Li Keqiang’s India visit: Why Trade not Border High on Agenda

Wealth (fu) and power (qiang) has remained the dream of China throughout its long history. The best manifestation of this is reflected during the modern period when China was down and out with the defeats it suffered at the hands of foreign powers starting from the Opium War (1840). The defeats demonstrated to the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) the importance of being rich and powerful. A movement, which came to be known as “self-strengthening” movement, was launched from 1861-1894 and carried out in three stages. During the first phase (1861-1872), the slogan was ziqiang (self-strengthening); the aim was to build up a strong military power through the purchase and manufacture of modern weapons. Slogan for the second phase (1872-1885) was fuqiang (wealth and power), and the aim was to build modern enterprise such as railways, shipping, mining and telegraph with the private capital. The third phase (1885-1894) was marked by building up of navy and the establishment of modern iron and steel works.  ‘Self-strengthening’ movement marked the beginning of industrialisation and sowed the seeds of modern capitalism in China. However, the modernisation campaign was constrained, as China adhered to the Confucian traditions; had disliking for merchandise and discouraged private enterprise and competition; and made no attempt to assimilate western institutions, philosophy, art and culture. Secondly, whatsoever attempts of modernisation were hampered by subsequent foreign aggressions: Japanese invasion of Formosa [Taiwan] in 1874; the British attempts to open Yunnan in 1875; the Russian occupation of Ili in Xinjiang, 1871-72, French invasion of Annam [Vietnam] in 1884-85, and Japanese aggression in Korea, 1894-95.

Five and half a decade later, Mao Zedong attempted to re-enact the ‘self-strengthening’ aura by following the Soviet model of industrial and agrarian development. Mao was successful in turning China powerful (qiang) by building the largest standing army in the world, but failed to make China rich (fu), as some of the constraints of “self-strengthening” movement were inherent in his developmental model besides the self-imposed isolation and economic blunders.

Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping de-Maoised China, ended the self-imposed isolation by initiating a policy of reforms and open door during the 3^rd Plenary Session of the 11^th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978. The thrust of the reforms was in rural areas, where a ‘contract household responsibility system’ was implemented that linked remuneration to output. Besides, a two-layer management system featuring the integration of centralisation and decentralisation was also implemented. During the 3^rd Plenary Session of the 12^th Central Committee in 1984, reforms were taken to the urban areas, and various systems of ownership such as collectively owned enterprises, individual, private and foreign owned enterprises were introduced and encouraged. During the 13^th national Congress of the CPC held in 1987, a three-stage modernisation formula (sanbuzou) for the next 62 years was advocated, which compared to the 33-year three-stage modernisation programme of ‘Self strengthening’ Movement allotted double the time for realising the defined strategic objectives. These three stages were defined as: 1) Doubling the 1980 GDP to end shortages of food and clothing (jiejue wenbao wenti). 2) Quadrupling the 1980 GDP by the end of 20^th century and achieving a relatively comfortable life for all the people (dadao xiaokang xueping). 3) Basically completing China’s modernisation by mid 21^st century, raising the per capita GDP to that of moderately developed countries and achieving a fairly well off life for its people (dadao zhongdeng fada guojia de shuiping) . 

The new vision of modernisation paid dividends as China showed its enthusiasm for merchandise and encouraged private enterprise and competition; and made serious attempt to import advanced western technology and management skills. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 brought in export boom, registering almost 30% annual growth until 2007 capturing more than 10% of the global market. Politically, China sought a stable and peaceful surrounding. It is remarkable to note that ever since its Vietnam adventure in 1979, China remained committed to peace with global powers and regions in its vicinity. To everyone’s surprise, China achieved the first stage by the end of the 1980s and the second stage in 1995 ahead of schedule.

The third and fourth generation of Chinese leaders pursued the growth model relentlessly. They not only legitamised the communist rule by adhering to growth model but also set new benchmarks for developments. Especially during Hu Jintao’s tenure (2002-2013), China witnessed unprecedented level of economic growth. China’s GDP touched $8.3 trillion from a meager $1.20 trillion when he took over from Jiang Zemin, registering an impressive 10% and above annual growth. Not only the financial crisis was effectively dealt with, but it also together with other Asian economies contributed almost 50% to the world’s economic growth during the slump. Rapid growth catapulted China to second largest economy of the world leaving behind countries like UK, France, Germany and Japan. Urbanization registered fastest ever growth anywhere in the world, and by the end of 2012 over 52% Chinese were living in the urban areas. The urbanization opened up real estate sector, and in fact became catalyst in maintaining and sustaining rapid growth; as a result the ghost cities in China also registered an increase, and the gap between China’s haves and have-nots have widened as could be seen from the rural urban income levels in China.

