians is need of the hour. The media to media relations
that have generally been neglected need to be strengthened and direct access to
news channels in either country is another possibility. In this regard, India
needs to increase its reporters’ strength in China with the knowledge of
Chinese, so as the Indian public get more and objective news stories about
different aspects of China.
From bilateralism to multilateralism
It is owing to CBMs that India and China
have struck some real convergence of interests on issues such as climate change,
democratization of international financial institutions through multilateral
forums such as Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle, Brazil; Russia,
India, China and South Africa (BRICS); Brazil-South Africa-India-China
(BASIC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); East Asian Summits (EAS); G 20 and other multilateral forums such
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and South Asia Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
India and China have also initiated dialogue on terrorism and Afghanistan. The multilateral
cooperation has been used to strengthen the bilateral relations by both the
countries, and both are working towards raising the level of bilateral
relationship with the hope of creating larger stakes in each other’s economic
systems through complementarities and interdependence. Since everyone talks about the strikingly similar
dynamics of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping, we will have to wait and watch if
they can think differently and change the dynamics of India-China relations.
Belt and Road Action Plan: Choices for India
During the Bo Ao
Forum for Asia convened in Sanya, Hainan between 26th and 29 March,
China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce on 28 March issued an action plan
on President Xi Jinping’s pet project ‘One Belt and One Road’ or the Belt and
Road initiative.
The concept was
first proposed by Xi Jinping during a speech at Nazarbayev
University, Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013 when he said that ‘To forge
closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development in the
Euro-Asia region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an
’economic belt’ along the silk road. This will be a great undertaking
benefitting the people of all countries along the route.’ Xi
proposed that traffic connectivity need to be improved so as to open the
strategic regional thoroughfare from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, and
gradually move toward the set-up of a network of transportation that connects
Eastern, Western and Southern Asia. Chinese President also urged the regional
members to promote local-currency settlement so as to improve their immunity to
financial risks and their global competitiveness.’
The initiative of building MSR was proposed by Xi Jinping
during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013 in order to deepen economic and
maritime links. The MSR begins in Fuzhou in Southeast China’s Fuzhou province
and heads south into the ASEAN nations, crosses Malacca Strait and turns west
to countries along the Indian Ocean before meeting the land based Silk Road in
Venice via the Red Sea and Mediterranean.
Under the ambit of MSR, China plans to build hard and soft
infrastructure from Indo-Pacific to Africa, including transport, energy, water
management, communication, earth monitoring, economic and social
infrastructure.
China realises the importance
of the geo-economic as well as geo strategic importance of the MSR, for there
are 32 littoral countries including China that touches the ‘21st
Century MSR’. The combined population of these countries is around 4 billion
people, and the GDP of around $16 trillion. These are the countries with huge
potentials and have archived rapid economic growth recently. From
2007 to
2012, the lowest annual growth rate was 5.27% that of Sudan, and the
highest average annual growth
rate of 22.83% that of Myanmar. In the view of
these figures, China believes that the ‘21st Century MSR’ is going to be an
important driver of regional as well as global economic growth. And given the
over capacities and structural adjustments being carried out in China, also
pronounced as ‘New Normals’, China sees an opportunity for sustaining its
domestic economy on one hand while strengthening strategic partnership with
various countries on the other.
The document released on Saturday points out that economic
connectivity
is the heart of the matter for which Chinese President Xi Jinping also
announced the establishment of a Silk Road Fund with 40 billion US dollars
to support infrastructure investments in countries involved, and have also
linked the establishment of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and
BRICS New Development Bank to the initiative as well. The document talks about
‘Silk Road Spirit’ interpreted as “peace and cooperation, openness and
inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit." It says that
Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The
initiative is open and inclusive, Chinese ambassador to India, Amb. Le Yucheng
does not subscribe it a Chinese solo but ‘a symphony performed by various
countries.’ The document identifies five major goals of the initiative in terms
of promoting policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, uninterrupted
trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. It is in the view
of its massive scale that the strategic
community has raised various questions including whether such initiatives are
in sync with China’s foreign policy goals; or is the initiative an antidote to
the US foreign policy goals like ‘pivot to Asia’ or ‘Trans Pacific Partnership’
(TPP)? Or, is China challenging the US hegemony and rewriting the rules of
geopolitical architecture?
India’s options
Why has India remained silent to China’s invitation even if
the former has underscored the importance of India as far as the
initiative is concerned? Should security analysts and sceptics see these
initiatives as part of ‘strategic encirclement’ of India, and club it with
China’s similar but smaller initiatives such as China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor, the prospective Trans-Himalayan Economic Zone of Cooperation with
Nepal and Bhutan, and the BCIM Economic Corridor that connects India’s
northeast to China’s southwest, Bangladesh and Myanmar? Is it because of this
‘strategic encirclement’ of India that India is going slow on the BCIM-Economic
Corridor even if it was officially signed during Premier Li Keqiang’s India
visit in 2013 and falls in the ambit of ‘one belt’ initiative? The security
establishment and strategic community have always maintained that India cannot
give China access to its sensitive areas. But, can the new government in office
think differently on the issue?
