Sino-US Rivalry in South China Sea: A New Normal?

South China Sea (SCS) which encompasses an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan, consisting of Dongsha, Xisha (known as Paracel), Zhongsha (also Huangyan in Chinese) and Nansha (Spratly) islands, has long been a bone of contention between China and Southeast Asian countries. Presently of these Zhongsha and Xisha are under the actual jurisdiction of China; Dongsha under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, and Nansha being fiercely contested by various countries in the region. The western, northeastern and southwestern areas of Nansha are under the actual jurisdiction of Vietnam, Philippine and Malaysia respectively. Of these islets 8 are controlled by China, 1 by Taiwan, 29 by Vietnam, 8 by Philippine, 5 by Malaysia and 2 by Brunei.

Various claimants have been passing legislations claiming certain islets. Last year in February, Philippines Senate and House of Representatives passed Baseline Bill and declared its ownership over Scarborough (Huangyan) island and some others in Spratly. A few months later Vietnam too passed its Maritime Law declaring indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands. China claims the entire South China Sea and has expressed outrage over these declarations, and further reinforced its claims by increasing the level of governance on the disputed islands; the establishment of Sansha city, a garrison in Zhongsha, inviting bids to explore resources in some of the disputed islands, and now the dredging and reclamation of some of the islets and reefs are manifestations of China’s show of strength and above all the assertion of its sovereignty in the region.

SCS reclamation row

Recent reclamation of islands and building soft infrastructure such as lighthouses on reclaimed islets has escalated not only into a war of words between the US  and China but also flared tensions in the region as the US PACOM has initiated surveillance of Chinese reclamation activities and installation of mobile artillery vehicles in the reclaimed reefs and shoals. The US believes that China is fortifying these areas and may threaten the regional stability. Conversely China argues that the facilities are primarily for public services. The war of words was carried out all the way to Shang-Ri La Dialogue held in Singapore between 29 and 31 May 2015. The US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reiterated the US position that it was within its right to protect the freedom of navigation and overflight, and called for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants.” Though Carter made reference to reclamation by others too, however, the criticism was primarily directed towards China, which he said, has reclaimed over 800 hectares, more than all other claimants combined and has done so in only the last 18 months. Though he did not directly accuse China of moving artillery vehicles to the reclaimed areas, but was categorical when he said that they “oppose any further militarization of disputed features.”

Rejecting Carter’s contentions, China’s Deputy Chief of General Staff, Admiral Sun Jianguo retorted that reclamation work in anyway does not affect the freedom of navigation and overflight, it is the US who in the garb of freedom of navigation wants to interfere in the dispute. Explaining the kind of reclamation activities China was undertaking, he said it has built an ocean survey station for the United Nations on Yongshu reef, and have initiated the construction of two multi-functional lighthouses on the Huayang  and Chigua reefs with an objective to provide better international public services in the realms of maritime search and rescue operations, disaster prevention and relief, marine research, meteorological studies, environmental protection, navigation safety and fishery production etc. therefore, China’s reclamation is “justified, legitimate and reasonable.” Back in Beijing, Hua Chunying, the spokeswomen of Ministry of Foreign affairs reacted fiercely to Carter’s criticism of China when she said no one has the right to dictate China’s moves.

China’s perceptions

First and foremost, China believes that apart from controlling most of the choke points in Indo-Pacific, the US is also attempting to control other swathes of marine territory and vital lanes, so that the US has greater maneuverability on the one hand and contain China on the other. Conversely, Reclamation by China will deny that strategic space to the US. Moreover, in long run the Malacca Straight dilemma would be overcome by ‘One Belt One Road’ strategy, especially the Sino-Pak Economic Corridor; therefore, no wonder the US is becoming more aggressive in the SCS. Two, China considers the US as an outsider in the region as it is neither located in the region nor does it have any sovereignty disputes with China or any other country in the region, therefore, besides maintaining it hegemony and containing China, the US has no locus standi in the SCS. Three, China perceives the US as an instigator of the dispute encouraging countries like Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and of late inciting South Korea and India to join the chorus in its policy of containing China. It feels that the US meddling will internationalize, complicate the situation and more importantly dent China image internationally. Four, China blames the US for having double standards, for the latter “chooses selective silence” toward those who illegally occupy territories claimed by China as was stated by Hua Chunying recently. It believes that the US has never objected to the reclamation activities of other claimants such as Vietnam which has ‘occupied’ maximum area in Spratly; asking all claimants to halt reclamation is just a lip service. Five,  the US which is not the signatory of the UNCLOS, has on the contrary argued that the UNCLOS grants foreign ships and planes free access beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial limit. The PA-8 surveillance aircraft of the US has followed these norms, however, have been warned by China to leave the area as China claims that military flights cannot cross its 200 mile exclusive economic zone without its permission. The US fears that China’s intentions are to make a fait accompli in the region by dredging and reclamation that will adversely impact on the freedom of navigation in the region. Had the US been a signatory to the UNCLOS, it might have taken China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the navigation issue. Six, China is aware that the US has maintained neutrality as far as the issue of sovereignty is concerned, therefore, has preferred to engage the claimants bilaterally, and has expressed its commitment towards the Code of Conduct negotiated by the ASEAN in 2002. However, if the US has not taken sides, it has also objected to China’s sovereignty over these reclaimed reefs. This is evident when Carter told his audience at Shang-Ri La that “Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty.” Seven, China is optimistic and confident about its success, and knows that most of the world including the US shares this viewpoint including some of its legal basis in the dispute, as was demonstrated by Barack Obama on June 1^st before leaving to Jamaica. Obama said that “the truth is, is that China is going to be successful, it’s big, it’s powerful, its people are talented and they work hard and, and it may be that some of their claims are legitimate.” But he also warned China to stop “throwing elbows” in SCS. Finally, China is aware that the US would not like to confront China seriously in the region and will not cross the 12 nautical miles territorial limit for surveillance, if it does, there may be miscalculation and the stability in the region will be threatened.

