Leadership Transition in China: What does it hold for India

China’s leadership transition in the wake of the 18^th Party Congress has been orderly except a few hick ups created by the by the Bo Xilai episode. With this Xi Jinping would be at the helm of China’s military, party and state, and Li Keqiang taking the reins of government affairs from March 2013. The going would not be as smooth as the transition had been for the new leadership, for the macro as well micro socio-economic and political environments are not as conducive as these were a decade back. A year or two or even more would be invested in consolidating and strengthening leadership positions before making big decisions. The top priority of the leadership would be to focus on the domestic economy which is marred by the declining exports and increasing social imbalances and corruption. The expectations and pressure on the new leadership would be very high as Hu’s tenure witnessed China’s GDP bouncing to 7.2 trillion USD from a meager 1.20 trillion USD. It would be extremely challenging to further consolidate post reform achievements, and the task of making China a fully well off society by 2020. Politically, it would also be tough for the new leadership to backtrack or escalate the maximal position Hu’s leadership took vis-à-vis territorial disputes with neighbors.  In the light of this, China’s foreign policy is going to be a low keyed one where continuity would be emphasized and status quo at different levels maintained.  Let’s examine how India would fit in this continuity and status quo approach:

Territory:

The new leadership would best endeavor towards maintaining a status quo on the border, for it would be impossible for the leadership to enhance or reduce the maximal position China has taken on solving the border issue with India. Hu’s reign saw China taking such positions as regards its territorial disputes with neighbors that the previous generations shied from. Both sides know it better that 38 rounds of talks (8 before 1988, 15 between the JWGs and 15 between the Special Representatives) in last three decades have failed the officials of both the countries to conclude a settlement. The December 3, 2012 informal border negotiations between Shiv Shankar Menon and his counterpart Dai Bingguo who is about to retire in next March remains a non starter like other formal rounds between the two countries, even though Menon has talked of “considerable progress” on the border issue during his recent China visit. Does he indicate that there is a breakthrough as regards accepting the claims of disputing parties as regards the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?  If it is the case, there is indeed a ‘considerable progress’ contrary to the general viewpoint that the talks at the Special Representative level have really run out of steam, and these seem to have been reduced more or less to perfunctory level by changing venues within the respective county. The outcome of the 15 rounds between the Special Representatives is a “common understanding report” to be submitted to respective governments for their perusal.

The breakthrough to this author looks impossible as both sides have diametrically opposite views on various sections of the LAC. The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, which was formed during the 15th round of border talks in New Delhi in January this year, and the maritime cooperation proposals to undertake joint operations against pirates and sharing technological knowhow on seabed research proposed by the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi in March 2012 only adds a few new dimensions to the security issue but do not suggest the resolve to settle the issue. Therefore, the best we can expect from China in the next four or five years is to maintain status quo on the border and leave the question to next generation.

Trade:

As far as bilateral trade is concerned, this would be the real focus of the new leadership, for it could be a catalyst in sustaining the domestic growth to some extent and maintain the desired continuity in the bilateral relations. Secondly since the US would also be looking towards India for greater trade and investment, job creation and economic growth, China would like to compete with the US in Indian markets for getting a sizeable pie, be it the infrastructural development, power and energy sector or the telecom and banking sectors. The present 200 plus strong Chinese delegation that participated in the November 26-27 Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in New Delhi manifests it quite clearly. It is also an indicator that economics of bilateral relationship has become much more important than any other impending issues including the border. The widening trade deficit and shrinking trade volume has portrayed a gloomy picture of the bilateral trade.