As
far as ‘Belt and Road’ initiative of China is concerned, India has been part of
the initiative with the signing of the BCIM – EC. The
work is in progress. As India’s Look East Policy has been widening in
scope, the BCIM-EC is another area where the policy could be integrated,
especially when we are thinking of developing landlocked and underdeveloped
northeast region of India. We certainly need to take a leaf out of China’s
experience as to how it has developed and connected its south-western and
southern states to ASEAN. Is New Delhi ready to forgo its sensitivities in
Northeast in turn of economic development of the region? Needless to say, the
Chinese arms supply to the insurgents need to be tackled sternly and China need
to do much more in this front. Can the massive trade between China-ASEAN and
India-ASEAN percolate to the northeast India and northwest China? The answer to
all these questions is yes provided we start looking at boundaries as gateways
but not barriers.
However,
as regards the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) India has been
tight lipped so far, neither has it declined the Chinese proposal, nor has it
shown eagerness to join the bandwagon. Notwithstanding its silence, India has
been responding by its own strategy. It has been expanding and strengthening its
maritime partnerships with the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Australia etc.
countries on one hand and engaging ASEAN in various domains on the other. Besides there are new initiative such as ‘Project
Mausam’ initiated by the Ministry of Culture in tandem with Archaeological
Society of India (ASI), New Delhi as the nodal agency and Indira Gandhi
National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), New Delhi as its Research Unit. Since area covered under the project
extends from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and
Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asia, and has been termed as Indian Ocean “world”,
analysts and
media has termed it India’s response to China’s MSR. Knowing that it is a pure
cultural construct many in China has termed it as a "threatening and
competing" initiative which will pose a major challenge for China's belt
and road plans.”
Even if we may
have soaring ambitions, the kind of economic muscle which is required to
materialise such projects simply does not exist. However, the official Chinese
policy is keen to rope in India and says that the “Belt and Road initiatives
can also be linked with India’s ‘Spice Route’ and ‘Mausam’ projects, thus
forming a new starting point and a new bright spot in China-India cooperation.”
The noises about turning Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace is perhaps
irrelevant as we may not find may voices supporting the idea.
What should be
India’s options? China has considered India as an important country and crucial
for economic integration in the region. Initiatives such as ‘Make in India’ and
‘Act East’ policies have been seen in alignment with the Chinese initiative.
China is already a partner in India’s
development; there is cooperation in railway sector as regards enhancing the
speed and heavy haul of the trains, China is also assisting India in the
training of railway personnel, design of the stations and in building up a
railway university in India. The feasibility study of Delhi-Chennai high speed
railway has been going on and will bring down the travel time to 7 hours from
present 28. India is also the founder member of BRICS Bank and AIIB linked to the
Belt and Road initiative by China.
It would be
unfortunate if India remains outside the value chain of such an initiative;
however, it may decide for itself what kind of project it could carry out with
China on case to case basis. These could be in realm of a variety of
infrastructure related projects including energy, transport, power, e-commerce,
and projects integrating investment and trade. China will also perhaps frame
its own responses and priorities towards countries along the Belt and Road. For
example it will have differentiated strategy while dealing with smaller and
medium size countries, with conflicting parties in South China Sea, ‘pivot’
countries like Pakistan and big and large countries like India. Secondly, as India faces uncertainties as well as opportunities, it
must capitalise on the invaluable geopolitical strategic space it has in the
Indo-Pacific. If the US is attempting to offset China’s geopolitical pull by
way of India confronting China or in tandem with the US and its allies in the
seas and land it would be disastrous for all the stakeholders. From an Indian
point of view, if the US is looking for a strong economic partnership with
India, so is the case of India’s economic engagement with China and the US
alike. It would be naïve to say that the US will dump its interests in China
for India. Imagine the $521 billion trade volume between China and the US and
compare it with our trade with China and the US combine! Therefore, if at all India would like to be a so called
‘swing power’ between China and the US, we need to be a swing power as far as
cooperation and healthy competition and India’s national interests are concerned
not the confrontation and conflict, which is neither in India’s interest nor in
the interest of China and the US.
Finally, since the maritime ambitions of both India and China are
soaring, the interests are overlapping too. There is an urgent need for
initiating more comprehensive mechanisms, one in the offing could be a
substantive maritime security dialogue which has remained a non starter since
2012.
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