A zero sum game?

Freedom of navigation may not be a serious an issue comparing the territorial claims, especially when more than 700 islets, reefs and shoals estimated to have oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are at stake. All the 9 ASEAN claimants are pitched against China and dependant on the US for diplomatic and military support. However, as the economic interests of these countries are highly intertwined with those of China, they may not like to confront China openly and alone. China has declared South China Sea as one of its core interests along with Tibet and Xinjiang where negotiations are out of question. The hard-line emanating from Zhongnanhai is that China will continue its reclamation activities and resist the US by various psychological, media, political and legal etc. warfare. As for the US, with its ‘pivot to Asia’ the US Navy would be testing China’s claims in the South China Sea, and may cross the 12 nautical mile limit as well, which may force China to impose a new ADIZ over SCS on the lines of Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, and the rivalry may lead to mishaps and miscalculations.

Since China is also gradually transiting from a continental power to maritime power, the confrontation in the Indo-Pacific between the established global power and a rising one may be a new normal in coming times. China is aware of the asymmetry in force structure with the US irrespective of its second strike capability.  Nevertheless, as China grows economically, the gaps are likely to be plugged in and new anti access/area denial weapons included its armor.  While China is expected to engage the US as well as ASEAN at the highest level and sell its common development and win-win cooperation, nonetheless, it will also heighten its military preparedness for any eventuality and protracted contest with the US. If the push comes to shove, the US may abandon its present position on freedom of navigation, unimpeded passage for commercial shipping, which anyway is not tenable, in favor of greater economic concessions from China, for asking or threatening China to halt its reclamation activities will not work at all.

Chinas humanitarian and international aid: Background and goals

1.     China has paid increasing effort in humanitarian aid in the past few years. What do you think is the background and goal of this move?

First and foremost, I believe event in the late 1980s eroded some of the credibility of the Party and the forces, therefore, the Party as well as the PLA undertook various tasks to restore the reputation and rebuild ties with the people and society. Disaster relief operations at home and abroad and peacekeeping operations abroad provided a excellent platform to ‘serve the people’ again. We may refer to humanitarian efforts in 1998 amidst Yangtse, Nenjiang, and Songhua Jiang flood relief operation, combating the SARS in 2003; Wenchuan earthquake relief operations in full media glare in 2008 and recent overseas evacuation of Chinese civilians from Libya and Yemen, as well as disaster relief during Nepal earthquake.

Secondly, couple of decades back, China neither had standardized norms nor the scientific and technological support for such operations, obviously owing to weak economy. The robust economic growth in the past three decades provided an impetus to perfect the mechanisms as well as employ technology in such efforts. For example it was only in 1997 that disaster relief for the first time was officially brought under the ambit of PLA military operations. In June 2005 more elaborate regulations as regards the army joining relief and rescue operations were promulgated by the State Council and Central Military Commission, whereby, the task, organisation, command, coordination and logistics were clearly defined.    Therefore, we can say that once China had set its house in order and displayed some confidence in handling such crises it was easier for it to go trans borders to signal the arrival of a benign power in neighborhood if not at global stage.      

2.     What are the characteristics of China’s international aid and what have changed over the years?

China’s international aid is in sync with its status as a developing country, however, is also part of its international obligations. As stated by a White Paper issued on foreign aid in 2011 China does not attach any political strings to the international aid. It was again in the 1990s that China started to streamline its international aid policy. In 1993, it set up the Foreign Aid Fund for Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects with interest-free loans; in 1995, Export-Import Bank of China, began to provide medium- and long-term low-interest loans to developing countries. Most of the aid has gobe for building capacities and developing skills and thus becoming partner in the development of other developing countries.

China has carefully chosen quantity of international aid depending upon the kind of relationship it has with certain country. With pivot countries like Pakistan and other friendly countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan etc. that could be converted into pivots China has whole heartedly supported their cause; however, it has differentiated with those with whom it has problems, for example the Philippines. China and Philippines are embroiled on territorial issues in South China Sea, and Philippines has even approached the International Court of Justice for arbitration.      

3.     China is still a developing country and some Chinese netizens find it unfair that the government is diverting money overseas. What do you think about this situation?

China is considerably a well off society at present; the living standards of the people have been enhanced tremendously over the past three decades of reforms. Today China is the second largest economy of the world with a whopping 4 trillion dollars foreign exchange reserves. Even during the worst of times China did commit international aid to poor and developing countries in cash or kind; and today when it can afford, it would be failing Chinese leadership as well as society for not undertaking its desired international obligations. There may be a bunch of overzealous and radicalized nationalist ‘angry youths’ in China here and there, but the kind of credibility and responsibility international community would like China to undertake with its rising economic and military stature weigh heavier than the howling of the netizens.  By way of international aid both your hard and soft power is at play, China’s image and acceptability would be dented severely if it does not responds swiftly to humanitarian crises and aid swiftly.  