Bilateral trade between India and China reached a record $73.9 billion last year, with the imbalance widening to $27 billion.  In 2012, the trade has faced a downturn and reached only $55.6 billion during the first ten months, with $23 billion trade deficit for India. Even though both countries have pledged to take the figure of bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2015, however, in the face of ballooning trade deficit and declining volume throws new challenging to the future leadership in India and China alike. The recently concluded SED may improve these figures as 11 MoUs worth $5.2 billion were signed between India and China. Most of the investment would be in the private sector as chunk of this capital rests in a $3 billion financing agreement between Reliance Power Ltd and China’s Guangdong Mingyang Windpower Group Co. Ltd and a $800 million agreement between NIIT China (Shanghai) Ltd and China’s Hainan province to establish an information technology enclave in Hainan. Since this was the second SED, we could expect the fifth generation leadership in China to adopt more proactive approach towards investment in India rather than the traditional cautious and incremental attitude.

India would reciprocate provided the balance of trade issue is addressed through a bigger market access to Indian companies in the Chinese markets. The investment in high speed railway and other infrastructural building projects could be considered as big opportunity windows to both the countries.  For India it could prove as an opportunity to learn from China experience, for it was during last 30 years of experience that China could develop its own technologies, perfect its  manufacturing facilities, bring in new managerial practices and become self reliant in many sectors, like heavy machinery and computer hardware. The recently opened retail sector is another example where India can learn from China, as to how China protected the interests of its farmers, as to how they were brought into the fold of new supply chains, and how it successfully created its own brands in retail giving tough competition to the foreign brands like Wall Mart and Carrefour etc. If all goes well the bilateral trade during Xi JInping’s tenure could jump to $250 billion or even more. 

Tibet:

Tibet and border issue are linked but as long as border is not settled the issue would continue to haunt both India and China. As of November 30, 2012 the self immolations by the Tibetans in inside TAR and other Tibetan inhabited areas in China have reached 90, and have attracted worldwide attention albeit China has targeted “Dalai Clique’ for spearheading such ‘separatist plots.’ Hu Jintao during his reign initiated ‘strike hard’ campaigns in Tibet in the name of stability and security on the one hand and targeted the Dalai Lama for feigning ‘separatism’ in Tibet on the other. He has appointed his protégé Ling Jihua in charge of the Tibet policy, and we could see the continuation of Hu’s policies in Tibet.  Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun who was responsible for Tibet’s affair in the 1980s was believed to be a soft on the Dalai and the minorities. If he carries some of his father’s influence, we may see somewhat softer approach towards Tibet. In this regard one has to wait and see what kinds of people are selected to the Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet that really formulates the policies for Tibet.

I believe since the main focus of the Chinese leadership is going to be economic development, Tibet would see greater investment in terms of infrastructural development, be it roads or railways and the investment in tourism industry. Infrastructural building in Tibet has already caused great concern in India. According to Indian Defense Minister A. K Antony’s statement of March 2011, “The total road network in TAR is assessed at 58,000 km in 2010. Extension of Qinghai Tibet Railway to Xigaze is in progress. Another railway line from Kashgar to Hotan in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is under construction,” besides there are five operational TAR airfields namely Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa. Antony further said that “necessary steps” were being taken in consonance with India's national security concerns.” It could be discerned that there are attempts to enhance the military capacity along the borders by both India and China along with the modernization of armed forces. This kind of capacity enhancement and modernization may create further tension along the LAC and vitiate the security environment in the region. It would also be a challenge to the new leadership in China as well as in India after 2014 to find better mechanisms to maintain peace and find better ways to resolve the pending issue.

Terrorism:

It is widely perceived that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 would further destabilize the Af-Pak region. The new equations would be a litmus test to the new leadership in China. Will Xi Jinping continue the present Chinese policy of steadfast support to Pakistan or will China accommodate the Indian and US concerns as regards terrorism and cross border terrorism? It has been admitted by the Chinese academicians that the “mono-dimensional (danweixing) China-Pak relationship is focused at military security cooperation with not an endogenous (neishengxing) aim but around external security concern (waibu anquan guanqie) that is to counter India.” They further posit that “this kind of cooperation, to a greater extent is due to the long rivalry of both Pakistan and China with India, as India for a long time has been number one enemy of Pakistan, and also poses major threat to the security of western China. It is in this context that China has not recognized the thesis of cross-border terrorism, especially in south Asian context albeit it is aware of the Trans border nationalism and its effects in Xinjiang that borders 8 countries including India.