The fifth generation leader Xi Jinping has advocated the notion of China dream and would be on a mission to make China a fully well off society by 2020 by doubling the 2010 GDP. If done China’s GDP in 2020 will reach around $12.54 trillion. However, it has also been reported that China’s GDP by 2020 will reach $16 trillion, close to the US economy in 2012. Probably the sixth generation leadership in China would be able to trounce the US as the largest economy in the world and gradually achieve the task of making China a developed nation by the mid of 21^st century.

It is this context that the visit of Premier Li Keqiang to India should be viewed and analysed. Chinese leaders have a long-term agenda of economic development and the trade with world including India would be high on the agenda. Politically, even though China has taken maximalist positions vis-à-vis its disputes in the region, however, it would not wish to see them spiraling out of control and jeopardize the economic agenda that was set in 1979 and more specifically by way of initiating the three step strategy for making China a developed nation by the middle of this century in 1987. The bilateral trade between India and China could be a catalyst in sustaining the domestic growth in China on the one hand and maintaining the desired continuity in the bilateral relations on the other. Secondly since the US would also be looking towards India for greater trade and investment, job creation and economic growth, China would like to compete with the US in Indian markets for getting a sizeable pie, be it the infrastructural development, power and energy sector or the telecom and banking sectors.

We may refer to Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent speech at Boao forum for Asia, considered as ‘China’s Davos’, which was attended by people from political, and academic affiliations but dominated by the business leaders. Xi Jinping in his speech talked about peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefits. He said China’s trade with its neighbors has grown from $100 billion and more to $1.3 trillion in the last decade. Talking about the future trends, he said it is projected that in the coming five years, China's import will reach some $10 trillion and China’s outbound investment to $500 billion; and also the number of its outbound tourists may well exceed 400 million people. Li Keqiang would have large Indian market in mind and as expected is leading a huge business delegation. It was revealed by Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Jiang Yaoping on 16^th May that an investment promotion mission will travel to India next week to follow up on the work of three earlier missions sent in 2008, 2010 and 2012. Jiang said the nature of the trade relationship was changing, particularly with India emerging as the biggest destination for project contracts for Chinese companies. According to him as of March, 2013, Chinese companies had completed projects in India worth $35.1 billion .

Bilateral trade between India and China reached a record $73.9 in 2011. In 2012, the trade faced a downturn and reached only $66.5 billion and the deficit of $29 billion for India. Even though both countries have pledged to take the figure of bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2015, however, in the face of ballooning trade deficit and declining volume throws new challenging to the future leadership in India and China alike. India would reciprocate provided the balance of trade issue is addressed through a bigger market access to Indian companies in the Chinese markets. The investment in high speed railway and other infrastructural building projects could be considered as big opportunity windows to both the countries.  For India it could prove as an opportunity to learn from China experience, for it was during last 30 years of experience that China could develop its own technologies, perfect its  manufacturing facilities, bring in new managerial practices and become self reliant in many sectors, like heavy machinery and computer hardware.

Notwithstanding the fact that both India and China no not want the border to be an irritant in developing bilateral relations in other areas, especially trade and investment, culture and people to people relations, but the recent border standoff is also a pointer to the fact that India-China relations remains “fragile” and the hyper sensitive nature of the border issue remains at the core of trust deficit and mutual suspicion, if not handled properly could rekindle the animosities in no time. It almost jeopardized the visits of Indian External Affair Minister Salman Khurshid to China and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit. Therefore, it becomes pertinent for both India and China to show political will and resolve, and reach an agreeable resolution of the border as soon as possible so that a way is paved for a firmer hand shake and trust between the two. India and China should also take a cue from the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations that shows that the trade volume not necessarily mitigate the political and security deficit.