4.     Any thoughts on the Chinese state propaganda on this issue? Are they doing a good job?

If your words match your deed then propaganda is justifiable, if it does not the propaganda may backfire. It connects Party and Army to the society or vice versa, and also encourages those who are engaged in relief and rescue operations. Above all it also eases some of the concerns of China’s growing military power internationally.

5.     From Yemen evacuation to Nepal disaster relief, do you think China is taking its responsibility or claiming its rising power in those regions? In the same way, what do you think about China’s aid in Africa? 

I believe it is natural for China to react this way, it is the need of the hour, for as China integrates into world economic system, its overseas interests gets intertwined with its national interests. Be it Chinese national engaged in business and developmental projects abroad or China’s involvement in overseas energy and resources or the sea lines of communication, defending these interests have been integrated to PLA’s new historic missions. On the other hand while chartering into new waters it signifies that China is also ready to shoulder new responsibilities. However, it may be too early to say that China would be seeking a role of a new regional power in the regions; however, the day may not be far when China would be able to project its power beyond its traditional spares of influence.

Notwithstanding the western criticism that emerging economies of Asia are neo-colonialists of Africa, the local governments in Africa and China see the relationship and Chinese investment as a ‘win-win’ partnership. Contrary to International Monetary Fund’s and World Bank’s stringent debt financing to these countries, China’s credit lines have been likened by most African countries.  Besides, China is also engaged in humanitarian projects in Africa. During the5^th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao listed 100 schools, 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers and 20 agricultural technology demonstration centers for such projects across Africa. Thousands of unutilized hectares of land has been leased to Chinese companies by many African countries for developing agriculture in various African countries, which obviously has been termed as ‘land grab’ by many western countries.

China-Africa cooperation has contributed to Africa's development with a keen focus on social development and people's wellbeing. The aim is to improve Africa's investment environment and its people's lives. Numerous infrastructure projects built with Chinese assistance, including schools, hospitals, stadiums and urban water and power supply systems, have improved the living and working conditions of African people. To lessen Africa's burden, China had altogether canceled RMB20 billion worth of debts owed by African countries by the end of 2013.’ He revealed that in 2013, China-Africa trade reached US$210 billion, 2,000 times that of 1960. China has been Africa's biggest trading partner for five years running. More than 2,500 Chinese companies are operating in Africa, creating over 100,000 jobs for the local communities. In 2013 over 1.4 million Chinese visited Africa generating huge amount of exchange revenue for Africa.

6.     Is the PLA Navy gaining more responsibility in overseas aid programs now? If so, why? And in what form?

Ever since China established a response mechanism for emergency humanitarian relief and aid in foreign countries in September 2004, the PLA navy has acted very swiftly. For example, during 2004 tsunami, China launched one of the largest ever emergency relief operations, and provided over 100 million dollar aid to the disaster hit countries. Obviously, owing to China’s overseas interests listed above in future, we will see the PLAN and PLAAF taking such more responsibilities as we witnessed during the Libyan and Yemen crisis.

Modi's China visit: Can India and China think differently?

In the times of globalization and intertwining economic interests at regional and trans-regional levels, the cooperation and crisis management has become increasingly important for a sustainable domestic as well as external economic development and environment. No one denies the role played by confidence building measures (CBMs) in maintaining peace and tranquility along the border, avoiding conflict, and thus creating a congenial atmosphere for cooperation not only at bilateral level but also at regional and multilateral organizations. CBMs signed between India and China in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and latest Border Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2013 is a pointer as most of the border negotiations have been held under the aegis of these mechanisms. However, the sensitive nature of the border has also called for ‘out of the box’ resolutions, for these have fallen short of finding a solution.   

From border to more complex issues

It was argued by most of the Indian and Chinese scholars that if there is an issue between India and China, it is the border issue. Padma Bhushan Prof. Ji Xianlin called it a ‘dark cloud’ shadowing the brilliance of two great civilizations. However, six decades down the independence, we have been overshadowed by more complex issues such as Sino-Pak entente, China’s involvement in the POK, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and many more non-traditional security issues including the trade deficit and trans-border rivers. As far as the border is concerned, it has acquired complexity as both India and China has made fait accompli of the border, China in the western sector and India in the eastern sector especially when the issue is being discussed at the special representative level. In such a situation forget about the resolution, even defining the LAC could be a herculean task. The onus is on the Chinese side, if they want to have normal diplomatic and economic relations with India, it should be China in a hurry to resolve the issue not India, for it cast a negative shadow on China’s image in India, and we cannot expect to have normal and robust economic engagement which is necessary for developing and sustaining economies on both side of the Himalayas.  China has to take India on board for realizing the Asian Century, and also for rewriting the rules of global political architecture.   

India an opportunity for China and vice versa

At the outset India needs a new and realistic farsighted foreign policy strategy that transcends conventional approaches. Conventional thinking has argued that we must not open for China be it the border regions or maritime domain. But did we succeed in preventing China making forays in our neighborhood? If not it’s better to be the part of value chain rather than being a moot spectator from outside. Today, China is our largest trading partner in goods, albeit there are issues pertaining to the trade deficit and market access to some of the Indian companies in China. While market access to the Indian company is well argued, the issue of Chinese investment in India has been seen with much skepticism and caution, but there are clear dividends. For example Chinese investment in telecom sector in India has successfully universalized mobile phone connectivity in India with affordable rates. It is not because of Nokia and Ericson, but because of the tough competition these companies received from Chinese telecom giants like Huawei and ZTE. Similarly, if India would like to build state of the art express ways, high speed railways, renewable energy capacity, even commercial ports and ship building with Chinese expertise, capital and competitive prices should be welcome.