The stability in western China, according to the Chinese government has been endangered by the forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism as well as narcotic smuggling. According to Chinese sources, there are over 50 East Turkestan separatist organizations in Xinjiang; and between 1990 and 2001 there have been 360 terror incidents causing 162 causalities and injuring over 440 people. As far as extremism or religious fundamentalism is concerned, China so far has blamed the pan Islamic religious fundamentalism emanating from Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan for armed smuggling, supporting East Turkestan Liberation Organization and creating instability and extremism in Xinjiang. It is mum on Pakistan albeit has admitted since 2001 that al Qaeda was in hand and glove with the Xinjiang ‘terrorists’. The wikiLeaks Gitmo files has made it clear that China’s “all whether friend” indeed provided training grounds to Uighur separatists. Amongst the hundreds of Taliban, there were 22 Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo, many of whom were captured in Pakistan.

In the backdrop of this, will the new leadership stop looking terrorism with Pakistani prism not only inside Pakistan but in the region as such? Will it be cautious in supporting Pakistan playing a dominant role in Afghanistan in the wake of prospective American withdrawal or will it advocate a regional approach where all the countries including India, Pakistan and China will have stakes? It must not be reminded that instability both in Pakistan and Afghanistan will have disastrous effects not only in South Asia, but also in China, especially Xinjiang.

South China Sea:

It is in recent years that China has started to define South China Sea as an area of core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet. India’s presence in the area has been challenged by China by resorting to various ways; be it the threat to INS Airavat on 22 July 2011; greeting INS Shivalik with “Welcome to the South China Sea, Foxtrot-47 by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) frigates in June 2012; or the threats to disrupt ONGC Videsh exploration in South China Sea and reiterating China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ in the region. Reciprocating the US, India too has advocated the freedom of navigation in the area, as one third of the world’s shipping lanes pass through this area. China hopes that the US and other players in the region need to be cautious and sensitive to its core interests, for it does not want interference by US and least to talk about the alliance of the democracies when it is embroiled with countries like Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Japan in the region. The new rules which China announced for the region on November 2012 authorize its police in the southern province of Hainan to board and seize foreign ships in the South China Sea. The move has already been criticized by various disputing parties, especially Vietnam and the Philippines.  

The new rules would escalate the tension further and push the smaller players in region in the US arms. China is wary about the US declaration that it would concentrate around 60% of its military assets in the Asia Pacific and that it would fiercely advocate the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. On 3 November 2012 naval chief Admiral D. K. Joshi in a statement has viewed the rapid modernization of Chinese Navy as a “major concern”, and made it clear that India will protect its interests in the disputed South China Sea, even if it means sending forces there.  China immediately made a statement saying that “China opposes any unilateral oil and gas exploration activities in disputed areas in the South China Sea and hopes relevant countries respect China's sovereignty and national interests, as well as the efforts of countries within the region to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations.” Whether India is in the position to defend its interest in the region or not, it should be clear to the policy makers in India, however, history says that whenever the US and China have come together, India has found itself in a disadvantageous position. On the contrary whenever the US has come closer to India, China has been less assertive in its approach towards India.

China is apprehensive about the US ‘pivot’ in the region and Obama’s second term could see the consolidation and strengthening of this ‘pivot.’ However, learning by its own experiences from Afghanistan and Middle East, the US is unlikely to be an interventionist in the conflicts; rather it would continue to be an offshore balancer in the region. Since China has taken maximal position as regards its territorial disputes with its neighbors, the next leadership could either further escalate the issues or maintain the status quo. However, owing to the macro and micro econo-political environment, fifth generation leaders are likely to maintain a status quo and revert to Deng’s attitude as regards the disputes, i.e. put aside the issue and seek common development of the resources in the disputed areas without referring to sovereignty. It is in this background India would attract wider attention in China than the previous years even though the US is going to be the focus of China’s attention.

Snkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute: A dangerous Standoff between China and Japan

On the occasion of the 81 anniversary of the Japanese invasion of northeast China (September 18, 2012), the History Museum in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, built specially to remember the anti-Japanese conflict (1931-45), rang a bell 14 times that signified the 14 year agony and disgrace China suffered at the hands of Japanese. Anti-Japanese demonstrations and protests ‘erupted’ across major Chinese cities, forcing the shutdown of many Japanese businesses. The recent standoff has been flared up by the detention of seven Chinese nationals on March 24, and the Japanese move to sign Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese and) purchase agreement with the private owner of the island on September 11. China has responded with sending half a dozen surveillance and fishing ships around the disputed island and by carrying out military drills in the East China Sea. It is interesting to note that China also commissioned its first aircraft carrier around the same time (September 23, 2012). Undoubtedly these developments have plunged the Sino-Japanese relations to their lowest ebb.

Why has it happened at a time when China would like to focus on its economic growth rather than pick up brawls in its surrounding? What are the circumstances surrounding the ins and outs of the Senkaku conflict? The dangerous standoff has definitely opened the wounds of the 14 year long conflicts between China and Japan, and pushed the theory of ‘seeking common grounds while reserving differences’ to the brink.  Could it unfold another armed conflict between the two of the largest Asian economies as has been indicated by some of the nationalistic fervors emanating from various Chinese press reports. Let’s examine the following:

The history of the conflict:

 The Senkaku Islands are situated in the East China sea under the jurisdiction of Japan, and are about 92 nautical miles northeast of in Keelung city of Taiwan. The islands primarily consists of Diaoyu (Uotsuri-jima in Japanese), Huangweiyu (Kuba-jima), Chiweiyu (Taisho-jima), Bei Xiaodao (Kita-Ko-jima), Nan Xiaodao (Minami-Ko-jima) and some smaller islets, reefs and rocks. The entire area of Senkaku islands is around 6.3 square kilometers, of which Diaoyu is the largest with an area of 4.3 square kilometers. Both China and Japan claims indisputable sovereignty over Senkaku.

China asserts that it has historical and legal records about the islands, which were first discovered by a Chinese called Yang Zai during the late 14^th century (Ming Dynasty).  More specifically the  islands have been referred as Diaoyu in the Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shunfeng Xiangsong) written in 1403 during Yongle’s reign and the Record of the Imperial Envoy's Visit to Ryukyu (Shi Liuqiulu) written in 1434. China claims that Japan’s earliest record about the Senkakus is found in a book entitled Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu (An Illustrated Description of the Three Countries) [Sanguo Tonglan Tushuo in Chinese] by Hayashi Shihei in 1785. The book again has been written on the basis of Xu Baoguang’s Records of Messages from Chong-shan (Zhongshan Chuanxin lu). Zhong Shan is used for the then Ryukyu Kingdom. Xu Baoguang was Qing emperor Kang Xi’s  envoy to Ryukyu in 1719.

China argues that prior to the annexation of Ryukyu in 1871 by Japan, China already had a history of over 500 years of friendly exchanges with Ryukyu.  1719 vintage book Nandaozhi written by a Japanese scholar named Arai, does not include Diaoyu in the 36 islands under the jurisdiction of Ryukyu. The 1875 map of Japan also does not have Diaoyu in it. Even in 1879 when Qing plenipotentiary Li Hongzhang discussed the jurisdiction of Ryukyu, both sides agreed that Ryukyu/Okinawa consists of 36 islands; Diaoyu was left out as before.  

Japan on the other hand asserts that Japanese Shoguns subdued Ryukyu to accept Japanese suzerainty in 1609. Since then the Ryukyu kings paid tribute to both China and Japan. Ryukyu’s tributary relations with China were formally approved by the Shogunate in 1655. In 1872 the Japanese put the Ryukyu affairs under the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in 1875 under the ministry of Home Affairs. In the light of these developments, Ryukyu terminated tributary relations with China in 1874. In 1879, Japan formally annexed Ryukyu and changed its name to Okinawa Prefecture. When China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki after its defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese was over Korea, China abandoned its claims to the Ryukyus. However, China argues that the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945 explicitly states that Japan should restore to China all the territories it had stolen or taken by violence and greed.

