Thursday, May 16, 2013

Li Keqiang’s India visit will keep the momentum of bilateral relations





The peaceful resolution of the ‘tent confrontation’ points to the maturing of India China relations, and that both sides have the will and confidence to dissolve the crisis bilaterally and prevent it from acquiring dangerous proportions. It is also a pointer to the fact that India-China relations remains “fragile” and the hyper sensitive nature of the border issue remains at the core of trust deficit and mutual suspicion, if not handled properly could rekindle the animosities in no time. It almost jeopardized the visits of Indian External Affair Minister Salman Khurshid to China and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit.

It is also indicative of the fact that the existing mechanisms have been effective in maintaining the peace and tranquility along the border in the last two decades or so, however, have also demonstrated that these fall short of finding a solution to the border issue. These incidents would continue to happen until and unless the border or LAC remains undefined and undemarcated on the ground. Therefore, it becomes pertinent for both India and China to show political will and resolve, and reach an agreeable resolution of the border as soon as possible so that a way is paved for a firmer hand shake and trust between the two.

The faceoff also demonstrates that both nations does not want the border to be an irritant in developing bilateral relations in other areas, especially trade and investment, culture and people to people relations. Here again a lot has to be done by both the governments. For example China need to open its markets for Indian pharmaceutical and IT products and allay some of the Indian concerns related to trade deficit; India on the other hand needs to open its market for greater Chinese investment in infrastructure, power and telecom etc sectors. As far as people to people exchanges are concerned, both India and China need to enhance the number of scholarships substantially. Unfortunately there are only 25 exchange scholarships for 2.4 billion people presently. Furthermore, India needs to open its educational institutes for Chinese students and strengthen its Chinese learning and China studies in India. We must ask ourselves, why have thousands of Indian students found their ways to China? And after all how many Chinese students have found their ways to the Indian universities. Why it is so that only 100,000 Chinese could visit India comparing to 600, 000 Indians to China? We need to initiate a flexible visa regime and facilitate larger academic exchanges at various levels. 

In this regard, the visit of Li Keqiang is extremely important. It is important as the Chinese leadership has chosen India to be the first country of his visit after resuming office, and that also prior to the return visit of Indian prime minister that is due since Wn Jiabao’s 2010 India visit. India has reciprocated to these positive signals emanating from Beijing positively. The fact that Indian Foreign Minister, Salman Khurshid putting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit above the border standoff, and also that India dispatched a defense delegation to China to work out the details of forthcoming hand-in-hand military exercises, shows that India is serious in maintaining good neighborly relations with China. In order to build the real strategic partnership, both the countries need to keep the momentum of the visits at highest level, diversify their relations in other fields substantially, and try to find a reasonable solution to the border issue that is acceptable to both the countries at the earliest. 

Sunday, May 12, 2013

Salman Khurshid, Li Keqiang and DOB Faceoff





As far as the face-off in the DOB sector is concerned, Chinese media has been tight lipped, barring a few expert comments. It exercised restrain and caution and selectively reported the squabble through what was already being reported in the Indian print and electronic media. The three week long standoff that started on April 15th was resolved peacefully on May 5th after several rounds of talks at different levels, thus paving way for Salman Khursid’s recent China visit and also that of the visit of Chinese premier Li Keqiang.  

Even though the Chinese media has downplayed the incident, but starting from May 1, some articles by academics started to surface in the Chinese print media and hint to the Chinese apprehensions about ‘aggressive’ patrolling in the region as well as the upgradation of border infrastructure by India. An Article by Hu Zhiyong, a professor in the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences while calling for a better management of the border issue, also maintains that presently India has deployed 45 battalions of police force along the border areas, besides 4 battalions are in the midst of organization. India plans to add 9 more battalions by 2015.  Hu says that both sides must put efforts to manage and handle the border and Tibet issue appropriately and strive for a just and reasonable solution so that these issues do not become a hindrance in the development of India-China relations.

On the same day Zhang Xiaodong, a professor with the same Academy wrote an article entitled “dragon and Elephant games: China should be confident while dealing with the border dispute” in the official web site of  Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) in Chinese.  The tone was rather hawkish and matches the cacophony of some of the voices in Indian media. Prof. Zhang made four assumptions. One, he said China must appropriately ‘hammer’ /admonish (qiaoda) India, for it has been supporting the Tibetan independence for long, have been cooperating with Vietnam in petroleum development, and would like to enter South China Sea to contain China; also it has been making great fuss about the ‘string of Pearls’ strategy of China in the Indian Ocean. This has harmed the Chinese interests, therefore, China need to teach India lessons by creating tensions on the land, and if we move a step forward, we can force India’s retreat to inner line of defense strategically; preventive and possible containment of India would be advantageous to China’s diplomacy. Secondly he said, in all probability, India would eat a humble pie (chibie), for China has been in dominating position. India has already said that the issue will not impact on the overall development of the India-China relation. Thirdly, China should exhibit confidence in dealing with the dispute. Finally, in the long run, the geopolitical game between India and China would continue, and China has many cards up in its sleeve as far as the dispute in southern Tibet (read Arunachal) and competition in Indian Ocean is concerned, for example controlling the water resources of South Asia, strengthening China’s strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, and strengthening China’s relations with the South Asian countries, and contain India both on the land and sea. Prof. Zhang also says that the comprehensive national strength and a strong military are the ultimate amours and chips of the foreign policy.