‘Belt and Road’ initiative of China

So far India has maintained silence towards joining the initiative, for such initiatives have been construed as part of ‘strategic encirclement’ of India by security analysts and has clubbed with China’s similar but smaller initiatives such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the prospective Trans-Himalayan Economic Zone of Cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan, and the BCIM Economic Corridor that connects India’s northeast to China’s southwest, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Here again, if India tend to benefit from Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank’s (AIIB)  membership, it will also benefit from Chinese initiative as an insider rather than remaining outside the supply chain, notwithstanding the fact that projects along the ‘Belt and Road’ could be selected on case by case. China is apprehensive of the US-Japan-India alliance, therefore, it is keen to take India on board and sees ‘Make in India’ , ‘Act East Policy’ and even project ‘Mausam’ as complementary to Chinese initiative.

The Chinese understands India’s predicament and anxiety, nevertheless, are also open to the idea of establishing a new mechanism under the aegis of ‘Belt and Road’ initiative where all possible issues pertaining to the cooperation could be discussed. Secondly, in the face of soaring maritime ambitions of both the countries and their forays in Indo-Pacific, it is essential that both initiate a substantive maritime dialogue, which has remained a non starter even if the same was advocated in 2012. It is better if more such mechanisms are initiated between India and China so that trust is built which certainly will prove beneficial for finding solutions to various bilateral problems. For example between China and ASEAN there are over 1000 flights per week with an annual flow of around 5 million people. Can we think of such an economic integration and flow of people between us! 

Can China support India’s UN bid?

From Indian perspective while India could participate in Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, and be a partner in bilateral economic development, why cannot China show greater magnanimity to India’s aspirations for a permanent membership to the UN Security Council? India has supported China’s case in the UN over 30 times, and even after the 1962 war. China’s support for India will create enormous goodwill for China in India and the bilateral relations could touch a new high, albeit everyone knows that the membership may never happen anytime sooner! However, we would be insensitive towards China’s Japanese sensitivities if India pushes its case together with Japan, in turn we may not get that support.  

Wider people to people exchanges

More and wider people to people contacts and a relaxed visa regime not only for tourists and business people but also for students and academicians is need of the hour. The media to media relations that have generally been neglected need to be strengthened and direct access to news channels in either country is another possibility. In this regard, India needs to increase its reporters’ strength in China with the knowledge of Chinese, so as the Indian public get more and objective news stories about different aspects of China.

From bilateralism to multilateralism

It is owing to CBMs that India and China have struck some real convergence of interests on issues such as climate change, democratization of international financial institutions through multilateral forums such as Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle, Brazil; Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); Brazil-South Africa-India-China (BASIC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); East Asian Summits (EAS); G 20 and other multilateral forums such Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India and China have also initiated dialogue on terrorism and Afghanistan. The multilateral cooperation has been used to strengthen the bilateral relations by both the countries, and both are working towards raising the level of bilateral relationship with the hope of creating larger stakes in each other’s economic systems through complementarities and interdependence. Since everyone talks about the strikingly similar dynamics of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping, we will have to wait and watch if they can think differently and change the dynamics of India-China relations.

Belt and Road Action Plan: Choices for India

During the Bo Ao Forum for Asia convened in Sanya, Hainan between 26^th and 29 March, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce on 28 March issued an action plan on President Xi Jinping’s pet project ‘One Belt and One Road’ or the Belt and Road initiative.

The concept was first proposed by Xi Jinping during a speech at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013 when he said that ‘To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development in the Euro-Asia region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an ’economic belt’ along the silk road. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route.’ Xi proposed that traffic connectivity need to be improved so as to open the strategic regional thoroughfare from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, and gradually move toward the set-up of a network of transportation that connects Eastern, Western and Southern Asia. Chinese President also urged the regional members to promote local-currency settlement so as to improve their immunity to financial risks and their global competitiveness.’

The initiative of building MSR was proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013 in order to deepen economic and maritime links. The MSR begins in Fuzhou in Southeast China’s Fuzhou province and heads south into the ASEAN nations, crosses Malacca Strait and turns west to countries along the Indian Ocean before meeting the land based Silk Road in Venice via the Red Sea and Mediterranean.  Under the ambit of MSR, China plans to build hard and soft infrastructure from Indo-Pacific to Africa, including transport, energy, water management, communication, earth monitoring, economic and social infrastructure.

China realises the importance of the geo-economic as well as geo strategic importance of the MSR, for there are 32 littoral countries including China that touches the ‘21^st Century MSR’. The combined population of these countries is around 4 billion people, and the GDP of around $16 trillion. These are the countries with huge potentials and have archived rapid economic growth recently. From 2007 to 2012, the lowest annual growth rate was 5.27% that of Sudan, and the highest average annual growth rate of 22.83% that of Myanmar. In the view of these figures, China believes that the ‘21^st Century MSR’ is going to be an important driver of regional as well as global economic growth. And given the over capacities and structural adjustments being carried out in China, also pronounced as ‘New Normals’, China sees an opportunity for sustaining its domestic economy on one hand while strengthening strategic partnership with various countries on the other. 