印度专家：中印关系日趋成熟 高访为两国关系发展注入新动力

My Interview with CRI published by http://world.huanqiu.com/regions/2013-05/3943472.html




　　中国和印度同为具有悠久历史的东方文明古国，同时又是世界上两个最大的发展中国家。近年来中印两国在政治、经济、军事、文化等各领域的交往取得 良好进展，在地区和多边事务中发挥积极作用。印度专家学者认为，中印关系正日趋走向成熟，新一轮的高层互访将为两国关系发展注入新动力。
　　在十多年前，中国对于许多印度人来讲或许只是一个地理名词。而如今在印度有很多人，特别是年轻一代，已经把中国作为他们关注的对象。勒妮(女) 和阿茹妮玛(女)来自印度中央邦的一所大学，谈到中国，她们说：“我看过许多中国电影，比如中国的功夫片，也读过很多关于中国的书。我们从书籍和电影中认 识中国。中国对我们来说并不陌生。”“我认为，在过去的30年里，中国是全世界发展变化最快的国家。我很想了解中国的发展经验中有哪些是值得印度借鉴 的。”
　　2003年，时任印度总理瓦杰帕伊访问中国后，中印友好关系发展迅速。在过去的十年间，中印两国在政治、经济、文化、教育等领域交往频繁，两国 人民的了解不断加深。中印在经贸合作方面的成果尤为显著。双边贸易额从2000年的不足30亿美元增长到2011年的740亿美元。

对此，尼赫鲁大学中国和东南亚研究中心教授狄伯杰表示：“中国与印度双边两国贸易额巨大，中国已成为印度第一大贸易伙伴。虽然2012年的贸易额有所下降，但我认为双方在这一领域仍有很大潜力。印度在基础设施等诸多方面都需要来自中国的投资。”

　　作为全球两大新兴经济体，中国与印度在多个国际组织如：G20(二十国集团)、金砖国家中都扮演重要角色。近年来，两国在地区和多边事 务中的合作取得了全面进展。狄伯杰教授认为良好的双边关系，能够帮助中印扩大在多边领域的协调和配合，更好地维护发展中国家权益。 “良好的中印关系不仅具有双边重要性，在全球经济体系中也有相当重要的意义。因此，两国必须在加强彼此合作的同时，巩固多边合作框架。”

　　对于两国关系未来的发展，印度专家学者认为，即将开展的新一轮的高层互访传达出"非常好的信号"，必将为中印关系发展注入新的强劲动 力。印度中国研究所研究员雅各布博士表示：“我认为，中印关系的发展潜力巨大。有中国新的领导集体的友好表态，在中国国家主席习近平提出的改善与印度关系 的五点建议的框架下，两国关系将会迎来一个新的开始。”(记者 孙洋、王超、何星宇)

Li Keqiang’s India visit will keep the momentum of bilateral relations

The peaceful resolution of the ‘tent confrontation’ points to the maturing of India China relations, and that both sides have the will and confidence to dissolve the crisis bilaterally and prevent it from acquiring dangerous proportions. It is also a pointer to the fact that India-China relations remains “fragile” and the hyper sensitive nature of the border issue remains at the core of trust deficit and mutual suspicion, if not handled properly could rekindle the animosities in no time. It almost jeopardized the visits of Indian External Affair Minister Salman Khurshid to China and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit.

It is also indicative of the fact that the existing mechanisms have been effective in maintaining the peace and tranquility along the border in the last two decades or so, however, have also demonstrated that these fall short of finding a solution to the border issue. These incidents would continue to happen until and unless the border or LAC remains undefined and undemarcated on the ground. Therefore, it becomes pertinent for both India and China to show political will and resolve, and reach an agreeable resolution of the border as soon as possible so that a way is paved for a firmer hand shake and trust between the two.

The faceoff also demonstrates that both nations does not want the border to be an irritant in developing bilateral relations in other areas, especially trade and investment, culture and people to people relations. Here again a lot has to be done by both the governments. For example China need to open its markets for Indian pharmaceutical and IT products and allay some of the Indian concerns related to trade deficit; India on the other hand needs to open its market for greater Chinese investment in infrastructure, power and telecom etc sectors. As far as people to people exchanges are concerned, both India and China need to enhance the number of scholarships substantially. Unfortunately there are only 25 exchange scholarships for 2.4 billion people presently. Furthermore, India needs to open its educational institutes for Chinese students and strengthen its Chinese learning and China studies in India. We must ask ourselves, why have thousands of Indian students found their ways to China? And after all how many Chinese students have found their ways to the Indian universities. Why it is so that only 100,000 Chinese could visit India comparing to 600, 000 Indians to China? We need to initiate a flexible visa regime and facilitate larger academic exchanges at various levels. 