The US Role

After the defeat of Japan in the World War II, Japan handed over the administration of Diaoyu Islands to the United States in 1951, the US returned the governance of these islands to Japan only in 1971. Japan asserts that China expressed no objection when the Senkaku Islands were put under the US administration under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, implying that China did not consider these as part of Taiwan. China claims that owing to the surge of Protect Diaoyu Island Movement in the 1970s, the US was forced to retreat from its earlier position that these island were under the sovereignty of Japan. However, China says that there is a change in the US position as the latter has privately acknowledged the sovereignty of Japan over Senkaku. This is precisely that lead Japan to develop the Islands, including the dispatch of US soldiers to the islands. Furthermore, as China is embroiled with countries like Philippines and Vietnam in South China Sea, the US has found it an appropriate occasion to fish in the troubled waters. It is in the backdrop of these events that the US has declared that around 60% of its military assets would be deployed in the Asia Pacific and that it would fiercely advocate the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Some analysts in China argue that the US is not content with its military deployment in Okinawa; therefore it would like to extend its military reach to the Senkakus. By doing so, the US would interfere in the Chinese attempts to restore its sovereignty  in the Senkakus but also build pressure on Taiwan as the Western Pacific military island chain gets closer to the Taiwan Strait.

China has hoped that the US needs to be cautious in its approach as regards China’s core interests in the region. As far as US’s commitment to support Japan in case of military conflict, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the Japan and the United is concerned, China wishes that the US must recognize that the treaty is a product of the Cold War, and has no relevance under present circumstances. In a veiled warning to the US, it has stated that the comprehensive national strength of China has increased manifolds since then, therefore the US should not be burning its fingers by taking the Japanese chestnuts out of the fire.

Why Senkakus are so important to both China and Japan

The analysts have often pointed to the economic benefits and the strategic location of the island. As far as the economic benefits are concerned,   both would like to extract the huge reserves of minerals, oil and natural gas from underneath the islands, as a 1969 UN reports has indicated that there are huge reserves of oil and gas in the area. It was also after the report went public that the voices of sovereignty have been louder in both the countries. Secondly, since Japan has been fishing in these waters since 1895, it does not want to let the benefits go over to China. As far as strategic position is concerned, if the Japanese retain the Islands, it can set up air and sea surveillance reconnaissance systems, shore-based anti-ship-to-air missiles on the island. By doing so, it could put a blockade to all the ports and air routes emanating from northern Taiwan, and also put areas such as Fuzhou, Wenzhou and Ningbo in mainland China under its radar. China would be very apprehensive of every move of the Japanese it decides to do so. Therefore, the establishment of the military bases and the deployment of heavy weaponry on the island  will pose a serious threat to China's national defense and security, argues China.

The future

China is in the favor of maintaining status quo on the Senkaku issue, for it believes that it would be better if the issue is left to the future generations to resolve. This was the thinking of the architect of China’s reforms, the late Deng Xiaoping. While restoring relations with Japan, Deng Xiaoping pointed out on October 25, 1978 that it would be wise to shelve the issue of Diaoyu if both sides fails to reach an agreement. He pointed out that may be the future generations would have better wisdom and ways to resolve the issue mutually acceptable to both the countries. On May 31, 1979 during the visit of the Liberal Democratic Party Congressman Zenko Suzuki Shiyou to China, Deng Xiaoping proposed common development of the Diaoyu. In June 1979, China formally pronounced publically that it is willing to put aside the issue and seek common development of the resources in the vicinity of the island without referring to the sovereignty.