The document released on Saturday points out that economic connectivity is the heart of the matter for which Chinese President Xi Jinping also announced the establishment of a Silk Road Fund with 40 billion US dollars to support infrastructure investments in countries involved, and have also linked the establishment of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS New Development Bank to the initiative as well. The document talks about ‘Silk Road Spirit’ interpreted as “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit." It says that Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The initiative is open and inclusive, Chinese ambassador to India, Amb. Le Yucheng does not subscribe it a Chinese solo but ‘a symphony performed by various countries.’ The document identifies five major goals of the initiative in terms of promoting policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, uninterrupted trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges. It is in the view of its massive scale that the strategic community has raised various questions including whether such initiatives are in sync with China’s foreign policy goals; or is the initiative an antidote to the US foreign policy goals like ‘pivot to Asia’ or ‘Trans Pacific Partnership’ (TPP)? Or, is China challenging the US hegemony and rewriting the rules of geopolitical architecture? 

India’s options

Why has India remained silent to China’s invitation even if the former has underscored the importance of India as far as the initiative is concerned? Should security analysts and sceptics see these initiatives as part of ‘strategic encirclement’ of India, and club it with China’s similar but smaller initiatives such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the prospective Trans-Himalayan Economic Zone of Cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan, and the BCIM Economic Corridor that connects India’s northeast to China’s southwest, Bangladesh and Myanmar? Is it because of this ‘strategic encirclement’ of India that India is going slow on the BCIM-Economic Corridor even if it was officially signed during Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit in 2013 and falls in the ambit of ‘one belt’ initiative? The security establishment and strategic community have always maintained that India cannot give China access to its sensitive areas. But, can the new government in office think differently on the issue?

As far as ‘Belt and Road’ initiative of China is concerned, India has been part of the initiative with the signing of the BCIM – EC. The work is in progress. As India’s Look East Policy has been widening in scope, the BCIM-EC is another area where the policy could be integrated, especially when we are thinking of developing landlocked and underdeveloped northeast region of India. We certainly need to take a leaf out of China’s experience as to how it has developed and connected its south-western and southern states to ASEAN. Is New Delhi ready to forgo its sensitivities in Northeast in turn of economic development of the region? Needless to say, the Chinese arms supply to the insurgents need to be tackled sternly and China need to do much more in this front. Can the massive trade between China-ASEAN and India-ASEAN percolate to the northeast India and northwest China? The answer to all these questions is yes provided we start looking at boundaries as gateways but not barriers.

However, as regards the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) India has been tight lipped so far, neither has it declined the Chinese proposal, nor has it shown eagerness to join the bandwagon. Notwithstanding its silence, India has been responding by its own strategy. It has been expanding and strengthening its maritime partnerships with the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Australia etc. countries on one hand and engaging ASEAN in various domains on the other. Besides there are new initiative such as ‘Project Mausam’ initiated by the Ministry of Culture in tandem with Archaeological Society of India (ASI), New Delhi as the nodal agency and Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), New Delhi as its Research Unit. Since area covered under the project extends from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka to the Southeast Asia, and has been termed as Indian Ocean “world”, analysts and media has termed it India’s response to China’s MSR. Knowing that it is a pure cultural construct many in China has termed it as a "threatening and competing" initiative which will pose a major challenge for China's belt and road plans.”

Even if we may have soaring ambitions, the kind of economic muscle which is required to materialise such projects simply does not exist. However, the official Chinese policy is keen to rope in India and says that the “Belt and Road initiatives can also be linked with India’s ‘Spice Route’ and ‘Mausam’ projects, thus forming a new starting point and a new bright spot in China-India cooperation.” The noises about turning Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace is perhaps irrelevant as we may not find may voices supporting the idea.

What should be India’s options? China has considered India as an important country and crucial for economic integration in the region. Initiatives such as ‘Make in India’ and ‘Act East’ policies have been seen in alignment with the Chinese initiative. China  is already a partner in India’s development; there is cooperation in railway sector as regards enhancing the speed and heavy haul of the trains, China is also assisting India in the training of railway personnel, design of the stations and in building up a railway university in India. The feasibility study of Delhi-Chennai high speed railway has been going on and will bring down the travel time to 7 hours from present 28. India is also the founder member of BRICS Bank and AIIB linked to the Belt and Road initiative by China.  

It would be unfortunate if India remains outside the value chain of such an initiative; however, it may decide for itself what kind of project it could carry out with China on case to case basis. These could be in realm of a variety of infrastructure related projects including energy, transport, power, e-commerce, and projects integrating investment and trade. China will also perhaps frame its own responses and priorities towards countries along the Belt and Road. For example it will have differentiated strategy while dealing with smaller and medium size countries, with conflicting parties in South China Sea, ‘pivot’ countries like Pakistan and big and large countries like India.   Secondly, as India faces uncertainties as well as opportunities, it must capitalise on the invaluable geopolitical strategic space it has in the Indo-Pacific. If the US is attempting to offset China’s geopolitical pull by way of India confronting China or in tandem with the US and its allies in the seas and land it would be disastrous for all the stakeholders. From an Indian point of view, if the US is looking for a strong economic partnership with India, so is the case of India’s economic engagement with China and the US alike. It would be naïve to say that the US will dump its interests in China for India. Imagine the $521 billion trade volume between China and the US and compare it with our trade with China and the US combine! Therefore,  if at all India would like to be a so called ‘swing power’ between China and the US, we need to be a swing power as far as cooperation and healthy competition and India’s national interests are concerned not the confrontation and conflict, which is neither in India’s interest nor in the interest of China and the US.  Finally, since the maritime ambitions of both India and China are soaring, the interests are overlapping too. There is an urgent need for initiating more comprehensive mechanisms, one in the offing could be a substantive maritime security dialogue which has remained a non starter since 2012.  