According to a recent report in Cankao Xiaoxi (reference news) which initially used to be for internal circulation only, India in April this year erected seven bunkers in the Chumar sector, of these one makeshift post overlooking Karakorum highway erected on April 21st was thought to be extremely objectionable. The removal of this according to China resolved the crisis.  China had expressed opposition to these posts and bunkers for it alleged that India violated the 2005 agreement that did not allow any party to the construction of these strongholds.


Another article that has appeared on May 10, 2013 in Huanqiu’s official website is by Hao Ding from the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences.  Hao talks about imperial China’s expansion during Yuan and claims Ladakh as part of Tibet right up to the 1830s when he says it was under the Manchus. He says that since 1843 it has been a part of Kashmir, and with the annexation of Kashmir by the British in 1848, Ladakh also was occupied. Hao also points to Chinese concerns about increased Indian infrastructure building in the region.  According to him India only restored seasonal patrolling of the DBO in the 1980s but since 2008 the region witnessed substantial increase in the deployment of troops, a comprehensive upgradation of the combat facilities and infrastructure, reactivation of large numbers of advanced landing airfields. At the same time India has also taken to a more aggressive border policy, by way of constructing border roads, deploying helicopters, radars and unmanned aerial vehicles, and has been “frequently nibbling Chinese territory including the Aksai Chin.”

According to Hao, India's military buildup, not only have undermined the agreements reached between the two countries pertaining to maintaining peace and tranquility in the border regions, but also has posed a substantial challenge to China's territorial sovereignty. Also, he says has increased the probability of both conflict and skirmishes on the border.  Therefore, the recent face off is the outcome of such a friction or rather the “the inevitable result of India initiating a new ‘forward policy’.” He admits that the faceoff was provoked by China and could be considered ‘Chinese Counterattack’ to Indian policies and a ‘microcosm’ of the series of frictions between India and China in these areas.  Only thing that has been different is that all previous skirmishes were provoked by India on the Chinese side, on this occasion it could be said as China’s counterattack.

Hao posits that the recent border faceoff is the creation of India’s right wing forces in tandem with military. It is obvious that the military has provided media the images and data captured by the UAV. According to Hao, even though the faceoff was settles peacefully by both the sides but the negative impact of such incidents cannot be underestimated. First, it has seriously undermined the basis of mutual trust between the two countries. It has greatly damaged the image of China in the eyes of Indian people, and has vitiated the atmosphere for developing good relations. Second, it has increased the risk of border conflict between the two countries. For example, if the counter measures such as deployment of additional special operation forces, cutting off the supply lines of the Chinese camp, are implemented, it would further escalate the confrontation.  Finally, Hao maintains that since there are stark differences between India and China on border, therefore, to resolve it peacefully in the short term is highly unlikely, therefore, the priority should be accorded to maintain the stability in the border areas.

The Chinese perceptions apart, the peaceful resolution of the so called ‘tent confrontation’ points to the maturing India China relations, and that both sides have will and confidence to dissolve the crisis bilaterally and prevent the crisis from acquiring dangerous proportions. It is also a pointer to the fact that India-China relations remains “fragile” and the border issue is the root of most of the trust deficit and mutual suspicion, if not handled properly could rekindle the animosities in no time. It is also indicative of the fact that the existing mechanisms have been effective in maintaining the peace and tranquility along the border, however, have also demonstrated that these fall short of finding a solution to the border issue. Therefore, it becomes imperative for both India and China to show political will and resolve, and reach an agreeable resolution of the border as soon as possible so that a way is paved for a firmer hand shake and trust.

The faceoff also demonstrates that both nations does not want the border to be an irritant in developing bilateral relations in other areas, especially trade and investment, culture and people to people relations. Here again a lot has to be done by both the governments. For example China need to open its markets for Indian pharmaceutical and IT products; and India its market to greater Chinese investment in infrastructure sector, power and telecom. As far as people to people exchanges are concerned, India needs to open its educational institutes to the Chinese students and strengthen its Chinese learning and China studies in India. We must ask ourselves, why have thousands of Indian students found their way to China? And after all how many Chinese students have found their ways to Indian universities. Why it is so that only 100,000 Chinese could visit India comparing to 600, 000 Indians to China? We need to initiate a flexible visa regime and facilitate larger academic exchanges at various levels.  