It is in this context that China has accused Japan of unnecessary raking of the the sovereignty issue, as well as the position taken by the US to take sides with Japan in any military conflict between China and Japan under San Francisco Treaty. China hopes that the US plays a balancing act in the region. Both China and the US knows that they are not ready for a direct military confrontation at this time, therefore, could the US urge both the parties to go back to the Deng’s position on the issue or the so called status quo.

Liang Guanglie’s India Visit and India-China Security Environment

In order to strengthen the defense ties and general security environment in the region, the Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie is heading a 23 member strong defense delegation to India between September 2 and 6. He will hold talks with the Indian counterpart A. K. Antony on various defense and security related issues including confidence-building measures (CBMs) along the border; military to military relations; and probably the South China Sea issue and Af-Pak security scenario.  General Liang’s visit is a return visit to Pranab Mukherji’s 2006 China visit; since then even though there has been a continuous flow of visits by military personnel, however, there are visible tensions especially since 2010 when China denied visa to Lt. General B. S. Jaswal, General Officer Commanding Chief, Northern Area Command of the Indian Army. Since then the military ties have been at its lowest ebb. Will the visit of General Liang turn around the relationship?  I believe there are positives as well and negatives in this relationship, and a huge scope for improvement, let’s examine the following:

Owing to the hostilities of the 1960s and subsequent deep freeze in the bilateral relations, the security issue has remained a very sensitive rather hypersensitive issue between India and China. One of the spin offs of the political distrust, has been the huge security deficit between India and China, which has led the other side to believe that they have been ganging up with the third parties to contain them. In such a situation it becomes pertinent for both the countries that they calmly identify some of the basic issues that haunts these relations and try to find out genuine ways to dispel the problems, so as a better peaceful and friendly environment is established between India and China.

Improving security environment:

The establishment of the Joint Working Group (JWG) for the resolution of border issue during Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 China visit, the 1991 and 1996 CBMs, 1992 visit of Sharad Pawar, the first ever by an Indian Defense Minister could be considers as path breaking in one sense or another. The CBMs in the military field along the Line of Actual Control has enabled peace and tranquility along the borders and improved the security environment significantly. Following these exchanging at the highest level, there have been an increased level of exchanges between the armed forces of India and China.

In the backdrop of these exchanges, we may assert that there has been an obvious improvement in the security environment, albeit the progress has been incremental. The improvement could be ascribed to the commitment from both the sides that neither poses a threat to the other notwithstanding some concerns. It could also be attributed to the high level political visits as well as the contacts between the armies of the two countries. For example, in 2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visited China amidst the scare of SARS. The visit not only resulted in the attitudinal change in Fernandes’ anti China rhetoric, but also it was during this visit that both India and China decided to step-up military-to-military exchanges, hold a counter-terrorism dialogue and increase CBMs to maintain peace along the LAC. In 2004, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan paid a return visit to India. In February 2005, Chinese Central Military Commission member, General Liang Guanglie, the present defense minister of China visited India. In May 2006, Indian Defense Minister, Pranab Mukherji visited China; during his visit Mukherji also visited some of the most sensitive military installations such as Chinese Center of Space Conduct and Control, and signed the “Memorandum of Understanding for Reinforcing Communication and Cooperation in the Defense Areas” with his Chinese counterpart Cao Gangchuan. The memorandum called for military training, military exercises, counter terrorism, fight against piracy, joint search and rescue, and personnel communications etc. between the armies of India and China. In November 2008, General Wu Shengli, another member of the Chinese Central Military Commission and Naval commander-in-chief visited India. This was followed by the visit of Deputy Chief of Staff, Ma Xiaotian in December.