Next phase of the U.S. Pivot to Asia: Responses from China

Just before setting off to his visit to Japan, South Korea and the US Pacific Command in Honolulu between April 8 and 11, the US Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter while delivering a speech at Arizona State University’s McCain Institute on April 6, 2015 said that he was ‘personally committed to overseeing the next phase of the rebalance, which will deepen and diversify the US engagement in the region.’

Carter was perhaps reassuring the US allies in Asia-Pacific that even though the US was bogged down in conflicts in the Middle East and Af-Pak region, it was serious about its pivot to Asia. Secondly, if the first phase of the pivot was overshadowed by China’s grandiose initiatives such as Asia Infrastructural Development Bank (AIDB), ‘Belt and Road initiative, Silk Road Fund, and the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), the second phase will see the US taking its leadership role in the Asia Pacific region. Thirdly, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its companion agreement Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) floated by the US, that has remained non starter may be realised sooner than the later. It was in this context that Carter compared the TPP as a ‘new aircraft carrier’ and one of the most important parts of Obama administration’s effort to shift more attention to Asia-Pacific. He urged the Congress to give President Barack Obama authority to complete the agreement that holds ‘enormous promise’ for economic development and job creation. Carter declared Asia-Pacific as ‘defining region’ for the future of the US.  

According to Carter there are three cornerstones of the next phase of the US pivot to Asia: advanced high-tech weapons; trilateral alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea; and the TPP. He said that most advanced weapons would be deployed in the Asia-Pacific, and 60% of the US naval fleet (six aircraft careers) would be deployed in the region. China finds it interesting that when the idea of pivot to Asia was floated in 2011, the US has pointed out that 60% of its fleet would be stationed in the Pacific, however, after 2013 the US have included the Indian Ocean as a part of the concept. 

It is in this context that analysts in China are apprehensive about India becoming a ‘pawn’ on the ‘pivot to Asia’ chessboard, for India has been issuing joint statements since last year on Asia-Pacific with the US.  However, many including Prof. Wang Wei of Central Nationality University believe that India may not be willing to play the second fiddle to the US. On the contrary, Chinese experts are of the view that India’s ‘Act East Policy’ may be on the path of ‘collision and friction’ as India expands its influence from South Asia to Southeast Asia. 

As far as the triangular alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea is concerned, China sees an increased level of defence cooperation between the three, and finds it in sync with Shinzo Abe’s efforts to expand the role of the Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) by loosening constitutional constraints, especially the right to collective self-defence. Japanese SDFs are likely to provide their logistic support for the US forces in a case where Japan’s national security is threatened, and will cooperate under various circumstances including in a case of collective self-defence. The alliance is also considering ballistic missile defence, to this end the US is trying to convince South Korea to deploy 'Sade System'.

The third cornerstone, the TPP, a symbol of economic and trade cooperation in the region, has been pronounced as one of the most important parts of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, ‘as important as an aircraft carrier.’ It is interesting to note that Japan and South Korea subsequently has been added to TPP negotiations while China has been kept out, albeit China has signalled that it may not be averse to join the agreement. However, it also believes that the TPP while serving the US pivot to Asia is also aimed to establish a new international economic order in Asia-Pacific under the auspices of the United States and contain China's growing influence in the regional and global economy. China also believes that the negotiations may be stalled further as the US-Japan differences on trade and tariffs are serious. 

The Ashton pronouncements have been regarded by China as ‘old wine in new bottle’; the wordings ranging from Hilary Clinton’s 2009 rhetoric of ‘Pivot to Asia-Pacific’ to Carter’s ‘new stage of the pivot’ according to China is a pointer to the fact the US has never been out of the ‘Cold War mentality’ and that it simply wants to consolidate its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, and maintain its hegemony in the region while containing China.

China believes that the reasons behind ‘the new stage’ of the pivot arise from ‘a sense of urgency’ from Obama administration, as it remains one of the flagships of US’s foreign policy but not taking a definite shape. It also reveals that there is ‘a sense of frustration’ as the ‘pivot’ has failed to contain China's rise and influence in the region. Not only this, the US has also failed to reassure its allies in the region. Its old ally the Philippines has even announced its withdrawal from the TPP negotiations. The declining leadership role of the US is not only felt by its allies but by the US itself. The third reason the Chinese analysts provide is ‘a sense of powerlessness’ in the minds of the US authorities, and that is why it is strengthening its security alliance with Japan, South Korea and other allies, as well as trying to coax other powers in the regions to be part of its strategy.

Analysts in China are of the view that contrary to be able to bring security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, the ‘rebalancing’ will bring disaster to the region. They are questioning whether the TPP which has been compared to an aircraft career is open to various countries on equal footing like the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative or not? Is it inclusive or is there any hidden agenda? If it is not inclusive and not a win-win proposition, how can it bring peace and prosperity and provide security to the region? If it is exclusive, and the players have to play by the US rules, isn’t that the thinking of a hegemon?