In this regard, the visit of Li Keqiang is extremely important. It is important as the Chinese leadership has chosen India to be the first country of his visit after resuming office, and that also prior to the return visit of Indian prime minister that is due since Wn Jiabao’s 2010 India visit. India has reciprocated to these positive signals emanating from Beijing positively. The fact that Indian Foreign Minister, Salman Khurshid putting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s India visit above the border standoff, and also that India dispatched a defense delegation to China to work out the details of forthcoming hand-in-hand military exercises, shows that India is serious in maintaining good neighborly relations with China. In order to build the real strategic partnership, both the countries need to keep the momentum of the visits at highest level, diversify their relations in other fields substantially, and try to find a reasonable solution to the border issue that is acceptable to both the countries at the earliest. 

Salman Khurshid, Li Keqiang and DOB Faceoff

As far as the face-off in the DOB sector is concerned, Chinese media has been tight lipped, barring a few expert comments. It exercised restrain and caution and selectively reported the squabble through what was already being reported in the Indian print and electronic media. The three week long standoff that started on April 15^th was resolved peacefully on May 5^th after several rounds of talks at different levels, thus paving way for Salman Khursid’s recent China visit and also that of the visit of Chinese premier Li Keqiang.  

Even though the Chinese media has downplayed the incident, but starting from May 1, some articles by academics started to surface in the Chinese print media and hint to the Chinese apprehensions about ‘aggressive’ patrolling in the region as well as the upgradation of border infrastructure by India. An Article by Hu Zhiyong, a professor in the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences while calling for a better management of the border issue, also maintains that presently India has deployed 45 battalions of police force along the border areas, besides 4 battalions are in the midst of organization. India plans to add 9 more battalions by 2015.  Hu says that both sides must put efforts to manage and handle the border and Tibet issue appropriately and strive for a just and reasonable solution so that these issues do not become a hindrance in the development of India-China relations.

On the same day Zhang Xiaodong, a professor with the same Academy wrote an article entitled “dragon and Elephant games: China should be confident while dealing with the border dispute” in the official web site of  Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) in Chinese.  The tone was rather hawkish and matches the cacophony of some of the voices in Indian media. Prof. Zhang made four assumptions. One, he said China must appropriately ‘hammer’ /admonish (qiaoda) India, for it has been supporting the Tibetan independence for long, have been cooperating with Vietnam in petroleum development, and would like to enter South China Sea to contain China; also it has been making great fuss about the ‘string of Pearls’ strategy of China in the Indian Ocean. This has harmed the Chinese interests, therefore, China need to teach India lessons by creating tensions on the land, and if we move a step forward, we can force India’s retreat to inner line of defense strategically; preventive and possible containment of India would be advantageous to China’s diplomacy. Secondly he said, in all probability, India would eat a humble pie (chibie), for China has been in dominating position. India has already said that the issue will not impact on the overall development of the India-China relation. Thirdly, China should exhibit confidence in dealing with the dispute. Finally, in the long run, the geopolitical game between India and China would continue, and China has many cards up in its sleeve as far as the dispute in southern Tibet (read Arunachal) and competition in Indian Ocean is concerned, for example controlling the water resources of South Asia, strengthening China’s strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, and strengthening China’s relations with the South Asian countries, and contain India both on the land and sea. Prof. Zhang also says that the comprehensive national strength and a strong military are the ultimate amours and chips of the foreign policy.

According to a recent report in Cankao Xiaoxi (reference news) which initially used to be for internal circulation only, India in April this year erected seven bunkers in the Chumar sector, of these one makeshift post overlooking Karakorum highway erected on April 21^st was thought to be extremely objectionable. The removal of this according to China resolved the crisis.  China had expressed opposition to these posts and bunkers for it alleged that India violated the 2005 agreement that did not allow any party to the construction of these strongholds.

Another article that has appeared on May 10, 2013 in Huanqiu’s official website is by Hao Ding from the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences.  Hao talks about imperial China’s expansion during Yuan and claims Ladakh as part of Tibet right up to the 1830s when he says it was under the Manchus. He says that since 1843 it has been a part of Kashmir, and with the annexation of Kashmir by the British in 1848, Ladakh also was occupied. Hao also points to Chinese concerns about increased Indian infrastructure building in the region.  According to him India only restored seasonal patrolling of the DBO in the 1980s but since 2008 the region witnessed substantial increase in the deployment of troops, a comprehensive upgradation of the combat facilities and infrastructure, reactivation of large numbers of advanced landing airfields. At the same time India has also taken to a more aggressive border policy, by way of constructing border roads, deploying helicopters, radars and unmanned aerial vehicles, and has been “frequently nibbling Chinese territory including the Aksai Chin.”