Besides these high level visits, the militaries have also been carrying out CBMs at various levels. For example, in November 2003, the naval forces of India and China conducted joint search and rescue exercises in the East China Sea. In 2004, the ground forces of the two countries conducted joint mountaineering exercises. The First Joint Training Exercise between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ‘Hand in Hand 2007’ was conducted in Kunming, China. One Company each from the Indian Army and the PLA participated in the counter terrorism exercises.  Lt Gen Susheel Gupta, DCOAS and Lt Gen Ma Xiaotian, Deputy CGS PLA represented their respective countries as observers. In 2008, the Suryakiran Aerobatic Team (SKAT) of the Indian Air Force participated in the 7th International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, ‘Hand in Hand 2008’ was conducted at Belgaum, India between December 4 and 14, 2008. Lt. General Nobel Thamburaj, GOC-in-C, Southern Command and Lt Gen Ma Xiaotian, Deputy CGS of the PLA were observers to the exercises. In April 2009 the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Suresh Mehta visited China and participated in the International Fleet Review (IFR) in Qingdao. Two Indian Naval ships, INS MUMBAI and INS RANVIR participated in the IFR.

Huge Security deficit:

In 2010 defense cooperation suffered a serious blow as China refused visa to Lieutenant General B. S. Jaswal, of the Northern Command. The move of China once again pointed to the security and much talked trust deficit between the two nations. India was furious and suspended the defense ties as it refused to allow two Chinese army officers to attend a defense course in India in a tit-for-tat move. Analysts in India upheld that the Chinese stand manifested that China relinquished its stand of neutrality in J&K and considered it a disputed territory; this is also established by the fact that China started to issue stapled visas to the Indian citizens from J&K at that time and before, albeit the stapled visa issue was settled during Wen Jiabao’s 2010 India visit. Secondly, it endorsed the Pakistan stand on Kashmir and repudiated the temporary nature of Sino-Pak border agreement on Shaksgam Valley in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Therefore, one must also acknowledge the fact that owing to historical reasons and animosities in the 1960s India and China have been suffering from a deep rooted mistrust and security deficit.

First and foremost, the unresolved boundary issue is the fundamental cause for mistrust at every level. India lost a couple of opportunities to resolve the issue as it could not see logic in the Chinese proposals of a package deal. Now the issue has gathered complexities and may not be easy to resolve for a long time to come. Secondly, China’s ‘all weather friendship’ with Pakistan and supplying the latter with sophisticated military weaponry including the missiles and nuclear technology, has posed a threat to India’s national security. Even if India and China doesn’t fight another war, but the image China has created in the minds of every Indian is that of a rogue who has been destabilizing Indian state through a third party for decades.  It is for the same reasons that India fails to understand why China should be concerned about India’s presence in the South China Sea, when China itself is indifferent to India’s sensitivities in its deputed areas with Pakistan.  It is for the same reasons that India fails to understand why China should be weary of its cooperation with the US, Japan, Vietnam and other countries in the region, when China itself has been engaging with many of India’s neighbors at various levels.  Furthermore, if some analysts in China say that the Indian Ocean in not India’s Ocean then the same formulations could be applied to South China Sea. It could be discerned that there is a huge security deficit and the security environment between India and China remains quite volatile.

What could be done?

The momentum of the high level political visits as well exchanges between the two armies at all the levels need to be maintained and deepened. It appears that the military exchanges at various levels are just perfunctory. For example in military exercises there is no real content. Even though these are termed counter terrorism, however, the approaches towards terrorism are dramatically different. China sees terrorism in the region from Pakistani prism, and that is why it would be difficult to find a common regional approach to the Afghanistan problem.   

The present confidence building measures need to be strengthened, consolidated and a series of new CBMs need to be initiated at various levels. In this regard India and China agreeing to undertake joint operations against pirates and sharing technological knowhow on seabed research, and the Mechanism on Coordination and Consultation on Border Affairs, are welcome steps. Another practical CBM could be dialogues between forward troops of both the sides in actually controlled areas.

Furthermore, economic relations need to be deepened and strengthened. Some of the irritants in trade such as huge trade deficit and market access denials by China to some of India’s leading sectors such as pharmaceuticals and information technology could be addressed. Vibrant trade between the two may prove as a catalyst to create a better security environment and reduce the security deficit greatly. Finally, in order to create a congenial atmosphere, the media on both the sides need to play a constructive role rather than flaring up the issue and deteriorating the environment.