South China Sea (SCS) which encompasses
an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan,
consisting of Dongsha, Xisha (known as Paracel), Zhongsha (also Huangyan
in Chinese) and Nansha (Spratly) islands, has long been a bone of
contention between China and Southeast Asian countries. Presently of
these Zhongsha and Xisha are under the actual jurisdiction of China;
Dongsha under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, and Nansha being fiercely
contested by various countries in the region. The western, northeastern
and southwestern areas of Nansha are under the actual jurisdiction of
Vietnam, Philippine and Malaysia respectively. Of these islets 8 are
controlled by China, 1 by Taiwan, 29 by Vietnam, 8 by Philippine, 5 by
Malaysia and 2 by Brunei.
Various claimants have been passing
legislations claiming certain islets. Last year in February, Philippines
Senate and House of Representatives passed Baseline Bill and declared
its ownership over Scarborough (Huangyan) island and some others in
Spratly. A few months later Vietnam too passed its Maritime Law
declaring indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands.
China claims the entire South China Sea and has expressed outrage over
these declarations, and further reinforced its claims by increasing the
level of governance on the disputed islands; the establishment of Sansha
city, a garrison in Zhongsha, inviting bids to explore resources in
some of the disputed islands, and now the dredging and reclamation of
some of the islets and reefs are manifestations of China’s show of
strength and above all the assertion of its sovereignty in the region.
SCS reclamation row
Recent reclamation of islands and
building soft infrastructure such as lighthouses on reclaimed islets has
escalated not only into a war of words between the US and China but
also flared tensions in the region as the US PACOM has initiated
surveillance of Chinese reclamation activities and installation of
mobile artillery vehicles in the reclaimed reefs and shoals. The US
believes that China is fortifying these areas and may threaten the
regional stability. Conversely China argues that the facilities are
primarily for public services. The war of words was carried out all the
way to Shang-Ri La Dialogue held in Singapore between 29 and 31 May
2015. The US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reiterated the US
position that it was within its right to protect the freedom of
navigation and overflight, and called for an “immediate and lasting halt
to land reclamation by all claimants.” Though Carter made reference to
reclamation by others too, however, the criticism was primarily directed
towards China, which he said, has reclaimed over 800 hectares, more
than all other claimants combined and has done so in only the last 18
months. Though he did not directly accuse China of moving artillery
vehicles to the reclaimed areas, but was categorical when he said that
they “oppose any further militarization of disputed features.”
Rejecting Carter’s contentions, China’s
Deputy Chief of General Staff, Admiral Sun Jianguo retorted that
reclamation work in anyway does not affect the freedom of navigation and
overflight, it is the US who in the garb of freedom of navigation wants
to interfere in the dispute. Explaining the kind of reclamation
activities China was undertaking, he said it has built an ocean survey
station for the United Nations on Yongshu reef, and have initiated the
construction of two multi-functional lighthouses on the Huayang and
Chigua reefs with an objective to provide better international public
services in the realms of maritime search and rescue operations,
disaster prevention and relief, marine research, meteorological studies,
environmental protection, navigation safety and fishery production etc.
therefore, China’s reclamation is “justified, legitimate and
reasonable.” Back in Beijing, Hua Chunying, the spokeswomen of Ministry
of Foreign affairs reacted fiercely to Carter’s criticism of China when
she said no one has the right to dictate China’s moves.