It is in this context that China believes that Asian affairs should be left to the Asian countries to be resolved. These could be only resolved on the basis of mutual respect, consensus and a win-win scenario. Asia does not require ‘foreign monks’ to recite the ‘scriptures’! China’s strategy according to Prof. Wang Wei should be win-win cooperation with the US on one hand and consolidating and strengthening of China’s relations with Asia-Pacific countries on the other. She believes that Asia-Pacific is big enough to accommodate both China and the US, however, China need to be cautious as the US harbour evil intention towards China.

One Belt One Road : China at the centre of the global geopolitics and geo-economics

Ever since being elected as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012 and subsequently the President of China in March 2013, Xi Jinping has put forth grandiose ideas like ‘Chinese Dream’ and ‘One Belt and One Road’. The former aims to ‘realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, by realising the two centenary goals, i.e. to double the 2010 GDP per capita income and build a moderately prosperous society by 2021 when the Communist Party of China marks its 100^th anniversary; and second goal is to turn China into an all-around modern and socially advanced country by 2049 when the People’s Republic marks its centenary. The later refers to setting up of a geopolitical and geo-economic Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) connecting China to Europe by land and sea.

These grandiose initiatives have been scantly reported and least debated in India and may be the world at large. Nevertheless, have raised hopes as well as suspicion as to what China is up to. And that even if silk routes existed in ancient times, but what is the relevance of such initiatives in modern times? And also whether such initiatives are in sync with China’s foreign policy goals such as multi polarity, no hegemony, common security etc. or an antidote to the US foreign policy goals like ‘pivot to Asia’ or ‘Trans Pacific Partnership’ (TPP)? Or, is China challenging the US hegemony and rewriting the rules of geopolitical and economic architecture?

The ‘One Belt one Road’ concept is rooted in history as there existed an overland Silk Route and a MSR that connected China to countries across Asia, Africa and Europe. In the last three decades of reforms, China has built a network of highways and railroads from north to south and from east to less developed western and south western regions. Having achieved that, China sees an opportunity to link the hinterland with south Asia, Europe, Africa and even the Americas.

The concept was first proposed by Xi Jinping during a speech at Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013 when he said that ‘To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development in the Euro-Asia region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an ’economic belt’ along the silk road. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route.’ Xi proposed that traffic connectivity need to be improved so as to open the strategic regional thoroughfare from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, and gradually move toward the set-up of a network of transportation that connects Eastern, Western and Southern Asia. Chinese President also urged the regional members to promote local-currency settlement so as to improve their immunity to financial risks and their global competitiveness (XHN 2013).’ Undoubtedly, the economic connectivity is the heart of the matter for which Chinese President Xi Jinping also announced the establishment of a Silk Road Fund with 40 billion US dollars to support infrastructure investments in countries involved; however, the notion is equally significant strategically as it will imply common security or security dilemmas at regional and trans-regional levels.

The initiative of building MSR was proposed by Xi Jinping during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013 in order to deepen economic and maritime links. The MSR begins in Fuzhou in Southeast China’s Fuzhou province and heads south into the ASEAN nations, crosses Malacca Strait and turns west to countries along the Indian Ocean before meeting the land based Silk Road in Venice via the Red Sea and Mediterranean.  Under the ambit of MSR, China plans to build hard and soft infrastructure from Indo-Pacific to Africa, including transport, energy, water management, communication, earth monitoring, economic and social infrastructure.

China has sought the participation of countries and regions touching the ‘One Belt and One Road ‘zone. For example most of the ASEAN countries with whom China has a trade volume of 400 billion dollars has welcomed the idea as it sets to build a single market economic community by 2015. As far as South Asia is concerned except India most of the smaller nations have also welcomed the idea as they perceive the initiative as a great opportunity to comprehensively deepen economic and people to people relations.

Why has India remained silent to China’s invitation even if the former has underscored the importance of India as far as the initiative is concerned? Should security analysts and sceptics see these initiatives as part of ‘strategic encirclement’ of India policy, and club it with China’s similar but smaller initiatives such as China-Pakistaan Economic Corridor, the prospective Trans-Himalayan Economic Zone of Cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan, and the BCIM Economic Corridor that connects India’s northeast to China’s southwest, Bangladesh and Myanmar? Is it because of this ‘strategic encirclement’ of India that India is going slow on the BCIM-Economic Corridor even if it was officially signed during Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit in 2013 and falls in the ambit of ‘one belt’ initiative? The security establishment and strategic community have always maintained that India cannot give China access to its sensitive areas. But, can the new government in office think differently on the issue?

Shennon Tiezzi (2014) associate editor of the Diplomat and Chen Dingding (2014) has drawn parallels between ‘One Belt one Road’ to the ‘Marshal Plan’ that established the US as a ‘bona fide super power’. The Chinese scholars including Prof. Shi Ze (2014) of the China Institute of International Studies, however, have denounced the western criticism of the initiative and have maintained that the policy of ‘Three Nos” that is non interference in the internal affairs of other nations; not to seek the so called ‘sphere of influence’; and not to strive for hegemony or dominance equally applies to the “One Belt One Road” policy (Shi Zi 2014). The initiative indeed is larger than the Marshal plan as it attempts to encompass the entire world, the economic value of which could reach whopping 21 trillion US dollars (Shennon Tiezzi 2014). Will this grandiose concept succeed and realise not only the Chinese dream but the dreams of various countries and people around the world? Or will it give rise to geostrategic rivalries around the world and cold or hot war with the sole and declining superpower of the world?

