In order to strengthen the fragile defense ties and
improve the security environment between India and China, the Indian
Defense Minister Mr. A. K Antony headed a defense delegation to China
between July 4th and 6th.
He held talks with his counterpart Chang Wanquan,
Special Representative on the boundary question Mr. Yang Jiechi on
various defense and security related issues including the
confidence-building measures (CBMs) along the border; military to
military relations; and the forthcoming joint military exercises to be
conducted in October later this year. He also met Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang and paid visit to some of the Chinese defense establishments.
Antony’s visit was a return visit to General Liang Guanglies’s 2011
China visit and as an Indian Defense Minister after a gap of 7 years.
Liang Guanglie’s India visit had broken some ice, and
given an incremental push to the security ties that had deteriorated in
2010 when China denied visa to Lt. General B. S. Jaswal, General Officer
Commanding Chief, Northern Area Command of the Indian Army. Chinese
Premier Li Keqian’s India visit restored some of the trust and continued
the momentum of the ties in the wake of Depsang border transgression
stalemate that had continued for three weeks and almost jeopardized the
visits of Indian Foreign Minister to China and that of Chinese Premier’s
visit to India. Antony’s visit could have consolidated the fruits of
these visits, but Major General LuoYuan’s remarks made during his
interaction with the All China Journalists Association a few hours
before Antony’s landing in China overshadowed the visit and reminded us
yet again the nature of perpetual security and trust deficit between
India and China.
General Luo who is known for his hawkish and anti-India
rhetoric is well known in the strategic circles, but the timing of his
remarks is unfortunate and abominable, especially when both sides are
reiterating that the media should not be given ammunition to stir and
flare up the hypersensitive issue. He had told the journalists that
‘there is still the problem of 90,000 sq. km. of territory that is
occupied by the Indian side. I think these are problems left over by
from history and we should look at these problems with a cool head.
Particularly, the Indian side should not provoke new problems and
increase military deployment at the border area.”
Analysts believe that the Depsang transgressions is the
making of generals like Luo Yuan, and also an indication that the PLA
does not give a damn to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in
China. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the stalemate took
such a long time to resolve, for India’s channels of communication for
negotiations were primarily with the MoFA. It is also believed that the
Chinese transgression is in response to India’s infrastructure
development and security measures along our borders.
It is precisely owing to these concerns that China has
pushed forward for a freeze in such measures and infrastructure
development along the border through the mechanism of Border Defense
Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), and rightly rejected by the Indian side.
BDCA, therefore would be another mechanism in the line of various other
mechanisms on border, and would be inconclusive like others as far as
the final resolution of the border is concerned, though these mechanisms
have prevented incidents like Depsang from snowballing into an armed
conflict and have effectively contributed to the peace and tranquility
along the border.
Even though the security environment owing to JWG on
border, the 1991 and 1996 CBMs, the mechanism of Special Representatives
in 2003, and Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the
Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, Mechanism on
Coordination and Consultation on Border Affairs etc. have contributed to
the incremental improvement in the security environment, but as long as
India and China are not able to address the core issue of border and
the spin offs of the issue, the environment cannot register considerable
improvement, and would continue to be held hostage to statements like
General Luo Yuan or those emanating from his Indian counterparts from
time to time.
The unresolved boundary issue is the fundamental cause
for mistrust at every level, owing to which there was a war between the
two, the wounds of which are still festering at least in the minds of
the Indians. The spin off has been the huge security deficit, which has
led the other side to believe that they have been ganging up with the
third parties to contain them.
Secondly, China’s ‘all weather friendship’ with Pakistan
and supplying the latter with sophisticated military weaponry including
the missiles and nuclear technology, has posed a threat to India’s
national security. Even if India and China doesn’t fight another war,
but the image China has created in the minds of every Indian is that of a
rogue who has been destabilizing Indian state through a third party for
decades. The hosting of Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif during Antony’s
China visit is said to be part of this calculus from China, and Luo
Yuan’s statements could also be seen in this context as well. And, will
it improve the environment when China signs 8 agreements with Pakistan,
some of which would involve the disputed territory of POK? See for
example the $44 million Xinjiang-Rawalpindi fiber optic link or the $18
billion economic corridor between Xinjiang and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
It may be noted that administrative control of Gwadar has been taken
over by China recently. The military exercises, even though these are
termed as related to counter terrorism, their approaches towards
terrorism are totally different. China sees terrorism in the region from
Pakistani prism, notwithstanding the fact that some of its own
‘terrorists’ are trained in Af-Pak region.
It is for the same reasons that India fails to
understand why China should be concerned about India’s presence in the
South China Sea, when China itself is indifferent to India’s
sensitivities in its disputed areas with Pakistan. It is for the same
reasons that India fails to understand why China should be weary of its
cooperation with the US, Japan, Vietnam and other countries in the
region, when China itself has been engaging with many of India’s
neighbors at various levels.
Some analysts would say that Antony should have called
off the visit in the same manner as Vajpayee did in 1979 when China
invaded Vietnam and cited teaching Vietnam a lesson similar to what it
was supposed to have taught India.
India, instead of its myopic thinking over issues needs
to take a futuristic and long term view. Here Indian policy makers
could take a cue from China’s policy makers who have drawn a roadmap for
China’s development by 2049. The roadmap would make China a developed
country, and goals so far have been achieved ahead of schedule by
China’s planners. It is here, why many of Indian and foreign strategic
thinkers deem India as a dysfunctional state with inherent policy
paralysis. While the momentum of the high level political visits as well
exchanges between the two countries at all levels need to be
maintained, strengthened and deepened, India must learn to wrest the
initiatives at the same time, else we would end up in a similar
situation as it happened during Antony’s China visit.