China’s perceptions
First and foremost, China believes that
apart from controlling most of the choke points in Indo-Pacific, the US
is also attempting to control other swathes of marine territory and
vital lanes, so that the US has greater maneuverability on the one hand
and contain China on the other. Conversely, Reclamation by China will
deny that strategic space to the US. Moreover, in long run the Malacca
Straight dilemma would be overcome by ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy,
especially the Sino-Pak Economic Corridor; therefore, no wonder the US
is becoming more aggressive in the SCS. Two, China considers the US as
an outsider in the region as it is neither located in the region nor
does it have any sovereignty disputes with China or any other country in
the region, therefore, besides maintaining it hegemony and containing
China, the US has no locus standi in the SCS. Three, China
perceives the US as an instigator of the dispute encouraging countries
like Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and of late inciting South Korea and
India to join the chorus in its policy of containing China. It feels
that the US meddling will internationalize, complicate the situation and
more importantly dent China image internationally. Four, China blames
the US for having double standards, for the latter “chooses selective
silence” toward those who illegally occupy territories claimed by China
as was stated by Hua Chunying recently. It believes that the US has
never objected to the reclamation activities of other claimants such as
Vietnam which has ‘occupied’ maximum area in Spratly; asking all claimants to
halt reclamation is just a lip service. Five, the US which is not the
signatory of the UNCLOS, has on the contrary argued that the UNCLOS
grants foreign ships and planes free access beyond a 12 nautical mile
territorial limit. The PA-8 surveillance aircraft of the US has followed
these norms, however, have been warned by China to leave the area as
China claims that military flights cannot cross its 200 mile exclusive
economic zone without its permission. The US fears that China’s
intentions are to make a fait accompli in the region by
dredging and reclamation that will adversely impact on the freedom of
navigation in the region. Had the US been a signatory to the UNCLOS, it
might have taken China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea on the navigation issue. Six, China is aware that the US has
maintained neutrality as far as the issue of sovereignty is concerned,
therefore, has preferred to engage the claimants bilaterally, and has
expressed its commitment towards the Code of Conduct negotiated by the
ASEAN in 2002. However, if the US has not taken sides, it has also
objected to China’s sovereignty over these reclaimed reefs. This is
evident when Carter told his audience at Shang-Ri La that “Turning an
underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of
sovereignty.” Seven, China is optimistic and confident about its
success, and knows that most of the world including the US shares this
viewpoint including some of its legal basis in the dispute, as was
demonstrated by Barack Obama on June 1st before leaving to
Jamaica. Obama said that “the truth is, is that China is going to be
successful, it’s big, it’s powerful, its people are talented and they
work hard and, and it may be that some of their claims are legitimate.”
But he also warned China to stop “throwing elbows” in SCS. Finally,
China is aware that the US would not like to confront China seriously in
the region and will not cross the 12 nautical miles territorial limit
for surveillance, if it does, there may be miscalculation and the
stability in the region will be threatened.
A zero sum game?
Freedom of navigation may not be a
serious an issue comparing the territorial claims, especially when more
than 700 islets, reefs and shoals estimated to have oil reserves of 7
billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are at stake.
All the 9 ASEAN claimants are pitched against China and dependant on
the US for diplomatic and military support. However, as the economic
interests of these countries are highly intertwined with those of China,
they may not like to confront China openly and alone. China has
declared South China Sea as one of its core interests along with Tibet
and Xinjiang where negotiations are out of question. The hard-line
emanating from Zhongnanhai is that China will continue its reclamation
activities and resist the US by various psychological, media, political
and legal etc. warfare. As for the US, with its ‘pivot to Asia’ the US
Navy would be testing China’s claims in the South China Sea, and may
cross the 12 nautical mile limit as well, which may force China to
impose a new ADIZ over SCS on the lines of Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, and
the rivalry may lead to mishaps and miscalculations.
Since China is also gradually transiting
from a continental power to maritime power, the confrontation in the
Indo-Pacific between the established global power and a rising one may
be a new normal in coming times. China is aware of the asymmetry in
force structure with the US irrespective of its second strike
capability. Nevertheless, as China grows economically, the gaps are
likely to be plugged in and new anti access/area denial weapons included
its armor. While China is expected to engage the US as well as ASEAN
at the highest level and sell its common development and win-win
cooperation, nonetheless, it will also heighten its military
preparedness for any eventuality and protracted contest with the US. If
the push comes to shove, the US may abandon its present position on
freedom of navigation, unimpeded passage for commercial shipping, which
anyway is not tenable, in favor of greater economic concessions from
China, for asking or threatening China to halt its reclamation
activities will not work at all.