It appears that if grandiose initiatives such as Asia Infrastructural Development Bank (AIDB), Silk Road Fund, MSR and most recent Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) has put China at the centre of the global geopolitics and geo-economics, and has forced the US to scramble for a leadership role at least in the region if not globe; the same has challenged the US hegemony in the region including the US notions of ‘pivot to Asia’ and Trans Pacific Partnership which is yet to take off. It remains to be seen, how India approaches both the camps as for now it is out of the ambit of US as well as Chinese initiatives. The Chinese have realised that the US would not be supportive of Beijing's renewed drive as it was during the formative years of reforms and open door policy in the late 1970s. The US sees China as the only potentially qualified rival to the US hegemony. China also believes that if there are countries that restrict China’s maritime ambitions these are the US, Japan and India (Zhang 2009). Under such circumstance, will India maintain its strategic autonomy or lean to one side, the choice would be difficult to make.

References:

Chen Dingding (2014) “China’s ‘Marshal Plan’ is much more” The Diplomat, November 10, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinas-marshall-plan-is-much-more/

Shennon Tiezzi (2014) “The New Silk Road: China’s Marshal Plan?” The Diplomat, November 6, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-new-silk-road-chinas-marshall-plan/

Shi Zi (2014) “One Road & One Belt” New Thinking With Regard to Concepts and Practice” lecture delivered at the 30^th anniversary of Conference of the Schiller Institute on October 14, 2014, Germany available at http://newparadigm.schillerinstitute.com/media/one-road-and-one-belt-and-new-thinking-with-regard-to-concepts-and-practice/

XHN [Xinhua News] (2013) “Xi suggests China, C. Asia build Silk Road economic belt” 7 September, 2013

Zhang Shiping (2009) 《中国海权》(China’s Sea Rights) People’s Daily Publication, Beijing

Need for a Substantive Maritime Dialogue between India and China

It is quite unambiguous that after years of alienation and disenchantment, India has accorded high priority in engaging its immediate and extended neighbors. Inviting SAARC heads of the states to his swearing in ceremony; his first visit to Bhutan and then Nepal as Prime Minister; and now a visit to three key Island nations in the Indian Ocean, Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka between 11 and 14 March 2015 are all manifestations of Prime Minister Modi’s highly assertive foreign policy. Is the alienation and disenchantment the sole reason? Did India take its land and maritime neighborhood for granted for the reason that India shared very strong historical and cultural bonds with them?

Analysts are of the view that India has started to look inward, for she has discovered that the very reasons mentioned above has provided space for China to engage aggressively with them economically and strategically. It appears that the continental mindset in India is undergoing a tremendous change, and there is a strong rationale for developing blue economy as well as blue water naval capabilities. This is amply clear with Modi’s visit to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka between 11 and 14 March; the visits are taking place after a period of 33, 10 and 28 years respectively by an Indian Prime Minister to these nations.

Perhaps taking cues from the Chinese diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region, India has signed a series of agreements with the island nations ranging from developing blue economy, developmental strategies to maritime security. India secured infrastructure development rights for two islands in the region - Assumption from Seychelles and Agalega from Mauritius. Giving a fillip to strategic cooperation, Modi also launched a Coastal Surveillance Radar Project in Seychelles. Besides, India also signed an agreement for hydrographical survey for maritime cooperation with Seychelles. It is believed that Seychelles, which currently is an observer, will soon become a full partner in the maritime security cooperation between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka.

In Mauritius, India signed five agreements that included a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in the field of 'Ocean Economy', sea and air transportation facilities at Agalega Island, traditional medicine and homoeopathy, cultural cooperation between 2015 and 2018, and import of fresh mango from India. India also offered to establish a second cyber city in Mauritius, and a 500 million US dollars concessional line of credit to Mauritius for improving civilian infrastructure.

The last leg of Prime Minister’s visit,  Sri Lanka, would be keenly observed by analysts in India and especially in China, for China’s hard and soft infrastructural development in the island nation has  raised concerns in India. Analysts believe that China’s forays in the Indian Ocean, has eroded the myth of Indian Ocean being India’s Ocean. The docking of China’s submarines at Sri Lankan ports ruffled quite a few feathers in the security corridors in India. It appears that the Tamil issue that hijacked India’s Sri Lanka policy has long been abandoned with the ascend of Modi to power, or at least his government will not allow it to impact on the bilateral relations. The electoral victory of Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena, who chose India for his first ever foreign visit, is believed to augur well for India-Sri Lanka relations.

It is obvious that if China’s increased footprints in the Indian Ocean has thrown new challenges to India's maritime security, in the same vein, India’s ‘Act East Policy’ under Modi, its increasingly intimate economic and security ties with ASEAN, and especially a “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’ signed together with the US, has made China apprehensive about India’s role in the Pacific. In the view of these overlapping interests and soaring maritime ambitions of both the countries, it is time that a substantive  maritime dialogue is initiated by India and China, the dialogue while paving way for the establishment of a series of mechanisms to enhance cooperation in the high seas, will also prevent the occurrence of any untoward incident that may flare up nationalistic sentiments on both sides.