Saturday, May 4, 2013

DOB Sector Stalemate and Sino-Indian border in the Western Sector

Excerpts from my book India and China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict (Manak 2005, Delhi)



   
     The Western Sector forms the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir State of India and Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions of China. The entire boundary in Western Sector according to India stretches over 1,770 kilometres. It starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan and runs eastward through the Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchnai Pass, Parpik Pass and the Khunjerab Pass. From Khunjerab Pass the boundary lies along a spur down to the north-western bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river, which it crosses at that point and ascends the crest line of the Aghil mountains. It then runs along the crest of the Aghil watershed through the Aghil Pass, the Marpo Pass and then to the Karakoram Pass. 

     From the Karakoram Pass, the boundary lies along the watershed between the Shyok and the Yarkand, and runs through the Qara Tagh Pass to cross the eastern bend of the Qara Qash river and to ascend the main Kun Lun mountains. Thereafter the boundary runs along the main crest of the Kun Lun Mountains and then descends in a southwesterly direction down to Lanak Pass. South of the Lanak Pass, the boundary passes through the Kone Pass and Kepsang Pass, which lie along the watershed between the Chang Chenmo and Chumesang in India and the streams flowing into the Dyap Tso in Tibet. Thereafter, the boundary runs along the southern bank of the Chumesang and the eastern bank of the Chang-lung Lungpa, skirts the western extremity of the eastern half of the Pangong Lake and follows the northern and eastern watershed of the Indus River through Chang Pass upto the Jara Pass.  A little south of Jara Pass it turns south-westward, crosses the Indus about five miles southeast of Demchok, and following the watershed between the Hanle river and the tributaries of the Sutlej river, it passes through the Charding Pass, the Imis Pass and the Kyungzing Pass. Thereafter it turns westward and crosses the Pare river about five miles south of Chumar to reach Gya Peak (Officials Report 1961: 1-2). 

     According to the Chinese, the Western Sector is divided into two portions, with Kongka Pass as the dividing point. The portion north of Kongka Pass is the boundary between Xinjiang and Ladakh, and the portion south of it is that between Tibet and Ladakh. The portion between Xinjiang and Ladakh runs along the Karakoram Mountain Range, following broadly the watershed between Tarim and Indus river systems. From Karakoram Pass the boundary runs eastward along the mountain ridge to a point east of 78 degrees East Longitude, turns south-eastward along the high ridge of the Karakoram Mountains on the east bank of the Shyok river and northern bank of the Kugrang Tsangpo river down to Kongka Pass. The portion between Tibet and Ladakh runs along the ridge, passing through the Ane Pass, cuts across the western half of Pangong Tso, skirts the western side of the Spanggur Tso upto Mount Sajum, crosses the Shangatsangpu (Indus) river at 33 degree North Latitude, runs along the watershed east of the Keyul Lungpa river and south of the Hanle river upto Mount Shinowu and then runs westward to reach the tri-junction of China’s Ari District [in Tibet] and India’s Punjab [Himachal] and Ladakh.
 
     Due to diverging approaches to boundary in this sector, somewhat 24,000 square kilometres of territory is claimed by both India and China (Lamb 1964: 7). According to Lamb it is hard to give precise figures for the area because the extent of Chinese claims seems to increase slightly from time to time. The Chinese (Zhao 2000: 141) however points to 33,500 square kilometres as disputed territory.  The first issue of discord is the Aksai Chin, situated in northwest of Kashmir, and the second being the Ladakh-Tibet boundary from Chang Chenmo valley to the region of Spiti where Himachal Pradesh has a common border with Tibet. According to Zhao (2000: 141), Aksai Chin has a total area of 27,200 square Kilometres and has historically been under the jurisdiction of Khotan region of Xinjiang. According to her, Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Beijing proposed border negotiations with the Chinese government. The British proposal included the entire Aksai Chin in British India; the Chinese government however ignored the British proposal. Following this the British marked this proposed line as “not defined” on their maps, as a result some 33,300 square kilometres of Chinese territory was shown in the Indian maps.[1] Wang (1998: 158) on the other hand asserts that in “recent hundred or two hundred years the Chinese maps are consistent as regards the boundary alignment in this sector,” and has “all along exercised jurisdiction” in accordance with the boundary marked on the Chinese maps, which according to him runs through Karakoram Mountain Pass and enter south along the Karakoram watershed upto Kongka Pass, from Kongka Pass it runs southward and reaches near Pare river. On the contrary, the maps published by Britain and India in recent one hundred year are “full of confusion and contradiction” in Wang’s view. Wang may be right when he argues that the Chinese maps were consistent, however, to assert that the Chinese maps showed the right alignment of western sector is misleading, for Chinese maps made it clear that Xinjiang was never conceived as extending south of the Kun Lun range and that Ladakh never was a part of China (Eekelen 1964: 150). Citing Chinese maps Rao (1968: 32-33) argues that works like Xiyu Tuzhi (Geographical works of Western Region [Xinjiang]) of 1762 and Xinjiang Zhilue (Xinjiang Annals) of 1821 compiled during the reign of Qianlong and Daoguang shows specifically that Nanshan [southern mountains] or Kunlun Mountains formed the southern boundary of Xinjiang all along the Chinese history. Had it been the case as argued by Wang, why did not China produced a single “consistent map” during the meetings of the Chinese and Indian officials in 1960 in support of their alignment? Moreover, the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question published by the Foreign Language Press also does not produce a single Chinese map in the support of their case; on the contrary the Chinese have heavily relied on the maps published by the British India and the government of India for their territorial claims. Not only this, even the official Chinese maps of 1893, 1917 and 1919 showed the boundary exactly as depicted in official Indian maps of today (Prasad 1992: 2). Like the Chinese Neville Maxwell has all along formed his argument on the British and Indian maps while turning a blind eye to the Chinese map alignments in his account of the 1962 war.