According to Hao, India's military buildup, not only have undermined the agreements reached between the two countries pertaining to maintaining peace and tranquility in the border regions, but also has posed a substantial challenge to China's territorial sovereignty. Also, he says has increased the probability of both conflict and skirmishes on the border.  Therefore, the recent face off is the outcome of such a friction or rather the “the inevitable result of India initiating a new ‘forward policy’.” He admits that the faceoff was provoked by China and could be considered ‘Chinese Counterattack’ to Indian policies and a ‘microcosm’ of the series of frictions between India and China in these areas.  Only thing that has been different is that all previous skirmishes were provoked by India on the Chinese side, on this occasion it could be said as China’s counterattack.

Hao posits that the recent border faceoff is the creation of India’s right wing forces in tandem with military. It is obvious that the military has provided media the images and data captured by the UAV. According to Hao, even though the faceoff was settles peacefully by both the sides but the negative impact of such incidents cannot be underestimated. First, it has seriously undermined the basis of mutual trust between the two countries. It has greatly damaged the image of China in the eyes of Indian people, and has vitiated the atmosphere for developing good relations. Second, it has increased the risk of border conflict between the two countries. For example, if the counter measures such as deployment of additional special operation forces, cutting off the supply lines of the Chinese camp, are implemented, it would further escalate the confrontation.  Finally, Hao maintains that since there are stark differences between India and China on border, therefore, to resolve it peacefully in the short term is highly unlikely, therefore, the priority should be accorded to maintain the stability in the border areas.

The Chinese perceptions apart, the peaceful resolution of the so called ‘tent confrontation’ points to the maturing India China relations, and that both sides have will and confidence to dissolve the crisis bilaterally and prevent the crisis from acquiring dangerous proportions. It is also a pointer to the fact that India-China relations remains “fragile” and the border issue is the root of most of the trust deficit and mutual suspicion, if not handled properly could rekindle the animosities in no time. It is also indicative of the fact that the existing mechanisms have been effective in maintaining the peace and tranquility along the border, however, have also demonstrated that these fall short of finding a solution to the border issue. Therefore, it becomes imperative for both India and China to show political will and resolve, and reach an agreeable resolution of the border as soon as possible so that a way is paved for a firmer hand shake and trust.

The faceoff also demonstrates that both nations does not want the border to be an irritant in developing bilateral relations in other areas, especially trade and investment, culture and people to people relations. Here again a lot has to be done by both the governments. For example China need to open its markets for Indian pharmaceutical and IT products; and India its market to greater Chinese investment in infrastructure sector, power and telecom. As far as people to people exchanges are concerned, India needs to open its educational institutes to the Chinese students and strengthen its Chinese learning and China studies in India. We must ask ourselves, why have thousands of Indian students found their way to China? And after all how many Chinese students have found their ways to Indian universities. Why it is so that only 100,000 Chinese could visit India comparing to 600, 000 Indians to China? We need to initiate a flexible visa regime and facilitate larger academic exchanges at various levels.  

DOB Sector Stalemate and Sino-Indian border in the Western Sector

Excerpts from my book India and China 1904-2004: A Century of Peace and Conflict (Manak 2005, Delhi)

   

     The Western Sector forms the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir State of India and Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions of China. The entire boundary in Western Sector according to India stretches over 1,770 kilometres. It starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan and runs eastward through the Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchnai Pass, Parpik Pass and the Khunjerab Pass. From Khunjerab Pass the boundary lies along a spur down to the north-western bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river, which it crosses at that point and ascends the crest line of the Aghil mountains. It then runs along the crest of the Aghil watershed through the Aghil Pass, the Marpo Pass and then to the Karakoram Pass. 

     From the Karakoram Pass, the boundary lies along the watershed between the Shyok and the Yarkand, and runs through the Qara Tagh Pass to cross the eastern bend of the Qara Qash river and to ascend the main Kun Lun mountains. Thereafter the boundary runs along the main crest of the Kun Lun Mountains and then descends in a southwesterly direction down to Lanak Pass. South of the Lanak Pass, the boundary passes through the Kone Pass and Kepsang Pass, which lie along the watershed between the Chang Chenmo and Chumesang in India and the streams flowing into the Dyap Tso in Tibet. Thereafter, the boundary runs along the southern bank of the Chumesang and the eastern bank of the Chang-lung Lungpa, skirts the western extremity of the eastern half of the Pangong Lake and follows the northern and eastern watershed of the Indus River through Chang Pass upto the Jara Pass.  A little south of Jara Pass it turns south-westward, crosses the Indus about five miles southeast of Demchok, and following the watershed between the Hanle river and the tributaries of the Sutlej river, it passes through the Charding Pass, the Imis Pass and the Kyungzing Pass. Thereafter it turns westward and crosses the Pare river about five miles south of Chumar to reach Gya Peak (Officials Report 1961: 1-2). 

     According to the Chinese, the Western Sector is divided into two portions, with Kongka Pass as the dividing point. The portion north of Kongka Pass is the boundary between Xinjiang and Ladakh, and the portion south of it is that between Tibet and Ladakh. The portion between Xinjiang and Ladakh runs along the Karakoram Mountain Range, following broadly the watershed between Tarim and Indus river systems. From Karakoram Pass the boundary runs eastward along the mountain ridge to a point east of 78 degrees East Longitude, turns south-eastward along the high ridge of the Karakoram Mountains on the east bank of the Shyok river and northern bank of the Kugrang Tsangpo river down to Kongka Pass. The portion between Tibet and Ladakh runs along the ridge, passing through the Ane Pass, cuts across the western half of Pangong Tso, skirts the western side of the Spanggur Tso upto Mount Sajum, crosses the Shangatsangpu (Indus) river at 33 degree North Latitude, runs along the watershed east of the Keyul Lungpa river and south of the Hanle river upto Mount Shinowu and then runs westward to reach the tri-junction of China’s Ari District [in Tibet] and India’s Punjab [Himachal] and Ladakh.

 

     Due to diverging approaches to boundary in this sector, somewhat 24,000 square kilometres of territory is claimed by both India and China (Lamb 1964: 7). According to Lamb it is hard to give precise figures for the area because the extent of Chinese claims seems to increase slightly from time to time. The Chinese (Zhao 2000: 141) however points to 33,500 square kilometres as disputed territory.  The first issue of discord is the Aksai Chin, situated in northwest of Kashmir, and the second being the Ladakh-Tibet boundary from Chang Chenmo valley to the region of Spiti where Himachal Pradesh has a common border with Tibet. According to Zhao (2000: 141), Aksai Chin has a total area of 27,200 square Kilometres and has historically been under the jurisdiction of Khotan region of Xinjiang. According to her, Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Beijing proposed border negotiations with the Chinese government. The British proposal included the entire Aksai Chin in British India; the Chinese government however ignored the British proposal. Following this the British marked this proposed line as “not defined” on their maps, as a result some 33,300 square kilometres of Chinese territory was shown in the Indian maps.[1] Wang (1998: 158) on the other hand asserts that in “recent hundred or two hundred years the Chinese maps are consistent as regards the boundary alignment in this sector,” and has “all along exercised jurisdiction” in accordance with the boundary marked on the Chinese maps, which according to him runs through Karakoram Mountain Pass and enter south along the Karakoram watershed upto Kongka Pass, from Kongka Pass it runs southward and reaches near Pare river. On the contrary, the maps published by Britain and India in recent one hundred year are “full of confusion and contradiction” in Wang’s view. Wang may be right when he argues that the Chinese maps were consistent, however, to assert that the Chinese maps showed the right alignment of western sector is misleading, for Chinese maps made it clear that Xinjiang was never conceived as extending south of the Kun Lun range and that Ladakh never was a part of China (Eekelen 1964: 150). Citing Chinese maps Rao (1968: 32-33) argues that works like Xiyu Tuzhi (Geographical works of Western Region [Xinjiang]) of 1762 and Xinjiang Zhilue (Xinjiang Annals) of 1821 compiled during the reign of Qianlong and Daoguang shows specifically that Nanshan [southern mountains] or Kunlun Mountains formed the southern boundary of Xinjiang all along the Chinese history. Had it been the case as argued by Wang, why did not China produced a single “consistent map” during the meetings of the Chinese and Indian officials in 1960 in support of their alignment? Moreover, the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question published by the Foreign Language Press also does not produce a single Chinese map in the support of their case; on the contrary the Chinese have heavily relied on the maps published by the British India and the government of India for their territorial claims. Not only this, even the official Chinese maps of 1893, 1917 and 1919 showed the boundary exactly as depicted in official Indian maps of today (Prasad 1992: 2). Like the Chinese Neville Maxwell has all along formed his argument on the British and Indian maps while turning a blind eye to the Chinese map alignments in his account of the 1962 war.

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[1] Zhao’s has wrongly interpreted MacDonald’s proposals to the Chinese government; in fact the proposals would have divided Aksai Chin between India and China. For various boundary alignments during British India in western sector, see section 2.2 of Chapter I.