[1] Zhao’s has wrongly interpreted MacDonald’s proposals to the Chinese government; in fact the proposals would have divided Aksai Chin between India and China. For various boundary alignments during British India in western sector, see section 2.2 of Chapter I.

Friday, May 3, 2013

Chinese media: some individual perceptions on DBO sector stalemate




Contrary to the Indian media flaring up DBO sector border stalemate between India and China since 15th of last month, the Chinese media has exercised restrain and caution so far. Even if there are some reports, these are in the form of reporting the coverage of the incident in the Indian print and electronic media, albeit have often substantiated these with the statements emanating from MOFA spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, such as ‘the Chinese troops have not crossed a step in the LCA’; ‘both sides are negotiating peaceful settlement of the issue’; and the latest statement of her on April 2, 2013 that ‘we believe, both India and China has the wisdom and ability to handle the differences between the two while developing friendly and cooperative relations.’ In yesterday’s statement she also called on the media to “give more time and be more patient,” and that “the issue will be properly resolved soon through negotiation.”

However, of late some jingoistic and hawkish voices have started to find their echoes in the media that is primarily for domestic consumption. On May 2, the People’s daily owned Global Times published an editorial and warned that the “Indian media and opposition politicians have been reporting that Chinese soldiers intruded on Indian-claimed territory and erected tents inside Indian borders,” the editorial accused the Indian government of  ambiguity on the issues and asked for an explanation. It said, “The Indian government ought to clarify the so-called “intrusion” in a timely way and assume the responsibility of maintaining a good atmosphere. However, it hasn’t done so. It has remained silent and ambiguous, which indulges Indian media habits.”  

On May 1, Zhang Xiaodong, a professor with the government owned Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences wrote an article entitled “dragon and Elephant games: China should be confident while dealing with the border dispute” in the official web site of  Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) in Chinese. Prof. Zhang made four assumptions. One, he said China must appropriately ‘hammer’ /admonish (qiaoda) India, for it has been supporting the Tibetan independence for long, have been cooperating with Vietnam in petroleum development, and would like to enter South China Sea to contain China; also it has been making great fuss about the ‘string of Pearls’ strategy of China in the Indian Ocean. This has harmed the Chinese interests, therefore, China need to teach India lessons by creating tensions on the land, and if we move a step forward, we can force India’s retreat to inner line of defense strategically; preventive and possible containment of India would be advantageous to China’s diplomacy. Secondly he said, in all probability, India would eat a humble pie (chibie), for China has been in dominating position. India has already said that the issue will not impact on the overall development of the India-China relation. Thirdly, China should exhibit confidence in dealing with the dispute. Finally, in the long run, the geopolitical game between India and China would continue, and China has many cards up in its sleeve as far as the dispute in southern Tibet (read Arunachal) and competition in Indian Ocean is concerned, for example controlling the water resources of South Asia, strengthening China’s strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, and strengthening China’s relations with the South Asian countries, and contain India both on the land and sea. Prof. Zhang also says that the comprehensive national strength and a strong military are the ultimate amours and chips of the foreign policy.

There is another article by Hu Zhiyong, a professor in the same Academy. He however, calls for a better management of the border issue. Prof. Hu says that after the 1962 war, Debsung valley has been under China’s control.  According to Prof. Hu presently India has deployed 45 battalions of police force along the border areas, besides 4 battalions are in the midst of organization. India plans to add 9 more battalions by 2015.   Hu says that 15 rounds of talks on border have been inconclusive, for there are huge differences as far as perceptions are concerned; this demonstrates that the issue is complex with long range characteristics. Both sides must put efforts to manage and handle the border and Tibet issue appropriately and strive for a just and reasonable solution so that these issues do not become a hindrance in the development of India-China relations.